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IN THE UTAH UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
BRIAN K. MILLER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060646-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals a $ 10,000 restitution award imposed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
77-38a-302 (West 2004), as part of a sentence for automobile homicide, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(a)) (West 2004), and attempted 
possession of a controlled substance (Oxycontin), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Gary D. Stott presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to consider 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court properly order defendant to pay $10,000 in restitution as 
part of the criminal sentence imposed following defendant's conviction for automobile 
homicide in the death of a 7-year-old girl? 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err in not determining that the driver of the other car was 
contributorily negligent where there was no credible evidence that anyone but defendant was 
at fault for the accident? 
Issue 3: Did the trial court properly consider the statutory factors in ordering 
restitution? 
Standard of Review for Each Issue: "'We will not vacate an order of restitution 
unless the trial court abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.'" State v. Dominguez, 
1999 UT App 343, If 6, 992 P.2d 995 (quoting State v. Westerman, 9AS P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 
App.1997)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and attached as Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann § 77-38a-102 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann § 77-38a-202 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information filed on March 4, 2004, with automobile 
homicide, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2) (West 
2004); possession or use of Oxycontin, a controlled substance, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); and driving under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 
2 
2004). R. 2. Defendant was bound over for trial on all three counts following a preliminary 
hearing held on July 28? 2004. R. 22. 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover on the DUI charge. R. 24. Defendant 
claimed that he could not be charged with both automobile homicide and drunk driving 
because the conduct underlying those charges was "one continuous act." R. 26. On the 
State's motion, the trial court dismissed the DUI count. R. 35. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the toxicology evidence obtained from him 
following the accident. R. 117-51. The trial court denied the motion. R. 230. 
On October 20, 2005, defendant pleaded guilty to reduced charges of automobile 
homicide, a third degree felony, and attempted illegal possession/use of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor. R. 313. 
Defendant was sentenced to one year in jail. R. 329-30. He was also ordered to pay a 
find of $975. Id. He was later ordered to pay restitution of $10,000. R. 499-501 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant runs a red light; a 7-year-old girl dies. 
In the immediate aftermath of the two-car collision that took the life of seven-year-old 
Karlee Haymond and seriously injured her mother, Sharane, there was little doubt about who 
was to blame. Witnesses all agreed that the light was red when defendant's southbound truck 
entered the intersection and struck Sharane's van, which was making a left turn. R. 415, 
416,418. 
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"While turning at Main St. [and] 1400 North at Springville[,] a white van entered the 
intersection at the green light," reported witness Penny Wheeler in a signed statement to 
Springville Police. "A white truck going north ran the red light hitting the van broadside." 
R. 416 (Addendum B). 
Charles Gilchrist, another witness, concurred: "The white truck was headed NB on 
Main. Ran Red light & hit the van (white) that was headed eastbound." R. 415 (Addendum 
B). 
Roy H. Scott also reported that defendant's truck entered the intersection as the light 
turned red. R. 279. 
Defendant's "obvious" impairment 
Nor was there any doubt that defendant was impaired. Scott, a retired highway patrol 
trooper from Ohio, told Springville officers that he had had been following defendant 
immediately before the accident because he was concerned that defendant was impaired. R. 
418; 512:11 (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, dated July 28, 2004, Addendum C). 
Springville police would later verify Scott's suspicion. "I wasn't sure if [defendant] 
was mentally challenged or if he was impaired by a substance or something else, but it was 
obvious there was a problem," Springville Police Lt. Dell Gordon recalled. R. 512:15. "I 
just noticed his pupils appeared smaller than normal given the light conditions. Again, just 
his slow speech. Pie just seemed very slow." R. 512:12. 
Officer Josh Chappell, a drug recognition expert, noted the same symptoms when he 
evaluated defendant at the police station. "His eyelids were droopy. As I spoke with him, I 
observed that his speech was slow and slurred." R. 512:29. 
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Defendant flunked all portions ChappelPs field sobriety test. During the walk-and-
turn test, defendant stepped from the line multiple times and had to raise his arms to maintain 
his balance. R. 512:31-32. Defendant also used his arms to maintain balance while standing 
on one leg. R. 512:32. He was also unable to touch his finger to his nose in six attempts. R. 
512:33-34. 
Officer Chappell concluded that, based on the field test results, defendant "was under 
the influence of a narcotic analgesic and a central nervous system depressant, and he was 
incapable of operating a motor vehicle safely." R. 512:41. 
Defendant was forthcoming about his drug abuse. He admitted to taking five 7.5-
milligram tablets of Lortab the previous evening. R. 512:38-39. He also stated that he had 
taken two 10-milligram doses of Valium and a 20-milligram dose of Oxycontin, the latter of 
which he admitted "snorting" a couple hours before the accident. R. 512:39, 40. He 
acknowledged he had no prescription for any of the drugs and that he had gotten them from 
friends. R. 512:40.* 
Guilty plea and sentence 
In pleading guilty to automobile homicide, defendant acknowledged causing the death 
of Karlee and seriously injuring her mother. See Plea Statement, Addendum D, R. 314-21. 
In his Plea Statement, defendant admitted that he "operate[d] a vehicle in a negligent 
manner," "caus[ed] the death of another," and that he was under the influence of alcohol, 
1
 The lab analysis of defendant's blood sample essentially confirmed his admissions 
by indicating the presence of Meprobamate, Diazepam, Nordiazepam and Oxycodone. R. 
512:42. 
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drugs or a combination of both that rendered him "incapable of safely operating a vehicle." 
R. 320. He also pleaded guilty to attempted possession of Oxycontin. Id. 
Defendant was sentenced to zero-to-five years in prison and ordered to pay a $975 
fine for automobile homicide, but the prison term was suspended in lieu of 36 months 
probation, conditioned in part on defendant serving 365 days in jail. R. 328-30. He was also 
sentenced to 365 days in jail and fined $925 for attempted possession/use of a controlled 
substance, but the jail term was suspended. 
Restitution 
Although pecuniary damage claims flowing from defendant's criminal conduct totaled 
nearly $200,000, virtually the entire amount was paid by defendant's insurer, Unigard, and 
SharaneHaymond's insurer, Safeco. See, e.g., R. 361,426. For the wrongful death of Karlee 
Haymond, Unigard paid $50,000 and Safeco another $50,000 to her parents, David and 
Sharane Haymond. Id. Sharane received an additional $45,000 from Unigard and $25,000 
from Safeco to cover physical and emotional injuries. Id. Safeco paid $ 10,000 to Sharane to 
cover medical and funeral expenses for herself and Karlee. R. 376, 426. Finally, Unigard 
reimbursed Safeco $9,250 for its coverage of damage to Sharane's vehicle. R. 361. 
As required by law, the prosecutor compiled information from all "victims" of 
defendant's criminal activities for submission to the court for restitution. Sharane initially 
requested restitution of $2,686.15 for funeral expenses, medical bills and grief counseling, 
Jacqueline Johnson, a friend of Karlee's was also a passenger in Sharane's vehicle, 
but suffered no serious injuries and her parents accepted $5,000 from Unigard to settle all 
claims. R. 474, 455-56. Her parents did not submit a restitution claim. 
6 
but later withdrew that request when she learned that the Office of Crime Victim reparations 
had agreed to reimburse her for those expenditures. R. 484,493. David Haymond, Karlee's 
father, requested $ 1,841.50 in restitution for airfare, a rental car, burial and grief counseling, 
but also withdrew his request. R. 484, 490. 
Ultimately, the only request for restitution was from Safeco. The insurer requested 
$10,000 as reimbursement of funds paid to cover medical and funeral expenses of Sharane 
andKarlee. R. 376,484-85. Defendant challenged Safeco'srestitutionrequest, arguing that 
such an award would be inconsistent with the terms of settlement agreements and with 
provisions of Utah law concerning insurance and comparative negligence. R. 460-62. 
Defendant also asserted that Sharane's failure to yield to his vehicle constituted negligence 
and "proximately caused the accident." R. 466-67. 
The trial court held a hearing to consider those claims. R. 513. The court ordered 
defendant to pay $ 10,000 in restitution to Safeco. R. 500. In doing so, the court found that 
"[t]he $10,000 insurance payment was reasonable and proper, having paid for pecuniary 
damages resulting from Defendant's criminal activity in this Case, to include medical 
expenses incurred by Sharane Haymond and the Deceased victim, Karlee Haymond." Id. 
The court also rejected defendant's claim that the award would contravene the "binding 
arbitration language" of Utah's insurance code, which "does not bar Safeco Insurance from 
making a claim for restitution in this matter, a criminal proceedings, nor does it prohibit this 
court from ordering appropriate restitution." Id. 
1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Safeco was properly awarded restitution. Because restitution serves the dual 
purpose of compensating victims and rehabilitating a defendant by forcing him or her to 
make reparations for pecuniary losses attributable to criminal conduct, the trial court 
properly awarded $ 10,000 in restitution to Safeco as reimbursement for insurance payments 
to defendant's victim, Sharane Haymond. Such an award was proper as restitution, even if 
Safeco may not have been able to recover those payments through arbitration or other civil 
proceedings. 
Point II: Defendant incorrectly claims that the trial court improperly awarded 
restitution to Safeco without comparing the alleged negligence of Sharane Haymond with 
that of defendant. This argument must be rejected because there is nothing in the law or in 
the record to suggest that anyone but defendant is to blame for the accident. 
Point III: The trial court's restitution order accorded with the statutory requirements. 
Contrary to defendant's contention, the court was only required to consider the statutory 
factors in making determinations concerning proper restitution and need not explicitly 
discuss or make findings on the record concerning each factor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED DEFENDANT TO 
PAY $10,000 TO SAFECO BECAUSE THE AWARD 
FURTHERED THE REHABILITATIVE GOALS OF 
RESTITUTON. 
Defendant claims that the trial court's $ 10,000 restitution award to Safeco Insurance 
is prohibited by Utah's "no fault" insurance system, which bars an insurance company from 
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recovering payments made to the victim of a tortfeasor. Aplt. Br. at 19-24. "If either the 
victim or the paying insurance company could turn around and sue the tortfeasor for the PIP 
[Personal Injury Protection] payments, the system would not be a no-fault system—but 
rather a mirror of the fault-based system that preceded no-fault." Id. at 20. 
This argument fails because, as demonstrated below, it fails to recognize that the 
purpose of restitution is not simply to compensate victims of criminal conduct. Rather, 
restitution also serves a rehabilitative function that requires a defendant to play a direct role 
in making his victims whole. 
A. Utah's No-Fault Insurance System Does Not Bar Restitution of 
Safeco's Insurance Payments to Sharane Haymond. 
As a victim of defendant's criminal activities, Safeco is entitled to restitution of 
pecuniary damages resulting from those activities. "When a defendant is convicted of 
criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as 
provided in this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (West 2004); see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (West 2004). A "victim" is any person or entity, 
including an insurer, who suffers pecuniary damages as a result of defendant's criminal 
activities. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(14)(a); see also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 
923 & n.4 (Utah 1998) (insurance company may be a victim under restitution statute), 
rev'd on other grounds State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 127 P.3d 682; State v. Dominguez, 
1999 UTApp 343,^8, 992P.2d995 (1998 amendment broadened definition of "victim" to 
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include insurers). "Pecuniary damages" are "all demonstrable economic injury, whether or 
not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
102(6). "Criminal activity" means "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-102(2). A "conviction" includes a guilty plea. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-102(1). 
Here, it is beyond serious dispute that defendant was convicted of criminal activity 
that caused pecuniary damages. He entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea in which 
he admitted to the criminal activity that caused Karlee's death and seriously injured her 
mother, Sharane. See Plea Statement, R. 314-21. In pleading guilty to automobile 
homicide, defendant admitted that he "operatefd] a vehicle in a negligent manner," 
"caus[ed] the death of another," and that he was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or a 
combination of both that rendered him "incapable of safely operating a vehicle." R. 320. 
For restitution purposes, defendant's most obvious victims were Karlee, Sharane and 
Karlee's father, David Haymond. The insurance companies—Unigard for defendant and 
Safeco for Sharane—were also victims under the restitution statute because they, too, 
3
 Defendant acknowledges in his brief that "by admitting his guilt, he has established 
his potential responsibility for the pecuniary damages resulting from his criminal conduct." 
Aplt. Br. at 27 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, he immediately goes on to argue that if the 
trial court had properly considered comparative negligence principles in awarding restitution, 
it would have determined that "the injuries and death were only partially, if at all related to 
the criminal conduct of the Defendant. . ." Aplt. Br. at 34 (emphasis added). The State 
debunks this claim in section II, below. 
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suffered pecuniary damages in the form of medical and wrongful death benefits paid to 
Sharane and David as a result of defendant's criminal activity. Those payments ultimately 
totaled nearly $200,000. See, e.g., R. 361, 426. However, the bulk of those pecuniary 
damages were not part of the restitution defendant was ordered to pay. Of $200,000, 
defendant was ordered to pay only $ 10,000 in restitution to reimburse Safeco for payments 
made to Sharane for medical and funeral expenses. Thus, the out-of-pocket cost to 
defendant for restitution of the damages caused by his criminal conduct amounts to 5 
percent of the total. 
Nonetheless, defendant is adamant in his rejection of the trial court's restitution order. 
"It is submitted that the No Fault statute is clear and the language of the Utah Appellate 
Courts is likewise clear. A paying PIP provider may not recoup the PIP payments from a 
tortfeasor who is insured. The restitution statute... only allows the recovery of pecuniary 
damages that could be recovered in a civil action." Aplt. Br. at 24. 
On the contrary, the no-fault provisions of the Utah's insurance code do not bar the 
$ 10,000 restitution award to Safeco. The Utah no-fault system "is a type of compensation 
system, which couples the payment of benefits on a no-fault basis with the partial 
elimination of fault-based tort actions for both economic losses and pain and suffering." 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. hie, 606 P.2d 1197,1199 (Utah 1980). Thus, the no-fault provisions of 
the insurance code concern civil actions in tort, while the restitution statute gives a trial 
judge in criminal cases authority to order a defendant to compensate victims of criminal 
conduct. Although these two statutes are interrelated, at least to the extent that the measure 
of restitution is partly based on pecuniary damages potentially recoverable through civil 
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litigation, Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-102(6), the policies promoted by the two provisions 
are distinct. 
The precise interrelationship between tort damages and restitution is not entirely clear 
in the law. Although the amount a victim could recover in tort is clearly a yardstick for use 
in determining restitution, Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-102(6), a civil judgment based on tort 
considerations should not rigidly limit the flexibility trial courts need to impose proper 
penalties and order restitution. See generally State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, Tffi 17-18, 61 
P.3d 1000 (discussing importance of trial court flexibility in fashioning sentence, including 
restitution). In State v. Gibson, for example, the defendant challenged a restitution order of 
$144,702.45 because it was more than double the $59,880.29 recovered by the victim in a 
previous civil action. 2006 UT App 490, ^ ff 5-7, — P.3d —. This Court rejected Gibson's 
argument. "Because the civil judgment covered a smaller time period than the restitution 
award, it did not address the same 'facts or events constituting [Gibson's] criminal 
activities.'" Id. (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-102(6)). Thus, civil damage awards in a 
given case do not create rigid guidelines that courts must follow in awarding restitution. 
More importantly, for present purposes, restitution is not simply a mechanism for 
compensating victims. Rather, restitution is also intended to assist in the defendant's 
rehabilitation. See State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1209 (Utah App. 1992) ("While 
historically restitution has been intended to repay victims for the damages resulting from the 
defendant's criminal activity, its purpose is also tied to punishment, deterrence and the 
court's estimation of the defendant's damage to the community"). Indeed, Utah law requires 
that in determining court-ordered restitution, the trial judge must consider "the rehabilitative 
12 
effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment;.. ." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(iii); see also State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 
1992) ("[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering rehabilitative and 
deterrent purposes and ordering restitution . . . " ) . 
Moreover, rehabilitative restitution need not be equal to the actual loss suffered by the 
victim. For example, in Twitchell, this Court upheld court-ordered restitution, even though 
the victims suffered no out-of-pocket losses. There, defendant was an insurance broker who 
told policyholders that their premium payments were being used to purchase insurance 
coverage from legitimate, licensed insurance companies. Id. at 867. However, defendant 
actually kept most of the premiums and processed damage claims himself. Id. Fortunately, 
defendant was caught before any policyholders suffered losses. Id. Nonetheless, the trial 
court ordered defendant to pay $447,762.34 in restitution—an amount equal to the total 
premiums paid to the defendant, minus the amounts he either forwarded to legitimate 
insurance companies or that he used to pay claims. Id. at 868. On appeal, the defendant 
protested that restitution was improper where there were no losses. This Court disagreed, 
noting: 
"Restitution, in theory, may help rehabilitate the offender; there is a strong 
feeling that if the offender is made to suffer a loss and pay for the 
responsibility of the loss he caused, there is a greater likelihood he'll not do it 
again." 
Id. (quoting State v. Dillon, 637 P.2d 602,606-07 n. 6 (Or. 1981)); see also People v. Milne, 
690 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1984) (restitution as condition of probation is part of criminal sentence 
akin to fine or other penalty). 
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Here, the rehabilitative rationale for the trial court's award of $ 10,000 to Safeco is of 
particular importance given that this amount is apparently the only out-of-pocket costs 
defendant will be required to pay toward restitution. Although the pecuniary damages 
resulting from defendant's criminal conduct amounted to nearly $200,000, defendant has 
only been required to pay $10,000, the amount of the medical and funeral benefits Safeco 
paid to Sharane Haymond. This Court should not allow defendant escape from the benefit he 
may realize from the rehabilitative and deterrent effects of being "'made to suffer a loss and 
pay for the responsibility of the loss he caused . . .'" Twitchell, 832 P.2d at 868 (citation 
omitted). 
Defendant also claims the $10,000 restitution is beyond his resources. In support, 
defendant points out that he "has a 12th grade education," "was engaged in manual labor 
before the accident," and "has no assets." Aplt. Br. at 36, R. 408-09.4 But shouldering a 
hardship is part of rehabilitation. As one court noted: 
In many instances... it will be necessary for a defendant to make substantial 
sacrifices in order to make restitution to the victims of his crimes. This is not 
an obstacle to an order requiring such restitution. Rather, where sacrifice is 
necessary, the probationer or parolee may learn to consider more carefully the 
consequences of his or her acts and thereby strengthen the offender's sense of 
responsibility. Thus, an order of restitution may properly require additional 
or alternative employment, a reduction of expenses, and even a temporary 
change in lifestyle in order to achieve that sense of responsibility which 
signals effective rehabilitation. 
Commonwealth v. Wood, 446 A.2d 948,950 (Pa. Super. 1982). Clearly, imposing a $10,000 
4
 Despite these apparent limitations, the Presentence/Postsentence Report lists as a 
mitigating circumstance defendant's "exceptionally good employment and/or family 
relationships." R. 511. 
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obligation is eminently reasonable, especially given that the statute explicitly allows payment 
in installments. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c)(ii). 
B. Safeeo's "Waiver" of Subrogation Rights Does Not Preclude the 
Award of Restitution. 
Defendant next claims that Safeco cannot seek restitution of the $105000 paid to 
Sharane because it agreed to waive its right to seek civil reimbursement of those payments. 
"Based upon that waiver, Safeco does not have a claim for subrogation it can pursue in these 
proceedings because the same was bargained for and sold by Safeco to facilitate the 
settlement of the claims in this matter." Aplt. Br. at 27. These claims fail because, once 
again, defendant misapprehends the crucial differences between tort recovery and criminal 
restitution. 
Defendant's claim that Safeco waived its right to seek restitution is premised on a 
cryptic e-mail, in which a Safeco representative states: 
As we discussed, we have given our insured's attorney, Kevin Sheff, 
permission to settle with you for your insured's policy limits. We are not 
interested in buying out the underlying claim and have agreed to waive our 
PIP subrogation. The only payments we have made under PIP were for 
Karlee and Sharane Haymond. 
R. 422. According to defendant, this e-mail refers to the same $10,000 Safeco subsequently 
requested as restitution "for damages" in the criminal case. R. 421. This is not explicitly 
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stated in the e-mail.5 But even assuming arguendo that Safeco intended the e-mail as a 
waiver of its right to recover $10,000 civilly, that would not preclude a criminal restitution 
award. See People v. Phillips, 732 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Colo. 1986) (insurer's contractual 
waiver of right to recover pursuant to insurance policy does affect the restitution decision). 
As noted above, the purpose of restitution is not entirely compensatory and the rehabilitative 
purpose of restitution justifies the $10,000 award even if Safeco could not have recovered 
that amount civilly or through arbitration. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ordered 
defendant to pay restitution. 
IL DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
IMPROPERLY AWARDED RESTITUTION TO SAFECO 
WITHOUT COMPARING THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF 
OTHER VICTIMS WITH THAT OF DEFENDANT MUST BE 
REJECTED BECAUSE THERE IS NO BASIS IN LAW OR IN 
THE RECORD TO SUGGEST THAT ANYONE BUT 
DEFENDANT IS TO BLAME FOR THE ACCIDENT. 
Defendant claims that the trial court, in imposing restitution, should have applied 
comparative negligence principles to allocate some or perhaps the entire fault to the victim 
of his admitted criminal conduct. Aplt. Br. at 34. "Here the injuries and death were only 
partially, if at all, related to the criminal conduct of the Defendant and the restitution order 
5If this e-mail was intended to spell out the rights and obligations of parties 
involved—Safeco, Unigard and the defendant—it does so in a manner inconsistent with the 
much more formal waivers executed by other parties involved in the negotiations. Compare, 
for example, the alleged e-mail "waiver" by Safeco with the formal waivers executed by 
other parties to the negotiations, which are memorialized in formal documents that spell out 
in painstaking detail the rights and duties of the parties before concluding with notarized 
signatures. See, e.g., R. 428-30 ("Release of Non-Heir Claims,5' signed by Sharane 
Haymond releasing certain claims against defendant and Unigard). 
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should so reflect that fact." Id. (emphasis added). According to defendant, because Sharane 
was allegedly at fault, Safeco would have no basis in civil proceedings to recover $10,000 
from defendant. Aplt. Br. at 28. It is therefore inappropriate, defendant concludes, for the 
trial court to award restitution of $10,000 to Safeco. Aplt. Br. at 34. 
These claims are specious. Defendant's suggestion that he may have no responsibility 
for the death, injuries and pecuniary damages precipitated by his criminal conduct is clearly 
contradicts his guilty plea and his admission that he negligently drove his vehicle while 
impaired and c<ms*e<iKarlee's death. R. 320. 
As discussed above, "pecuniary damages" are "all demonstrable economic injury, 
whether or not yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
102(6). The damages a party may recover in a civil suit for negligence are determined by 
Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-28 (West 2005 Supp.). 
Under the statute, "[t]he fault of a person seeking recovery may not alone bar recovery by 
that person." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-28(1). The statute further states: "The fact finder 
may, and when requested by a party shall, allocate the percentage or proportion of fault 
attributable to each person seeking recovery, to each defendant, . . . for whom there is a 
factual and legal basis to allocate fault." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-28(1). 
In suggesting that the trial court erred in not applying comparative fault principles, 
defendant relies on State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah App. 1993), a case in which 
this Court voided a restitution award because the trial court did not account for the 
negligence of all parties in a traffic accident. Robinson pleaded guilty to charges that he 
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made an improper lane change and struck a motorcycle, injuring the two riders. Id. The 
court imposed $13,567.80 in restitution, representing the cost of the medical bills of both 
motorcyclists. Id. This Court held that the restitution award violated Robinson's due 
process rights because he had never been given an opportunity to contest the award and the 
trial court had failed to consider whether the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of 
the victims' injuries. Id. at 893. 
Defendant claims that his victim, like Robinson's, was responsible for the accident 
because, under Utah law, "'the operator of a vehicle . . . intending to turn to the left shall 
yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction...'" Aplt. Br. 
at 29 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-903 (West 2003)). "Given the absence of any 
excessive speed on the part of the Defendant, his vehicle was there to be seen by Mrs. 
Haymond and had the right of way over her vehicle." Id. at 30. Thus, defendant claims he, 
like Robinson, should not be responsible for all or perhaps any of his victim's injuries 
because Sharane "violated a strict legal duty" in failing to yield. Aplt. Br. at 29. 
This argument fails, first of all, because it is based on a very selective reading of the 
Utah Traffic Rules and Regulations, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-1 -189 (West 2004 and 2005 
Supp.). In fact, which driver has a "strict legal duty" to yield depends on which provisions 
of the traffic code are deemed controlling in any given situation. Once defendant's 
tendentious version of the traffic accident is rejected in favor of the version overwhelming 
supported by the evidence in the record, see discussion below, it becomes clear that 
defendant had the strict duty to yield because he entered the intersection against a red light. 
Utah law requires that an "operator of a vehicle facing a steady circular red or red arrow 
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signal.. .may not to enter the intersection" and "shall stop at a clearly marked stop line..." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-305(4)(a)(ii) & (ii) (emphasis added). Moreover, in making a left 
turn, Sharane was entitled to assume other drivers would conform to the law by maintaining 
a proper speed and lookout and by exercising reasonable care for their safety and that of 
others. Smith v. Gallegos, 400 P.2d 570 (Utah 1965). Thus, in this case, it was reasonable 
for Sharane to assume defendant would exercise reasonable care by not driving while under 
the influence of prescription drugs and that he would obey traffic signals by stopping at red 
lights. That such an assumption may have had disastrous consequences for Sharane and 
Karlee does not negate its reasonableness. 
Second, any attempt to claim that Sharane is somehow responsible for the accident is 
without competent evidentiary foundation. Defendant's claims that he was traveling at a 
"reasonable speed" and that he "responded within normal limits" when Sharane "turn[ed] in 
front of him" are apparently based on a report prepared by defense "expert" Greg DuVal, 
who "reconstructed" the accident seven months after the fact based on a review of the initial 
police report, statements from witnesses and other information. Aplt. Br. at 29; R. 278-281. 
Because DuVal's opinion is based entirely on second- or third-hand sources and estimates or 
inferences from those sources, its evidentiary status is extremely dubious. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Hensley, 624 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (officers' testimony that defendant 
entered intersection on yellow light was inadmissible because not based on first-hand 
knowledge, but rather on the accounts of others); Watkins v. Schmitt, 665 N.E.2d 1379,1385 
(111. 1996) (accident reconstructionist's calculations of automobile speed not admissible 
because speed of automobile within the understanding of average juror). 
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Moreover, DuVal's report was apparently never intended to be admissible evidence 
and, in fact, the court did not admit it for any purpose. The report was simply filed with the 
court to the meet the expert witness notice requirements for eventual use at trial. R. 283 
(citing Utah Code Ann. §77-17-13 (West 2004)). Thus, the purpose of the report was not to 
provide evidence, but rather to provide notice of proposed evidence so that the State could 
properly prepare to counter the testimony.6 Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (requiring at least 
30-days notice for expert testimony). Because DuVal never testified, either at trial or the 
restitution hearing, his expert report has no evidentiary value and cannot be treated as 
established testimony. 
By contrast, the evidence actually in the record—evidence gathered by police 
investigators at the scene and later admitted as evidence at the preliminary hearing— 
demonstrates beyond dispute that defendant's criminal activities are the direct and only cause 
of collision. Eyewitnesses interviewed at the scene of the accident unanimously reported 
that the light was red when defendant entered the intersection and broadsided Sharane's van. 
R. 415, 416 (Addendum B). Defendant's impairment was apparent to everyone he 
encountered. Even Roy Scott, the retired highway patrol trooper from Ohio, reported that he 
had been following defendant immediately before the accident because he was concerned 
6
 In response, the State provided notice of its own expert witness to counter DuVal's 
testimony if necessary. R. 293-96. However, neither expert testified. 
7
 DuVal's report states that Nathan Taylor, who was a passenger in defendant's truck, 
told DuVal that the light was yellow when defendant's truck entered the intersection. R. 
278. The statement is, at best, hearsay in that Taylor did not testify at the preliminary 
hearing or the restitution hearing. 
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that he was impaired. R. 418; 512:11 .Springville police officers investigating the accident 
found defendant's impairment so obvious—slurred speech, droopy eyes—that one of the 
officers wondered at first if defendant was "mentally challenged." R. 512:12,15. Defendant 
also flunked every portion of the field sobriety test and candidly admitted he had taken two 
10-milligram doses of Valium and a 20 milligram dose of Oxycontin, the latter of which he 
admitted "snorting," a couple of hours before the accident and a Lortab the night before. R. 
512:39,40. Defendant ultimately tested positive for several prescription medications, to wit: 
Meprobamate, Diazepam, Nordiazepam and Oxycodone. R. 512:31-32, 42. 
In short, the record contains overwhelming and unrebutted testimony from numerous 
witnesses based on their own firsthand observations establishing defendant's responsibility 
for the accident and resulting damages. With the exception of the hearsay allegations in 
DuVal's unsworn report, there is nothing to suggest that fatal car crash was attributable to 
anything but defendant's impairment by prescription medications and his failure to stop at a 
red light. In awarding restitution to Safeco, the trial court opted to hold defendant financially 
responsible for his criminal conduct and this Court should affirm. State v. Dominguez, 1999 
UT App 343,1f 6, 992 P.2d 995 ("'We will not vacate an order of restitution unless the trial 
court abused its discretion or exceeded its authority'") (quoting State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 
695, 696 (Utah App. 1997)). 
Finally, defendant's suggestion that there is a legal basis for finding a victim, such as 
Sharane Haymond, contributorily negligent for damages caused by the clear negligence of a 
drunk or impaired driver is without precedent in Utah or virtually anywhere else. Indeed, 
after extensive research, the State found only the single case cited by defendant. See Aplt. 
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Br. at 31-32 (titmgPeople v. Crossley, 512 N.Y.S.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1987) (victim 
25 percent responsible for two-car collision with drunk driver)). Even in the civil context, 
few courts have apportioned fault to plaintiffs who were injured by impaired drivers in two-
car collisions. But see Reed v. City of Syracuse, 309 A.D.2d 1195, 1197 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2003) (drunkenness of driver who collided with another car after proceeding into intersection 
Q 
with green light may only be considered to determine if he was negligent). 
In any event, this Court need not decide whether Utah should allow comparative fault 
in the present case because, as noted above, there is no credible evidence that anyone besides 
defendant was in any way responsible for the accident. But even if the evidence pointing to 
defendant's culpability was less cut-and-dried, his guilty plea and his accompanying 
admissions establish his liability definitively. "If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily 
decides the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is 
More often, the question of whether drunk drivers may allocate fault to others is 
considered in lawsuits against the provider of the alcohol, e.g., Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel 935 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 1997) (plaintiff injured by drunk driver may claim 
contributory negligence under "Dramshop Act," which imposes potential liability on any 
person who provided liquor); Booker v. Morrill, 639 N.E.2d 358 (Ind. App. 1994) (bartender 
liable), or cases in which defendants claim a plaintiff/passenger was contributorily negligent 
for getting into the car with a drunk driver. Wark v. McClellan, 68 P.3d 574,581 (Colo.App. 
2003) (comparative negligence instruction appropriate based on claim that parents were 
negligent in allowing themselves and daughters into vehicle with alcohol-impaired driver). 
There are also cases in which the state was deemed negligent by failing to remove double 
line from center of dead-end segment on which a drunk driver died, State v. Humphrey, 457 
N.E.2d 767, 769 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983) (state 60 percent negligent), and where the state 
improperly reinforced a guard rail, which was largely the reason for another drunk driver's 
death. Clark v. State, 124 A.D.2d879, 881 (N.Y. 1986) (claimant is 60 percent negligent for 
veering off the road while drunk, while state is 40 percent negligent in fabrication of 
guardrail). 
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conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-403(2) (West 2004).9 In entering his guilty plea, defendant was 
required to admit to the elements of automobile homicide—operating a motor vehicle while 
impaired and causing the death of another in either a negligent or criminally negligent 
manner. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(a) (ii); State v. Riggs, 1999 UT App 271, 987 P.2d 
1281. Accordingly, he admitted that he "operate[d] a vehicle in a negligent manner," 
"caus[ed] the death of another," and that he was under the influence of alcohol, drugs or a 
combination of both that rendered him "incapable of safely operating a vehicle." R. 320. 
Because defendant unequivocally admitted to those elements, defendant's liability for 
pecuniary damages caused by his criminal conduct is conclusively determined. Thus, the trial 
court correctly ordered defendant to pay restitution. There was no error. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE MORE THAN 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE RESTITUTION AWARD. 
Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to explicitly delineate "court ordered 
restitution" and "complete restitution" and to explicitly consider and discuss the statutory 
restitution factors on the record was error. Aplt. Br. at 34-38. This argument is readily 
refuted by the Utah Supreme Court's consideration of the same issues in State v. Weeks, 
2002UT98,61P.3dl000. 
Weeks, like defendant, complained that the restitution order was deficient because the 
trial court did not follow the statutory requirement to consider enumerated factors and "make 
9
 Defendant's guilty plea constitutes a "conviction" for restitution purposes. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-3-102(1). 
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the reasons [for its restitution] decision a part of the court record." Id. at ^ f 22; see also Aplt. 
Br. at 35-36. The Supreme Court disagreed, noting that the statute did not require a trial 
court to explicitly state its consideration of each factor on the record: 
[Tjhere is no mandatory requirement in the language of the statute that a 
sentencing court make a record setting forth its reasoning as to each of the 
factors in its restitution order, only that it consider each factor and make a 
record setting forth the reasons for its decision. In other words, the court must 
consider all of the factors, but need make a record only of the reasons on 
which it relied in reaching its conclusion. 
Id. at f 23 (emphasis in original).10 
Weeks is dispositive. Although the trial court in this case did not explicitly delineate 
and distinguish the amounts needed for "complete restitution" and "court-ordered 
restitution," such a discussion was not necessary. See Id. Because most of the questions 
concerning compensation to victims had been settled through negotiations between the 
parties and insurers, the trial court was presented with a narrow issue: Should the defendant 
be ordered to pay $10,000 in restitution to Safeco? In making this determination, the trial 
court had plentiful amounts of information in the record concerning the accident, defendant's 
criminal culpability, his financial resources, as well as detailed legal memoranda. See, e.g., 
408-475 (Defendant's Hearing Memorandum on the Issue of Restitution) and R. 476-87 
(State's Response and Hearing Memorandum on the Issue of Restitution). The court also 
1U
 Weeks refers to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20 l(4)(e), 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i), and 76-3-
201(8)(b) and (c), which have since been repealed because they duplicated several sections 
of the Crime Victims Restitution Act. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, \ 2, n. 1. The court noted that 
the sections were renumbered as follows: The subsections were renumbered as follows: §§ 
76-3-201(4)(e) to 77-38a-302(4), 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) to 77-38a-302(3), and 76-3-201(8)(b) and 
(c) to 77-38a-302(5)(b) and (c). 
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held an evidentiary hearing in which counsel presented argument and some testimony. R. 
513. The Presentence/Postsentence Report prepared for sentencing purposes also contains 
extensive background on defendant and his financial resources. R. 511. Thus, although the 
trial court's restitution order is brief, it is not deficient under the statute. See Weeks, 2002 
UT98,H23. 
State v. Barrett, 2004 UT App 239 (Memorandum Decision) (Addendum E), cited by 
defendant, says nothing to the contrary. There, this Court voided a restitution order that 
simply voided a previous restitution order by stating only "restitution is stricken." Id. at *2. 
This Court noted that although a trial judge has considerable discretion in awarding 
restitution, it "does not, however, have discretion to not make restitution determinations with 
supporting findings." Id. at *1. And while Barrett found the trial court's restitution order 
deficient, it nonetheless reiterated that the statute requires only that the trial court consider 
the restitution factors, not that it discuss each of them on the record. Id. 
Accordingly, the trial court's order that defendant pay $10,000 in restitution to Safeco 
complied with the statutory requirements and should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the 
appellate court in its decision[-]making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 
2005 UT 18, f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the 
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 
560 (Cal. 1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would be "significantly aided 
by oral argument." Utah. R. App. P. 29(a). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's restitution award.. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of April, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act 
Part 1. General Provisions 
§ 77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the 
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make 
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a 
prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not 
yet incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts 
or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair 
market value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including lost earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or 
exemplary damages and pain and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and 
defendant setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon 
which the defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution 
and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant 
but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing 
sentence upon him on condition that he comply with specific conditions as set 
forth in a plea in abeyance agreement. 
(9) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon 
which, following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in 
abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution 
and defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or 
any agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or 
where charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and 
payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation 
and as may be further defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an 
offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except 
that the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or 
a bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the 
public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that 
has been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act 
Part 2. Restitution Determination 
§ 77-38a-202. Restitution determination—Prosecution duties and responsibilities 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony 
or class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, 
or district attorney shall provide to the district court: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution; 
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part 
of the plea disposition. 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county 
attorney, municipal attorney, or district attorney shall: 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution 
amounts; and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea 
disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which the 
defendant is charged. 
(3) If charges are not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution 
claims from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 38A. Crime Victims Restitution Act 
Part 3. Restitution Requirements 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution 
as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning 
as defined in Subsection 77-3 8a-102(14) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in 
Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the 
time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this 
part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or 
to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, 
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, 
the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment 
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted 
in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due 
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the 
victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) 
and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d)(i) Except as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine 
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution 
orders at the time of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after 
sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer 
an order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of 
restitution. 
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J u l y 2 8 , 2004/ P r o v o , Utah 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
-0O0-
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Brian Kirk Miller. 
This is our File Number 041400862. We were just having an 
off-the-record discussion with regard to the information to 
Count 1, Automobile Homicide. And the information I'm 
receiving from the prosecutor is that it should be 
76-5-207(3)insteadof(2). 
MR. BODILY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: I ask just because I like to know what 
I'm looking at as I listen to the evidence, so criminal 
homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony. If a 
person operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent 
manner causing the death of another -- and you said (ii) -• 
who is under the influence of alcohol, any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that 
renders a person incapable of simply operating a vehicle. So 
I'm expecting evidence as to impairment but not point .08; is 
that right? 
MR. BODILY: That's correct. There is one other 
matter, Count 3 is charged as a B misdemeanor. I mentioned to 
Mr. Petro that the State intends to move to amend that under 
41.4644 under (b), where it's a third degree felony, if the 
person inflicts serious bodily injury upon another as the 
proximate result of operating the vehicle. 
THE COURT: Separate victim from the automobile 
homicide. 
MR. BODILY: That is the same victim. 
THE COURT: How do you get both? 
MR. BODILY: All right, that's right. 
THE COURT: If you're charging the homicide, I think 
the only way you could do that one is do it in the 
alternative. 
MR. BODILY: You're right. You're right. I'll leave 
it. 
THE COURT: I'll let Mr. Petro make those arguments. 
All right. Do you have any objection, Mr. Petro, to my 
amending any information in Count 1 so it reads (3) after 207? 
MR. PETRO: No. 
THE COURT: I have made that amendment I'm going to 
initial it and date it out to the side 7/28/04. I'll just put 
a note here that it was a preliminary hearing. 
All right. Mr. Bodily is here for the State of Utah. 
Mike Petro is here for the defendant Is that the defendant 
seated at the table next to you? 
MR. PETRO: It is. 
THE COURT: Are the parties ready to go forward with 
this preliminary hearing? 
MR. BODILY: Yes. 
1 MR. PETRO: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Bodily, would you call your first 
3 witness. 
4 MR. BODILY: State calls Dell Gordon. 
5 MR. PETRO: Your Honor, Mr. Miller would like to 
6 exclude witnesses. 
7 THE COURT: All right. What other witnesses are 
8 there in the courtroom here? 
9 MR. BODILY: Penny Wheeler is here as a witness and 
10 Officer Chappell is here. 
11 THE COURT: The exclusionary rule has been invoked 
12 which means I need to exclude you from the courtroom. And I 
13 will ask you - I'll order you to refrain from any discussion 
14 of the case with each other or anyone else or any other 
15 witnesses who may leave the courtroom so that your testimony 
16 may be preserved for the witness stand, and that includes both 
17 before and after you testify until this hearing is concluded. 
18 All right, thank you very much. You may be excused. 
19 Come on up to my clerk and she will swear you in. 
2 0 DELL GORDON, 
21 called by the State, having been duly 
22 sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
23 THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
24 you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 



























THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Please come up here and have a seat. The 
microphone that is in front of you is purely cosmetic most 
days, so if you will speak up, that will help the attorneys 
hear you. Thank you. 
MR. BODILY: May I question him from here? 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BODILY. 
Q State your name and spell your last name, please. 
A My name is Dell Gordon, G-0-R-D-O-N. 
THE COURT: How do you spell the first name? 
THE WITNESS: Dell, D-E-L-L. 
THE COURT: AH right 
Q (By Mr. Bodily) Who do you work for? 
A Springville Police Department. 
Q How long have you been with Springville? 
A Just over twenty years. 
Q What are your duties generally with the Springville 
Police Department? 
A My assignment right now is I'm the patrol lieutenant, 
so I supervise all the patrol officers. 
Q Was that your assignment back on October 31st of last 
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A Yes, it was. 
Q How long have you been a patrol supervisor? 
A I've been a lieutenant for over four years. Before 
that I was a sergeant. 
Q With similar responsibilities? 
A Yes, but only for a portion of the patrol officers, , 
not all of them. 
Q As you're aware, we're here to talk about an 
automobile accident that occurred on October 31st of last 
year. Do you remember that incident? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Relevant to your recollection of that incident, do 
you have any specific training or experience that was 
important that night relevant to that night? 
A The reason that I was called, I was at home and was 
called out. Any time there's a serious accident, especially 
one that involves a possible fatality, then I'm notified and 
will respond, if possible. That's the reason for my response. 
I was called out from home. 
Q Could you tell the court where the accident happened? 
A 1400 North Main Street. 
Q In what city? 
A In Springville. 
Q Is that in Utah County? 
Yes, it is. 
About what time did you arrive on the scene? 
I believe it was about twenty minutes to 8 p.m. 






A Traffic was basically completely stopped. There were 
two vehicles that were involved in the accident completely 
blocking the southbound traffic lanes. There was an ambulance 
there. I was told that there had been two ambulances there 
and the first one had already left for the hospital. 
Q What was the weather like? 
A It was lightly snowing, roads were wet 
Q Did this accident occur at an intersection? 
A Yes, it was in the intersection. 
Q Is there any lighting at that intersection? 
A Yes, the intersection is lit, street lights on all 
four corners. 
Q Was it dark at 7:40, the end of October? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Completely dark or getting dark? 
A When I arrived it was dark. All the vehicles that 
were there had their lights on. 
Q What did you do when you first arrived on the scene? 
A My first response is to talk with the officer that's 
in charge. I found who was the officer assigned to the 
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1 investigation of the traffic accident, and that was Corporal 
2 Ralph Anderson, so I sought him out immediately to find out 
3 what he could tell me about the situation. 
4 Q What did he tell you about the situation? 
5 A Basically he told me that there was a young child, 
6 seven years old I believe, that was in the van that was 
7 struck. She's the one that had been transported to the 
8 hospital already, and they didn't expect her to live because 
9 of the injuries involved in the accident. 
10 Q Once you spoke with Corporal Anderson, what did you 
11 do then? 
12 A \ had him give me an overview of what had been done 
13 and what the circumstances were surrounding the accident at 
14 that time. 
15 He explained to me that the pickup truck that the 
16 defendant was driving was southbound on Highway 89 coming oul( 
17 of Provo, and that they had struck in the intersection. He 
18 went on to explain that an off duty - or a retired highway 
19 patrolman from Ohio -
20 MR. PETRO: Object, this is double hearsay. 
21 THE COURT: It is. I'll sustain it. 
22 MR. BODILY: Actually, I'll shorten it up a little 
23 bit This testimony he's offering has not been offered for 
24 the truth of the matter. It's just offered to show how it 


























information. It's just some foundational information. 
Q (By Mr. Bodily) You were saying, Lieutenant Gordon? 
A He just explained that he had the retired highway 
patrolman filling out a statement at that time and pointed him 
out to me. He just explained that he said that the retired 
trooper told him that he thought - the way he explained it to 
Corporal Anderson was that he looked like a typical 
intoxicated driver as he was following him. 
Q What did you do next in your investigation? 
A I asked where the driver was. Corporal Anderson told 
me he had sat him in the backseat of his patrol car to get him 
out of the weather because his vehicle was damaged. And then 
he told me that the driver appeared to be slow; thought there 
may be something wrong with him; thought he may be impaired 
and wanted me to talk to him. 
Q Did you go talk to the defendant? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Could you tell us how that conversation proceeded? 
A Yes. I went to the patrol car and opened the door 
and talked with him there. Basically \t was obvious that he 
was upset. He had been crying. I explained to him the 
circumstances that we were - that I had been told and was 
concerned about his condition as well as everybody else in the 
accident, and we needed to investigate to find out what had 
happened. 
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Q Did you have any additional conversation with him? 
A Yes. We basically just talked about how important it 
was to find out the truth about what had happened. I 
explained to him that the retired trooper said that he thought 
he was intoxicated, and I needed to further investigate that. 
In doing so, I looked at his physical condition, looking at 
his eyes, and noticed some things that didn't seem right. He 
seemed real slow in his responses. 
Q Let me stop you for just a second. You said you 
noticed some things that didn't seem right. Didn't seem right 
in what way, could you clarify that? 
A Sure. I'm trained as a drug recognition expert, in 
fact, l teach other officers to be drug recognition experts. 
And with that training, I just noticed his pupils appeared 
smaller than normal given the light conditions. Again, just 
his slow speech. He just seemed very slow. 
Q Any other indicators or symptoms that you noticed 
that appeared off? 
A At that point, no. Again, he was seated in the 
patrol car to stay out of the weather. It was, like I said, 
raining and drizzling, kind of a snow/rain mix, if I recall 
right. And so at that point, I just - I asked him if he 
would be willing to accompany an officer down to the police 
department to take a drug and urine test. He said that he 
would. And I also asked him -- actually, he asked me if the 
Lortab he had taken the night before would show in the blood 
and urine test, and I explained to him that I didn't think it 
would. 
Q Did you have any other conversation? 
A At that point I pretty much completed my conversation 
with the defendant. I was told at that point that his parents 
had arrived, and so I went and talked with them. 
Q You said a few moments ago, other than the 
constricted pupils, slow speech and he seemed slow, you didn't 
notice any other symptoms that seemed odd or inappropriate. 
Were there other things that you noticed later in your contact 
with him that seemed odd? 
A Basically after that point, and I don't recall 
exactly, but after he was transported to the station by 
Corporal Anderson, I responded to the hospital to check on the 
condition of the child, so I don't recall - 1 don't recall 
anything after that. 
Q Okay. Did the defendant make any statement about 
where he had used the Lortab the night before? 
A No. 
Q Did you have any discussion with him about him being 
the driver of the vehicle involved in the crash? 
A No, I don't think that I did. I know that Corporal 
Anderson explained to me that he had talked to him about that, 
but I don't believe I asked him anything about driving the 
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1 vehicle. 
2 Q Were you present for any field sobriety tests or 
3 urine or blood samples that were given? 
4 A I was not. 
5 Q Did the defendant make any other reference to drug 
6 use besides being a party to all this about the Lortab? 
7 A Not to me. 
8 Q In the time that you spent with the defendant, were 
9 you able to come to an opinion about whether he was impaired 
10 or not or able to safely operate a motor vehicle? 
11 MR. PETRO: Objection; foundation. 
12 MR. BODILY: I just asked him if he was able to come 
13 to an opinion based on the information he had. 
14 THE COURT: I'll allow it. 
15 THE WITNESS: My opinion was that there was --
16 MR. PETRO: Objection; foundation. 
17 THE COURT: Tell us first what you based your opinion 
18 on. 
19 THE WITNESS: My opinion was based on his the signs 
20 that I had seen, how slow he seemed, how his speech was 
21 slurred, you know, the constricted pupils. All of those 
22 things led me to believe that he was either impaired or in 
23 some way slow. 
24 Q (By Mr. Bodily) When you say "or in some way slow," 


























A I wasn't sure if he was mentally challenged or if he 
was impaired by a substance or something else, but it was 
obvious there was a problem. 
Q You said after the conversation that you just 
described that that was basically the end of your contact with 
the defendant? 
A That's correct. 
Q Where did you go at that point? 
A I went and had a conversation with both of his 
parents. 
Q After you spoke with his parents, did you remain at 
the scene or what did you do? 
A No. Then I went to the hospital to Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Center to check on the conditions of the 
victims. 
Q When you arrived at the hospital, what was the 
condition of the victim? 
A The one victim - the one that eventually died was 
being transported at that time to University of Utah, I 
believe, and so I didn't get much of a chance to talk to her 
mother, but it was just a very brief conversation. And 
basically they told me they weren't expecting her to live. 
MR. BODILY: I don't have any other questions for you 
at this point. 
THE COURT: Mr. Petro. 
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MR. PETRO: Do you mind if I remain seated? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PETRO: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PETRO: 
Q Lieutenant Gordon, you indicated that when you first 
talked with Mr. Miller, he was in the back of the patrol 
vehicle; is that correct? 
A That's correct 
Q Did you have any understanding about whether or not 
he was under arrest at that time? 
A Yes, he was not under arrest at that time. 
Q How did you know he was not under arrest? 
A That's what Corporal Anderson told me. He was not 
handcuffed. He was seated in the back of the car. 
Q You indicated that you spoke with Mr. Miller and you 
told him about - 1 think your words were you told him what 
the circumstances that you observed were. What did you tell 
him exactly? 
A As I recall I explained to him that there was a 
witness there that had followed him from Provo down the 
highway, that felt like he was driving like he was 
intoxicated. 
Q Now, the first person you spoke with when you got to 
the scene, as I understand it, was Lieutenant Anderson; is 
that correct? 
A Corporal Anderson. 
Q He indicated that you had an accident and that there 
was possibly a fatality involved? 
A That's correct. And that's also the information I 
got at home when dispatch called me at home. 
Q Did you advise Mr. Miller of the fact that there was 
possibly a fatality involved? 
A To be quite honest, 1 don't remember if 1 did or not. 
Q Other than your conversation with Corporal Anderson 
and with Mr. Miller, did you speak with anyone else at the 
scene? 
A Several people, most specifically the defendant's 
parents. 
Q Where were the defendant's parents when you arrived 
at the scene? 
A They weren't there. I'm assuming they were at home. 
Q Where did you finally talk with them? 
A Just outside the patrol car in the middle of the 
street basically. 
Q Who else did you speak with, anyone else? 
A Well, the other officers that were at the scene 
trying to get some information about what the people - the 
officers that were taking the pictures, the ambulance 
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1 personnel. 
2 Q Who was taken to the hospital? 
3 A Carlee Haymond was the victim that had already been 
4 transported when I arrived. And the other little girl's name 
5 I think was Jacqueline Johnson. She was in the same vehicle 
6 seated next to Carlee. Yeah, Jacqueline Lee Johnson. She was 
7 just being ready for transport when I arrived. 
8 Q Did you see her before she went in the ambulance? 
9 A No, I did not. 
10 Q Do you know what the relationship is between Carlee 
11 and Jacqueline, if anything? 
12 A They were friends is all I was told. 
13 Q What about the driver of the other vehicle, what was 
14 her name? 
15 A The driver o f -
16 Q Of the vehicle in which the two young ladies were 
17 driving? 
18 A Sharane Haymond. 
19 Q Did you ever see her at the scene? 
20 A No, I did not. She had gone in the ambulance with 
21 her daughter. 
22 Q Other than Sharane and Jacqueline and Carlee, were 
23 there other individuals in the vehicle? 




























Q Let me ask you about some individuals that are listed 
in the police report. It says involved person Brian Miller, 
who is seated to my right, and then Carlee we talked about. 
Jacqueline Johnson we've talked about. Roy Scott. He's the 
retired highway patrolman? 
A Correct, that's right. 
Q From Ohio, as I understand it? 
A That's right. 
Q Who is Penny Wheeler? 
A A witness to the accident. 
Q Who is Charles Gilchrist? 
A Another witness to the accident. 
Q Who is Nathan Taylor? He was in Mr. Miller's car, as 
I recall; is that right? 
A That's my recollection, yes. 
Q Sharane Haymond we talked about. 
A Correct 
Q What about - okay, your name is listed. Officer 
Sherwood. What is Officer Sherwood's first name? 
A Greg. 
Q Is he with Springville Police Department currently? 
A Yes, he is. 
Q Do you know what Officer Sherwood did that day in 
connection with this case? 
A He and Officer Mendez were the initial responding 



























officers. They actually arrived before Corporal Anderson did 
and helped secure the scene before Corporal Anderson arrived. 
Q Is Officer Mendez still with Springville? 
A Yes. 
Q What is Officer Mendez' first name? 
A Vincent. 
Q How Jong has officer Sherwood with Springville? 
A Approximately three years. 
Q What about Officer Mendez? 
A Just less than that, I believe, two and a half years, 
right in there. 
Q Are their duties patrol duties? 
A Yes. 
Q And then Sergeant Esklund? 
A Correct. 
Q His first name is Reed? 
A Reed. 
Q What did Sergeant Esklund do in connection with this? 
A Basically I think his responsibilities at the scene 
were taking photographs, just helping to complete the 
investigation. 
Q And then Officer Chappell? 
A Correct. 
Q And then Suzette Mitcheli who I understand is a 
forensic nurse? 
20 
A That's correct 
Q Do you know where she's employed? 
A By Forensic Nursing Services, that's the name of the 
company. 
Q Did you look at the two vehicles? 
A Yes. 
Q Was there extensive damage done to both of them? 
A Yes, there was. 
Q I read in the report somewhere that Mr. Miller wasn't 
wearing his seat belt; is that correct? 
A Again, that was what Corporal Anderson toid me when I 
arrived. 
Q Did he appear to be injured at all? 
A He didn't appear to be injured. In fact, I asked 
him, and he said he was not injured. 
Q Okay. You indicated that he was - I think you put 
in the report "thick tongued"? 
A I believe that was in Corporal Anderson's report. 
Q What was your observation about? 
A That his speech was slow, slurred. He just was very 
slow to respond. 
Q He obviously had been crying; is that correct? 
A Absolutely. 
Q And his eyes were red? 
A Yes. 
21 
1 Q Which is consistent with crying? 
2 A Absolutely. 
3 Q His reactions were slow? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Both slow reactions and dry mouth are typical 
6 by-products of stress, wouldn't you agree? 
7 A Sure. 
8 I Q In order to make really a determination of whether he 
9 was impaired or not, wouldn't you agree that you would at 
10 least need to do a DRE examination or a blood draw or urine 
11 test done? 
12 A That's exactly right, and that's why we went the 
13 route that we did. 
14 Q Now, Mr. Miller was in the back of the vehicle as you 
15 approached him; is that correct? 
16 A Correct. 
17 Q You asked him if he would go to Springville Police 
18 Department; is that correct? 
19 A That's correct 
20 Q What did you tell him he was going to do there? 
21 A I asked him if he would submit to a blood and urine 
22 test and also to some field sobriety type tests at the police 
23 department because it wasn't safe there at the scene. 
24 Q What was his response? 


























how he said it, but he agreed that he would go and do that 
Q You don't know at that time whether you advised him 
that there was a possible fatality; is that correct? 
A I know we discussed serious injuries, but I don't 
recall if I told him that there was the possibility of a fatal 
accident or not 
Q Who did the actual accident reconstruction of this 
case? 
A There wasn't an accident reconstruction done. The 
investigation was completed by Corporal Anderson. 
Q So I take that to mean that you were relying more on 
witnesses as opposed to mathematical evidence that you 
obtained from the scene? 
A It was probably an oversight on my part, but, yes, 
that's correct. 
Q So I take it then that there's no skid marks or other 
physical observations that were made at the scene other than 
the location of the cars that you're relying upon in this 
case? 
A That's correct 
Q I take it since Mr. Miller wasn't advised he was 
under arrest, that Miranda rights were not read to him at the 
scene? 
A Not at the scene that I'm aware of. 
Q Were any other admonitions given to him about, "We're 
22 23 


























investigating a serious case. You might want to talk to a 
lawyer," or anything like that? 
A No, I don't believe so. 
Q Was there any snow on the ground? 
A The road was wet, to my recollection. I don't recall 
any snow being actually on the road. There may have been on 
the shoulders but not on the road itself. 
Q How was Mr. Miller dressed? 
A I don't recall. I remember him shivering in the 
backseat of the patrol car, being cold. 
MR. PETRO: I don't have any other questions. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. BODILY: Yes, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BODILY: 
Q Lieutenant Gordon, I have a couple questions. You 
said that no accident reconstruction was done. Does that mean 
it may have been an oversight on your part? 
A Correct 
Q Were there any other reasons, any facts about the 
scene that would have played into that decision? 
A Well, again, the problem was the weather conditions 
at the time made it difficult for us - there were no skid 
marks that were visible because of the conditions at the time 
and basically that's why. 
Q Have you overseen accident reconstruction on other 
cases? 
A Springville Police Department doesn't actually have 
anybody qualified to do accident reconstruction, so we have to 
call on somebody in from another agency, and, yes, we have 
done that in the past. 
Q Did you consider it in the case? 
A I believe it was pretty overwhelming. I don't recall 
even thinking about it at the scene that night. 
Q Do you have a practice in dealing with defendants, a 
routine or a habit in dealing with defendants at crime scenes, 
where there's a possible fatality, that you generally talk 
about it generally don't talk about it? 
A No, I don't believe there is a policy. It just 
depends on the circumstances at the scene. 
Q Did you say you asked Mr. Miller if he was injured? 
A Yes. 
Q His response was? 
A That he was not injured. 
Q Did you observe anything about him that would 
indicate to you that he was injured? 
A No, I didn't. 
MR. BODILY: I have no other questions for him. 



























THE COURT: All right. May he be excused? 
MR. PETRO: Yes. 
MR. BODILY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Your next witness. 
MR. BODILY: State calls Officer Josh Chappell. 
THE COURT: Lieutenant Gordon, if you could have him 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I will. 
THE COURT: All right, Officer, come up and be sworn 
in. 
JOSH CHAPPELL, 
called by the State, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have a seat. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BODILY: 
Q Officer Chappell, would you state your name and spell 
your last name for the record, please. 


























Q Officer, where do you work? 
A Springville City Police Department. 
Q How long have you been in Springville? 
A Over two years. 
Q What are your duties generally? 
A At the time of this incident I was assigned to 
patrol. I've recently changed and I'm going to be a school 
resource officer. But up to this point, I have been assigned 
to the patrol division of the police department. 
Q Do you have any prior law enforcement experience 
either as a cadet or with another agency? 
A Another agency. 
Q Where? 
A Mapleton Police Department assigned to patrol. 
Q Well, how long were you in Mapleton? 
A A year, over a year. 
Q Anything else? 
A No. 
Q Anything in your experience relative to being a 
police officer like time in the military or specific training 
like medical training, paramedic, anything like that? 
A I attended the academy at UVSC; graduated from UVSC's 
law enforcement academy in May of 2001. There I received 
training in standardized field sobriety, also CPR training. 
In September, the end of September of the same year, I went to 
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the DRE school put on by the Department of Public Safety here 
in Utah, which I successfully completed. I was certified by 
the NACP as a drug recognition expert. 
Q Do you currently maintain that certification as a 
DRE? 
A (do. 
Q Have you been certified every year since you were 
first certified? 
A I have. 
Q We are here to talk about an investigation you may 
have been involved in on the 31st of October of last year. Do 
you remember being called out to an accident scene? 
A Yes. I wasn't actually called to the accident scene. 
I was called to our police department. 
Q How did you become involved in the investigation? 
A Obviously ! was off duty. I received a phone call at 
about 8:30 p.m from one of our dispatchers, Ruth Bybee. She 
requested I respond to the police department to perform a DRE 
evaluation. 
Q Did you perform that investigation? 
A I did. Upon arrival at the police department, I --
Q Hang on a second. You said you did perform an 
evaluation? 
A I did. 
Q When you initially - actually first, the field 
sobriety tests were conducted and this DRE evaluation was 
conducted in the police station? 
A It was. 
Q What were the general lighting and other conditions 
in the police station? 
A The lighting was good. It was well lit. The climate 
was room temperature. 
Q Were the floors level there? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you notice anything about Mr. Miller when you 
first had contact with him? 
A Yes. My first observation of Mr. Miller was he was 
sitting on a bench, his legs were extended. It appeared that 
he had been crying. His eyes appeared to be blood shot. His 
eyelids were droopy. As I spoke with him, I observed that his 
speech was slow and slurred. 
Q Anything else? 
A No. 
Q What did you do then? 
A Well, we began the preliminary investigation. We 
began the DRE evaluation. I asked him a few questions like, 
"Are you sick or injured? Are you under the care of a doctor 
or dentist? Are there any physical defects or such things 
that I ought to be aware of?" 




























A He said no. 
Q How did he respond to the question if he was under a 
doctor's care? 
A He was not. He advised he was not under the care of 
a doctor or a dentist. 
Q Did you ask him at that point in your preliminary 
part of the investigation whether he had taken any medication? 
A No. I did ask him at that point, there is a 
question, "Are you taking any medication?" He indicated, no. 
Q Did he say he had any other physical defects or 
ailments that would possibly affect the test? 
A He indicated no. 
Q What did you do then? 
A We began the psychophysical test beginning with the 
Romberg test. 
Q When you say psychophysical test, what are you 
talking about? 
A Divided attention test, field sobriety test, 
dividing -- where they actually have to perform something and 
think about what they are performing at the same time. 
Q How many of those types of tests did you perform? 
A The Romberg test, the walk and turn, the one-legged 
stand, and the finger to nose. 
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Q 
"your voice. 
(By Mr. Bodily) You said you asked him to do the 




That was the first test. 
Can you describe his performance on that test? 
Mr. Miller estimated 50 seconds as 30. I also 
observed that he had a circular sway. 
Q Are there certain indicators you're looking for on 
that test? | 
A Mainly the time, how long it took him, how much time 










Is it fair to talk about these tests in terms of 
or failing the test? 
Sure. 
Did he pass or fail the Romberg test? 
Failed. 
What was the next test you administered? 
Walk and turn. 
Actually on the Romberg why did he fail? 






The next test you administered was the walk and turn? 
Walk and turn. 
And how did Mr. Miller perform on that test? 
Also failed. 
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Q What was the reason for the failure? 
A Stepped off line multiple times. He raised his arms 
to maintain his balance during this test. 
Q So he had shown two clues or two indicators that 
indicated failure on that one? 
A Yes. 
Q What's the minimum number of indicators for a person 
to have to fail that test? 
A Two. 
Q What was the next test? 
A The one leg stand. 
Q How did the defendant do on that test? 
A Also failed that test. 
Q Why did he fail? 
A When he was asked to stand on his left leg and raise 
his right foot, he swayed while balancing and used arms to 
help maintain his balance. And then when he stood on his 
right foot elevating his left leg, he put his foot down, 
swayed while balancing and also used his arms to help maintain 
his balance. 
Q How many clues total did you observe on that test? 
A The total of five clues, two clues on the first 
section of the test and three clues on the second section of 
the test. 
Q How many clues does someone have to exhibit to fail 
that test? 
A Two. 
Q So if he raised his arms for balance in the 
instructional phase then raises it during the test, are those 
separate clues? 
A That's still just one clue. 
Q What was the next test that you gave him? 
A The finger to nose test was the next test 
Q Can you briefly describe that test? 
A That test is --1 explained to the defendant that I 
wanted him to clinch his fist like this and extend his pointer 
fingers then hold them down to the sides of his body. And 
then he is instructed when he is either given a right - when 
I either give the command of right or left, he will touch the 
tip of his finger to the tip of the nose. Once the individual 
has touched the tip of his nose, he is then to immediately 
bring it down to the side of the body. 
Q You just demonstrated in court how a person is 
supposed to touch their finger to their nose. Did you do that 
kind of a demonstration to the defendant? 
A I did. 
Q How did he perform on this test? 
A He missed the tip of his nose six out of six times. 
Q Is that pass or fail? 


























I clues that we look for in this other than being able to touch 
the tip of his finger with the tip of his nose and then 








You just consider his performance generally? 
Yes. 
He missed touching his nose on all six attempts? 
Yes. 
Did he otherwise perform the test correctly? 
Yes. 
Were there any other psychophysical or divided 










No, those were all of them. 
What happened next in your investigation? 
The eye examination was something that we performed. 
Okay. What did you observe when you examined his 
What I observed is his pupils were constricted. 
Was that significant in your investigation? 
Yes, it was significant 
How did you - can you be more specific about how you 




The size of his pupils are gauged -
Let me stop you right there. My question was, can 
more specific in how you determined that his pupils 













































It was meant that they were below the normal ranges. 
Did you check his pupils in room light? 
I did. 
What was your observation in room light? 
That they were 3.0 size. 
Is that within the normal range? 
That is within the normal range. 
Did you check his eyes in darkness or near darkness? 
I did. 
What was the result from that check? 
That his size was 4.0. 
Is that normal range? 
That's within the normal range. 
In direct light? 
2.5. 
Is that within the normal range? 
That would be below the normal range. 
From the three eye exams you just described, is that 




Yes. At any point if the eyes are above or below the 
ranges, we consider the pupils either constricted or 
And in this investigation we determined the pupils 
were constricted. 
Q You've said that the difference between direct light 
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and total darkness was about 1.5 millimeters; is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q Is that difference significant in any way? 
A Yes, because there's not much reaction to the light. 
Q Is that also potentially an indicator of drug use or 
some substance use? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q What was the next thing you did in your 
investigation? 
A We also took vital signs, blood pressure and pulse. 
Pulse was taken three times. At three times during the 
evaluation, the blood pressure was taken. Temperature was 
also taken. Signs of congestion were also investigated. 
Q Pulse. Anything about the three pulses that was 
outside the normal range? 
A No. 
Q Anything about blood pressure that was outside the 
normal range? 
A No. 
Q Body temperature, was that normal? 
A It was normal as well. 
Q Were there any - did you say signs of ingestion? 
A Yes. 
Q Any signs of ingestion that you noticed? 
A The only thing I checked is his oral cavity and his 
nasal area. There was a white foamy substance on his tongue. 
His nasal -- his nose was also runny. 
Q Is a runny nose or a white foamy substance 
significant to you as part of your DRE investigation? 
A It's just noted. It could be, but... 
Q Okay. What did you observe next? 
A We checked muscle rigidity and checked for injection 
sites and took a third pulse. 
Q Was his muscle rigidity normal? 
A Yes. 
Q Were there any injection sites? 
A No, only from where the blood was drawn from his arm. 
Q He did submit to a blood test? 
A He did. 
Q Were you present when his blood was taken? 
A I was. 
Q When did that happen relative to your DRE 
investigation? 
A It was during the course of the investigation. 
Q After checking for injection sites - actually, do 
you remember when during your investigation the blood was 
drawn? 
A I don't recall an exact time frame. Typically an 
evaluation is started and then Forensic Nursing Services comes 
and completes the blood and the urine for us. We do try to 
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1 accommodate them a little bit because they are very busy. So 
2 if we're at a stopping place during the investigation, we will 
3 allow them to obtain the blood and urine. I believe I have a 
4 time here somewhere indicating that Susan Mitchell with 
5 Forensic Nursing Services obtained the blood draw at 21:07. 
6 Q You don't remember at what part of your investigation 
7 it happened? 
8 A It would be close to the beginning. 
9 Q Now, after you - let's see. You observed that there 
10 were no injection sites. What happened then? 
11 A I talked with Mr. Miller about any drug use that he 
12 would have been involved in. 
13 Q Did you Mirandize him at some point in your l 
14 conversation? 
15 A I did. 
16 Q When was that? 
17 A It indicated in my report 20:50 hours, so that would 
18 have been at the beginning of the DRE evaluation. 
19 Q Would that have been before the preliminary matters 
20 that we've talked about? 
21 A Yes. I indicated the evaluation time started at 
22 20:49, so it would have been directly after that. 
23 Q Did the defendant make any statements about what had 
24 happened that night? 


























had taken five 7.5 milligram Lortabs on October 30th, which 
was the night before at about 10:30 hours. He also stated 
that on that day, October 31st, at approximately 3 p.m., he 
took two 10 milligram Valium and one 20 milligram OxyContin. 
The OxyContin was taken at about 5:30 that evening. 
THE COURT: Sorry, which evening was this? 
THE WITNESS: The 31st. 
THE COURT: The Valium and the OxyContin were on the 
31st and the Lortab was not? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 




At about 5:30 p.m. 
For each of these separate things he had taken, did 
he tell you where he had taken them? 
A Yes, he did. The Lortabs were taken at his house. 
Q Did he say where that was? 
A In Mapleton. The Valium was taken at a friend's 
house in SpringviNe, and the OxyContin was also taken at his 
house in Mapleton. 
Q Did you ask him if he had a prescription for any of 
these drugs? 
A I did. 
Q What was his response? 
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A He stated that he did not have a prescription for any 
of the drugs; that he had obtained them from some friends. 
Q Did you talk to him about how he had ingested the 
drugs? 
A I did. 
Q What was his response? 
A He advised - he told me that the Lortabs and Valium 
he had taken orally or he had swallowed and the OxyContin had 
been snorted. 
Q Other than saying it had been snorted, did he provide 
any more information about how he had taken the OxyContin? 
A No. 
Did you ask him why he had taken the drugs? 
I don't know that I asked him that question. 





Were there any other statements that defendant made 
as part of your interrogation of him? 
A No. 
Q Did you at that time form an opinion as to whether he 
was impaired or incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle? 
A I did. 
Q What was the basis for that opinion? 
A The basis of that opinion was after completing the 
evaluation and after looking at all the signs and symptoms, 
statements made, I came to the conclusion or it was my opinion 
that he was incapable of operating a motor vehicle safely. 
Q Specifically what things did you rely on in forming 
that opinion? 
A My training and experience. I also - the notes that 
I had made on the evaluation. 
Q What was your opinion? 
A That Mr. Miller was under the influence of a narcotic 
analgesic and a central nervous system depressant, and he was 
incapable of operating a motor vehicle safely. 
Q Do you know if the blood test was submitted to the 
Crime Lab? 
A It was. 
MR. BODILY: Your Honor, may I approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Petro) Officer Chappell, I'm going to hand 
you what's been marked as State's Exhibit Number 1. I want 
you to take a look at that. Have you seen that before? 
A I have. 
Q What is that? 
A A toxicology report from the State of Utah Crime Lab. 
Q Is that in reference to this case, the case you were 
investigating on the 31st of October? 
A It is. 



























A It has Mr. Miller's name on it. It also has our 
agency's case number and it has the case officer's name on it 
as well, Anderson. 
Q Are there results stated in the lab report? 
A Yes. 
Q What does the lab report say was found in 
Mr. Miller's blood? 
A Meprobamate, Diazepam, Nordiazepam and Oxycodone. 
Q Does the lab report indicate whether those are 
narcotic analgesics or central nervous system depressants? 
A It indicates them as central nervous system 
depressants. 
Q Does that lab report also provide a therapeutic range 
for each of those? 
A It does. 
Q Is Mr. Miller above or within the therapeutic ranges 
on those drugs? 
A It appears that's he's within the therapeutic range. 
Q From your training and experience, do you know if any 
of those drugs are controlled substances? 
A Yes. 
Q Which ones are? 
A Oxycodone is a controlled substance, Schedule 2, as I 
recall. 


























A It is a Schedule 4. 
Q Now you said in your opinion Mr. Miller was under the 
influence of a central nervous system depressant and narcotic 
analgesic, but the lab report doesn't mention narcotic 
analgesics; does that mean you're incorrect in your 
assessment? 
A No. 
Q Why not? 
A Because in the - understanding that Oxycodone is a 
depressant, but in the DRE evaluation we have its own separate 
category for narcotic analgesics, and Oxycodone or OxyContin 
would fall under that category. 
MR. BODILY: Your Honor, at this point I would offer 
State's Exhibit Number 1. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. PETRO: No objection. 
THE COURT: Fine. It's received. 
(State's Exhibit Number 1 
was received into evidence ) 
MR. BODILY: At this point, Officer Chappell, I don't 
have any other questions. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination. 
Let me just ask, how are we doing on time? How many 
more witnesses do you have? 
MR. BODILY: We just have one other witness, Your 
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THE COURT: Okay. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PETRO: 
Q Officer Chappell, you indicated that you had finished 
your DRE training in September; is that correct? 
A Of 2001, yes. 
Q This accident happened in October of 2003; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Between the time you completed your training in 2001 
and October of 2003, how many DRE exams have you done? 
A This was number 21. 
Q Are there other DRE's at Springville Police 
Department? 
A There are. 
Q Who else - What other DRE's are there? 
A Corporal Carter and Lieutenant Gordon, who is an 
instructor. 
Q How long has he been a DRE? 
A Who? 
Q Lieutenant Gordon. 
A I don't know. 


























I A I don't know. I know that he went through the class i 
after mine, but what date and how long... 
Q Do you know why they called you in to do the DRE 
rather than Lieutenant Gordon? 
A I think Lieutenant Gordon was already involved in 
this investigation and --
Q What time did you actually arrive at the police 
station? 
A I don't know the exact time, but prior to 8:49. I 
received a call from dispatch at about 8:30, so sometime 
between 8:30 and 8:49. 
Q Before you started the DRE exam, did you talk with 
Mr. Miller? 
A I explained to him what the DRE exam was. 
Q Did you talk to him about any of the facts in the 
case? 
A No. 
Q It indicates the evaluation time was at 20:49; is 
that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q That's the start time? 
A That was the start time. 
Q It indicates that the DRE exam was completed at 
21:57? 



























Q So it took a little over an hour and 10 minutes to 





Nods head (affirmatively). 
Is that a typical length for a DRE exam? 
Yes. 
Then it indicates that you read Mr. Miller his 









What time did you read his Miranda rights to him? 
I indicated in my report 20:50 hours, so 8:50. 
Is that consistent with your memory? 
That is, yes. 
Now was Mr. Miller arrested at 20:50? 
I don't know the answer to that question. I was 




Did you assume Mr. Miller was arrested? 
I assumed because I believe I was told that he was 
he had come there voluntarily. 
THE COURT: Is that a no? Did you think he was 





THE WITNESS: No, I did not think he was arrested. 
(By Mr. Petro) Did you make any attempt to arrest 
No. 


























A That was something that case officer Corporal 
Anderson or something would had to have made that decision. 
Q Your understanding was that he was not under arrest. 
You didn't have any feeling about whether he was free to leave 
or not, and you read him his Miranda rights at 20:50? 
A 1 did. 
Q How did you read him his Miranda rights? Was it from 
memory? Did you paraphrase them or did you read them off the 
card? 
A I have a card. 
Q Do you have it? 
A I don't have the exact one, but it's similar to this 
one right here. 
Q Why don't you read what it says. 
A "You have the right to remain silent. Anything you 
say can or will be used against you in a court of law. You 
have the right to talk to a lawyer or have him present with 
you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford to 
hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish. If you decide to answer 
questions now without having counsel present, you may stop 
answering questions at any time. Also, you may request 
counsel at any time during questioning." 
Q Is that pretty consistent with what you read that 
night? 
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Q Did you have any understanding about the severity of 
the traffic accident Mr. Miller was in? 
A The only understanding that I had had been relayed to 
me through dispatch and Corporal Anderson, that it was a 
serious traffic accident. 
Q Did you have an understanding about whether or not 
there may have been a fatality? 
A No. 
Q When you say serious accident, are you talking in 
terms of impact speed or personal injury or what are you 
talking about? 
A Personal injury. 
Q So somebody had been significantly hurt? 
A Yes. 
Q Did Mr. Miller ever indicate to you that he had 
understood somebody had been significantly hurt? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever advise Mr. Miller that your 
understanding was somebody had been significantly hurt? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Let's go over some of the things on your DRE that you 
didn't talk about before. It's got - do you have your DRE 
with you? Do you have a copy of the report? 
A Yes, I do. 
1 Q It says, "What have you eaten today?" And can you 
2 indicate what his response is? 
3 A He gave me several things that he had eaten today. A 
4 sandwich at about 13:00 hours, along with fries, and then 
5 between 4:00 and 5:00 he had eaten some cereal. I don't know 
6 if that was hot or cold, but cereal. And then sometime after 
7 17:00 hours, he had had some candy. 
8 Q What's the significance of those answers, if 
9 anything? 
10 A Just - 1 don't know that there's anything 
11 significant. 
12 Q Why do you ask the question then? 
13 A To know if they've eaten that day. 
14 Q As far as you know, there's no significance between 
15 any response that's given to that question and your DRE exam? 
16 A Well, I think a lot of these questions have - as we 
17 probably go down the list to make sure that this isn't fatigue 
18 that is causing the signs and symptoms that the officer 
19 observed or a medical problem. 
20 Q Or in this case whether he was hungry or not? 
21 A (Shrugs shoulders.) 
22 Q Is that a "yes"? 
23 A I wasn't wondering if he was hungry or not 
24 Q You really don't understand the significance of that 
25 question? 
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1 A Other than what I just explained. 
2 Q It says, "When did you last sleep?" And what was his 
3 response? 
4 A He said that he had last slept from midnight to 6:30, 
5 so six and a half hours. And also he had slept for about 30 
6 minutes from 17:00 hours to 17:30 hours. 
7 Q Any significance to those answers? 
8 A Like I said again, maybe this is a fatigue issue or 
9 he's tired. 
10 Q As it specifically applies to his response, was there 
11 any significance in his response? 
12 A It appeared that he had slept. 
I i 
13 Q Then it says, "Are you sick or injured?" 
14 You got, "No." 
15 Are you diabetic or epileptic?" 
16 He said, "No." 
17 Do you take insulin?" 
18 He said, "No." 
19 Do you have any physical defects?" 
20 He says, "No." 
21 "Are you under the care of a doctor or dentist?" 
22 He said, "No." 
23 "Are you taking any medication or drugs?" 
24 He says, "No," which is inconsistent with what he 


































"Attitude," and you've written in "sad, been crying." 
/our observation or his response? 
That was my observation. 
"Coordination," you've got poor. 
"Breath, cottonmouth"? 
Yes. 
How do you tell from somebody's breath if they have 
cottonmouth or not? 
A When they talk to you, you can see that they 










It's not something you smell? 
No. 
You're talking basically about a dry mouth? 
Yes. 
You got "Face," you've got a response written there? 
"Red." 
Could that be due to crying? 
Possibly. 
Then the eyes are bloodshot and watery, but you 





I did indicate he had been crying. 
That is consistent with bloodshot or watery eyes? 
It could be, yes. 
"Blindness, none. Tracking, equal or unequal." You 
I 
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don't have anything written in there. Any reason for that? 
A No, an oversight. 
Q As far as tracking, are you talking about horizontal 
gaze tracking? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you make an observation about horizontal gaze 
tracking? 
A Yes. 
Q What was your observation? 
A It was normal. 
Q Then you've got, "Corrective lenses, none. Pupil 
size equal." What would the unequalness of the pupil size 
tell you if they were unequal? 
A Possibly an eye injury or head injury of some kind. 
Q "Able to follow stimulus." I assume that's with 
regard to the horizontal gaze? 
A Yes. 
Q "Eyelids droopy." You got the pulse listed three 
times, and you indicated the pulse was normal? 
A It was within the normal ranges. 
Q You did a horizontal gaze nystagmus test; is that 
correct? 
A I did. 
Q You were looking for basically three clues in each 
eye; is that correct? 
A It is. 
Q And you've got, "Lacks smooth pursuit present in both 
the left and right eye"; is that true? 
A Nods head (affirmatively). 
Q What does that tell you? 
A Lack of smooth pursuit? 
Q Yes. 
A Whether the eye is tracking smoothly. And in this 
case I indicated it was present, so it was not tracking 
smoothly. 
Q What's the significance of that? 
A It's a sign or a symptom of possible drug use. 
Q Then you got left eye and right eye nothing as far as 
maximum deviation nystagmus? 
A Yes. 
Q What does that tell you? 
A Also it tells you that it may or may not be a certain 
type of drug because you won't get nystagmus in all drugs that 
are used. 
Q Then "Angle of onset," which normally is 45 degrees, 
you got nothing In either the right or left eye? 
A Yes, just indicating it was not present 
Q With regard to his examination with regard to the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus, you got "lack of smooth tracking in 
each eye," but you don't have a nystagmus either at maximum 
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1 deviation or at 45 degrees; is that correct? 
2 A That's correct. 
3 Q Now "Convergence" you got right eye and left eye. 
4 You got some arrows drawn. Is there any significance to what 
5 you've written down in the convergence section? 
6 A Just showing that his eyes converged. 
7 Q Is that normal? 
8 A It can be normal. Again, with the lack of smooth 
9 pursuit, maximum deviation, those kinds of things, if a person 
10 is under the influence of some drugs or drug category, they 
11 will not be able to - their eyes will not be able to 
12 converge. 
13 Q The fact his eyes converged means his eyes were 
14 acting normally. 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q If they had not converged then it would have been a 
17 sign of drug use? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q But they did converge in this case. 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Then the Romberg test - explain to the court what 
22 the Romberg test is. What did you ask the defendant to 
23 actually do? 
24 A I asked Mr. Miller to tilt his head slightly back, 


























Q You've got 50 estimated at 30 seconds. Tell me what 
you mean by that? 
A When he tilted his head back and began the test, I 
kept track of time on my watch and 50 seconds had gone by when 




So his internal clock was slow? 
Yes. 
Now you did a walk and turn test, you talked about 




We do have a fixed line in the police department. 
What kind of line is it? 
It's in the tile. It's in the marble flooring 
there's a black straight line. 
Q 
A 
Is it a piece of tape? 
No, it's not. It's actually in the marble. It's an 










What's the width of it? 
I would guess three and a half to four inches. 
Then you did also a one-leg stand? 
Yes. 
Did he put his foot down? 
Yes. 
At what number? 
Eighteen. 
So he was able to make it to 18 seconds? 
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Q You've talked a little bit about the eyes. The pupil 
size on both the left and right eyes were 3.0 and that was 
normal? 
A That was within the normal ranges. 
Q Then the pupil size in darkness was 4.0; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q So just looking at him in normal light or dark light, 
his pupil size would have been normal; is that correct? 
That's - it's in the normal ranges, but it's on the 
low end of the normal, so it would appear to be smaller than 
normal. 
Q But within the normal range, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q How do you measure the pupil size? 
A Use a pupillometer chart. 
Q Then you got "direct 2.5." Explain that because I 
didn't understand what you said. 
A Direct light is we - 1 have a little pen light that 
we wil l shine in the eye and wil l measure the size of the 
pupil. 
Q What is the normal range when approached with direct 
light? 


























Q So his was 2.5 and it should have been 3.0; is that 
correct? 
A To be within the normal ranges, yes. 
Q What kind of variables do you usually see there when 
you check somebody's pupils with a direct light? 
A Depends on what type of drug they may have been 
using; it ranges. 
Q What does the 2.5 tell you as far as drugs; does it 
tell what type? 
A Constricted. 
Q Does it tell you what type? 
A Yeah. There's only one drug category that constricts 
the pupils. 
Q What is that? 
A Narcotic analgesic. 
Q All right. Now you said he couldn't touch his nose 
in six attempts, the tip of his nose. Where did he touch his 
nose or was he able to touch it at all? 
A He touched his nose, but it wasn't the tip of his 
nose. As I indicated - I think you have the copy of the face 
sheet we're looking at. Those dots would indicate where the 
nose was touched. 
Q Those are pretty hard to see, so I want you to tell 
me where -



























Q Just generally where did he touch his nose? 
A Just around the nose, mainly on the left side of the 
nose. 
Q Would it be fair to say that looking at your picture 
that he always touched the nose, but it wasn't necessarily on 
the tip? 
A Yes. 
Q Nothing unusual about the blood pressure, the pulse; 
is that correct? 
A It was normal. 
Q Or temperature. 
"Opinion of evaluator," you marked "depressant"; is 
that correct? 
A Yes, and also narcotic. 
Q And also "narcotic analgesic." What's the 
differences between a narcotic and a narcotic analgesic? 
A Say that again. 
Q What's the difference between a plain narcotic and a 
narcotic analgesic? 
A I think it's just a different term used. 
Q You really don't know what the significance of the 
analgesic means? 
A No. 
Q Tell me what conclusions that you arrived at in your 


























influence of a depressant? 
A Well, after completing the evaluation and looking at 
the signs and symptoms that I observed, whether it be in the 
psychophysical test -
Q That is what I specifically want to ask you about. 
What part of the psychophysical test leads you to believe that 
he was under the influence of a depressant? 
A On all of - the walk and turn, the one-leg stand, 
failed. 
Q You are relying on the one-leg stand and walk and 
turn -
A And also the Romberg test shows that his internal 
clock was slow. 
Q What else? 
A And then the finger to nose. He was unable to touch 
the tip of his nose. 
Q Those four things? 
A Yes. 
Q What results of the psychophysical test led you to 
believe that he was under the influence of a narcotic 
analgesic? 
A Didn't we just talk about the psychophysical test? 
Q Yes. We talked about depressants, now I want to know 
about narcotic analgesics. 
A The same. 
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Q Now, would you agree that all of those tests are 
subjective in that you are the one that makes the 
determination whether they are pass or fail or not? 
A Yes. But through my training and experience I record 
what I see. 
Q The tests that are not subjective, and I'm talking 
about pulse, blood pressure, pupil size and moonlight and 
darkness, temperature of the body, those are all normal; isn't 
that true? 
A If I heard you right - did you say the eye? 
Q I just said in room light or darkness? 
A Those are normal. 
Q Now, the white foamy substance you saw on the tongue, 
did you have any opinion what that was? 
A No, I did not have an opinion. 
Q And the fact his nose was runny could have been 
consistent with a cold or the weather actually; isn't that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q What about the muscle rigidity, how do you measure 
that? 
A Typically we'll just, you know, squeeze biceps, 
forearms, and if it's tensed up obviously it would be rigid, 
okay. And if it was really loose it would be flaccid, okay. 
Q I sort of understand. What if you got somebody who 
is in good shape and has lifted weights and works out and 
muscles are tight as opposed to somebody who doesn't work out?j 
A But it would be his muscles contracting, not typical 
for somebody even though they worked out and well conditioned 
that their muscles would be contracted and tight. 
Q So does it mean that the muscles are more dense; is 
that fair to say? 
A I don't understand. 
Q I'm just not - I don't understand how you tell the 
difference in muscle rigidity between just whether the muscle 
is rigid because of working out or rigid because they are 
tense for some reason? 
A It would be that they were tense or constricted. 
When something is constricted it's really tight. 
Q His was normal? 
A His was normal. 
THE COURT: Can I just ask a question. If I've got a 
body builder in his peak form and he's just standing in front 
of you and he's relaxed and you squeeze his biceps, are you 
going to feel a difference between his biceps and my biceps 
because I'm not a body builder? 
A Yes, you'll feel a difference but you would also feel 
a difference if you were flexing your biceps between your 
muscle tone versus his muscle tone. 
THE COURT: There is still going to be some 
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1 difference between him and me, but the difference that you're 
2 looking for is whether or not he has somehow tightened his up 
3 and has constricted his muscles. 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: What does that show if he has? What 
6 does -
7 THE WITNESS: It's just some drugs will cause 
8 tightening of the muscles. 
9 THE COURT: If he's standing there with his arm 
10 loosely hanging to the side and it feels like he's up with his 
11 arm tightening as if he was making stronger muscles, then that 
12 would be an indication to you that there's some drug at work. 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, it would. 
14 THE COURT: I don't know if I helped you or not. 
15 MR. PETRO: You did. 
16 Q (By Mr. Petro) One of your opinions was that 
17 Mr. Miller had taken a depressant; is that correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Is there anything on your DRE examination that you 
20 would have expected to see if someone had taken a depressant 
21 that you didn't see? 
22 A I would expect to see the clues that were exhibited 
23 during the psychophysical test. 
24 Q What I asked you is there are any -- is there any 


























you would have expected to see if somebody was under the 
influence or had taken a depressant? 
A Yes. 
What? 






All right. Anything else? 
I expect his - I think I indicated his body 
temperature was normal. Also the reaction to light would be 
slow. 
Q You didn't see any of those things? 
A No. 
Q Are there any things that you would have expected to 
see that you didn't see based upon your opinion that he had 
used a narcotic analgesic? 
A Again, I would expect to see his pulse rate down, or 
below normal, his blood pressure below normal and also his 
body temperature below normal. Did I answer that correctly? 
Is that what you wanted? 
Q Yes. After the DRE was performed, did you talk with 
Mr. Miller after it was completed? 
A After --
Q After you did these physical tests, did you actually 
talk with Mr. Miller? 
A Yes. 
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Q Did you record that conversation? 
A I did. 
Q Video or audio recorder? 
A Audio recorder. 
Q Do you have a tape of that recording? 
A With me right now? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Where is the tape of that recording? 
A It's in our evidence room. 
Q Has it been transcribed? 
A No. 
Q Can you get a copy of that to Mr. Bodily? 
A I sure will. 
Q What did you ask Mr. Miller when you spoke with him 
and what was his response, if you remember? 
A I asked him if he had been using any kind of illegal 
drugs, prescription drugs, any medicines of any kind. 
Q He told you what your response was before about the 
Lortab, the Valium and the OxyContin? 
A Yes. 
Q You already testified that those were within the 
therapeutic range; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did you ever place Mr. Miller under arrest? 
A No. 
Q Anything else you remember that's significant? 
A No. 
MR. PETRO: I don't have any other questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bodily. 
MR. BODILY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BODILY: 
Q Officer Chappell, you are trained as a DRE. You've 
had that training for about three years or so? 
A Yes. 
Q Part of that training you're trained to recognize 
someone under the effect of some general drug categories? 
A Yes. 
Q Are you trained in why the drugs are categorized as 
they are? 
A No. 
Q Are you trained in how those drugs are used or 
prescribed or what they are for? 
A No. 
Q You look at performance on tests and the things that 
you observe and make general category determinations? 
A Yes. 
Q Are those determinations that you make, would you say 
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1 that they are certain or would you say they are more based on 
2 probability? 
3 A The latter. 
4 Q They are more based on probability. 
5 Once you come to that opinion, is there anything that 
6 corroborates your opinion? 
7 A Toxicology. 
8 Q In this case the toxicology did show the classes of 
9 drugs that you suspected when you looked at Mr. Miller? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q When you first observed Mr. Miller, how long did it 
12 take you - I'm not talking about your ultimate conclusion. 
13 Just in your opinion, based on your training and experience, 
14 how long did it take you to form the opinion or to have some 
15 indication that either something was wrong or that he might be 
16 impaired in some way? 
17 A It was only just a few minutes after I began talking 





23 I A 
24 J Q 
25 night? 
Have you ever seen him before? 
No. 
Have you ever spoken with him before as far as you 
No, not that I know. 



























Q But within a couple minutes you were starting to get 
a picture? 
A Yes. 
Q You looked at just the way he looked, you saw how he 
performed on tests that you gave him. You heard his responses 
to questions and you interviewed him and asked him certain 
things and he gave you certain responses, and then you formed 
an opinion? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you form that opinion before or after you saw the 
results of the lab test? 
A Before. 
Q In considering all those things, are there certain 
factors or certain portions of your investigation that in your 
mind are more important than others? 
A Yes. 
Q What are those factors as it applies to this case? 
A His demeanor is important, how the field sobriety 
tests or psychophysical tests were performed, those were 
important, and then the pupil size and statements he made. 
Q Why is demeanor important to you in this case? 
A Just because the way a person looks, the way his 
coordination, his eyes, all those things, his speech, are all 
indicators that something may be going on in his body. 
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Q How about his performance on the test in this case, 
why are those significant? 
A He was unable to perform most of the tests, all of 
the tests. 
Q Were any of the tests that you administered that you 
felt he passed? 
A No. 
Q Pupil size, why is that significant in this case? 
A Because there's only one drug category that 
constricts the pupils and that's narcotic analgesics. There 
are several that will cause the pupils to dilate and there are 
some that will just be in the normal ranges. But when I see 
somebody that has constricted pupils, it's something that I 
will make note of or document 
Q Was there any significance to the lack of change? I 
think in your report it says "reaction to light little to 
none." 
A Yes, there was. 
Q Why is that significant? 
A Also there's only one drug category that you'll see 
that in, where there's little to no reaction to light, and 
that would also be in the narcotic analgesic category. 
Q What was the significance of his statements? 
A That he had used a narcotic. 
Q Did you give any weight to the quantity of narcotic 
that he said he had used? 
A Yes. 
Q Did that lead you to a conclusion toward impairment? 
A Yes, absolutely. 
Q As far as the lab report goes, we talked already 
about Oxycodone. That, for the purpose of a DRE, that's a 
narcotic analgesic even though the crime report classifies it 
as a central nervous system depressant? 
A Yes. 
Q I want to just ask you about a couple of these other 
things: Meprobamate, Equanil or Miltown. The lab report says 
that's a central nervous system depressant; that its affect 
may be additive to other depressants. How is that classified, 
if you know, under DRE protocols? 
A Repeat. 
Q The Meprobamate, the lab report classifies that as a 
CNS depressant. How does the DRE classify it? 
A As a CNS depressant. 
Q How about Diazepam or Valium? The lab report says 
CNS depressant. How would the DRE classify that? 
A As a depressant. 
Q Nordiazepam. That is classified as a CNS depressant. 
In the lab report how would the DRE report that? 
A As a depressant. 
Q And Oxycodone is one we already talked about. 
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1 Are you trained to make these kinds of evaluations in 
2 situations where there is more than one drug category 
3 potentially on board? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Does having possibly two or more drugs on board or 
6 two or more substances on board, classifications on board, 
7 does that complicate your evaluation? 
8 A It does. 
9 Q Why is that? 
10 A Because you'll see signs and symptoms from both drug 
11 categories. 
12 Q Is it possible that some signs that are indicative of 
13 one drug cancel out what you would expect to see from another 
14 drug? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Based on your experience, is it common to see every 
17 single possible indicator in the case where you determined 
18 someone was impaired? 
19 A No. 
20 Q It's not common to see that? 
21 A No. Say that again. 
22 Q In your experience, is it common or typical to see 
23 someone who exhibits every symptom or indication down the line 
24 for a given drug category? 



























Q But you make a judgment call in determining? 
A Yes. 
Q I was a little bit confused when you were asked 
earlier about the significance of some of your preliminary 
questions that you asked. Can it affect your opinion as to 
impairment or inability to safely operate a vehicle if you 
have someone who has not eaten? 
A No. 
Q What if they haven't slept? 
A Yes, it could. It could affect somebody's ability if 
they had gone several hours -- or excuse me, several days 
without any sleep. 
Q So are you trying to rule out possible causes of 
failure or -
A Yes. 
O AH right. During your contacts with Mr. Miller, did 
he ever ask to leave? 
A No. 
Q I believe you've already stated you did not place him 
under arrest? 
A No. 
Q Do you know if he was placed into custody after your 
evaluation? 
A It is my understanding he was not. He actually left 
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with his parents. 
Q Did you make that decision? 
A No. 
MR. BODILY: I don't have any other questions for 
you? 
MR. PETRO: Just a couple more questions. 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PETRO: 
Q When you asked Mr. Miller about drug use, he 
indicated to you that he had taken five Lortab the day before; 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And he indicated that he took an OxyContin; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q What milligrams did he tell you on the OxyContin? 
A 20 milligrams. 
Q What milligrams on the Lortab? 
A 7.5. 
Q He took five of them? 
A Yes. 
Q That was the day before? 
A Yes. 
Q What else did he tell you he took? 
A Also took a Valium. 
Q Was there anything significant about what he said 
there about those drugs? What's the significance of taking 
five Lortab the day before and one OxyContin and a Valium? 
A Seems like a lot. 
Q Which seems like a lot? 
A Five Lortab. 
Q You've reviewed the blood draw, the results of the 
blood draw; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q It doesn't even appear that there was any Lortab in 
his system; is that correct? 
A You know, I don't know if Oxycodone makes up Lortab 
or not. It doesn't say in the crime report. 
Q It doesn't list Lortab. 
A It does not list Lortab. 
Q Under the State Crime Lab list, they've got, "Blood 
Oxycodone." Then on the second page, it says, "OxyContin, 
Percodan, Percocet, Roxicet, Roxicodone or Tyiox." So they 
don't list Lortab, do they? 
A No. 
Q And the amount of Oxycodone in the blood is .1 
microgram; is that correct? 
A I believe that's correct 



























I Oxycodone; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
It is within the therapeutic dosage. j 
Twenty milligrams of OxyContin anyways is one of the 




I believe that it is in the OxyContin. 
Usually it goes up to 80 milligrams, 1 think. 




In 20 - or what the kids call them on the street is 






1 don't know if they refer to them as babies. 
But it's a small milligram amount; is that correct? 
Yes. 
MR. PETRO: 1 don't have any other questions. 
MR. BODILY: No further questions. 
THE COURT: May he be excused? 
MR. BODILY: Yes. 
MR. PETRO: Yes. 
THE COURT: I'm going to take a quick break before we 
(Recess taken.) 
MR. BODILY: State calls Penny Wheeler. 
THE COURT: Please come forward to my clerk and 



























called by the State, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Please come up here and have a seat. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: We'll need to have you speak up. The 
microphone is mostly cosmetic. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BODILY: 
Q Ms. Wheeler, would you state your name and spell your 
last name for the court, please. 
A Penny Wheel, W-H-E-E-L-E-R. 
Q Ms. Wheeler, what do you do for a living? 
A I'm a manager. 
Q Of? 
A At the University of Phoenix. 
Q How long have you been there? 




























Q Have you ever testified in court before? 
A No. 
Q We're here to talk about an incident that occurred on 
the evening of October 31th last year; do you remember that 
night? 
A Yes. 
Q How can you remember it? 
A Because my daughter and I were on our way home and we 8 
witness - well, were we - we came upon an accident. 
Q Do you remember about what time the accident 
occurred? 
A I'm thinking about 8:00, maybe 9:00. 
Q It's been a few months. Since the time of the 
accident, did you make any notes about what happened or make 
any kind of recording or anything? 
A No. 
Q Did you give a statement to police on the night that 
it happened? 
A I filled out a paper the night that it happened. 
Q Okay. I want to talk to you for a few minutes just 
about what happened. Can you describe what happened just 
prior to you seeing or hearing the accident? 
A I was driving eastbound making a right-hand turn at 
the intersection where the accident took place, and as I was 


















heard the accident and was in the process of making the turn 
and then stopped. 
Q So, as you approached the intersection, were you 
driving straight or had you started to turn when you --
A I was driving straight already, but the light was 
green for me, and so I didn't make a stop because the light 
was green. So I was going driving and then I slowed down 
enough to make the turn and stopped right at the corner. 
Because by that time the accident had happened and --
Q My question to you is, the moment that you first 
heard or saw the accident -
A I was approaching the intersection. 
Q You were approaching the intersection. You had not 
begun your turn? 
A No. 
Q Did you have time to stop or what did you do next? 
A As I - I stopped as I was making the turn. 
Q As you were approaching the light, you said that it 
was green? 
A Yes. 
Q That was the light for your direction? 
A Yes. 
Q How long had you seen the light, best you can 
estimate, if you can, how long had you seen the light green? 
A Several seconds. 
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1 Q Can you be more specific at all? Can you give a 
2 range or anything? 
3 A I'd say at least a couple of seconds. 
4 THE COURT: Counsel, would you finish your question. 
5 How long had it been green when what? 
6 MR. BODILY: When she -
7 THE WITNESS: When I noticed it? 
8 Q (By Mr. Bodily) As you were approaching the 
9 intersection prior to hearing the accident? 
10 I A A couple of seconds. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. 
12 Q (By Mr. Bodily) As you were approaching the 
13 intersection, did you have to slow down because the light was 
14 red prior to it turning green? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Do you remember if there was any traffic headed the 
17 same direction that you were as you approached the 
18 intersection? 
19 A I don't remember. 
20 Q Were there any vehicles in front of you as you were 
21 making your turn or before you made the turn? 
22 A Possibly there could have been. I don't recall. 
23 Q Did you have to brake for any of the vehicles? 
24 A No, I did not. 


























come over a hill or down a hill or anything like that as you 
approached the intersection or is it pretty much a flat shot 
to the light? 
A It's a fairly flat surface as you approach the 
intersection. 
Q For about how far back from the intersection was it 
flat? 
A I'm not very good with distance. It's quite a ways. 
Q Can you be anymore specific at all? 
A I can't. I have no judgment of distance at all. 
THE COURT: Counsel, would you have her identify 
where the intersection is. 
Q (By Mr. Bodily) What intersection was it that we're 
talking about the night the accident occurred? 
A I don't know the northbound coordinate, but it's on 
Main Street and it's the intersection by the McDonald's. I 
don't know what street that is. 
Q What city is it in? 
A Springville. 
THE COURT: You were eastbound, but you don't know 
what street you were on? 
THE WITNESS: I know where the street is, but I don't 
know what the street name is. 
Q (By Mr. Bodily) Did you stop after you heard the 
accident? 
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Q What did you do then after you stopped? 
A I pulled over to see if I could offer any assistance. 
There were several young children there. And I helped another 
woman that was at the accident gather the children together 
because everybody was just running. And we could see these 
young people running, and we were trying to - they were 
scared and they were crying, and so we were just trying to 
gather them to get them out of the way. 
Q Did you see who was driving the vehicles involved in 
the accident? 
A No. 
Q Was there anyone with you in your vehicle? 
A My daughter. 
Q What's her name? 
A Tamera, T-A-M-E-R-A. 
Q Same last name? 
A Yes. 
MR. BODILY: I don't have any other questions for you 
at this point. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PETRO: 
Q Ms. Wheeler, how old is your daughter? 
A She's 16 now. 
Q Sixteen, 1-6? 
A Sixteen. 
Q You said you were heading eastbound? 
A Yes. 
Q So you were coming from the direction of the freeway 
towards the foothills in Springville? 
A That's correct. 
Q Where were you in relationship to the intersection 
when the accident happened? 
A I heard the accident. I was just approaching the 
intersection and making the turn, so it happened as I was 
approaching and then I made the turn to stop. 
Q So you were approaching the intersection going 
eastbound, and it was your direction to go straight through 
the intersection or were you going to turn? 
A I was going to turn right. 
Q You were going to go south into Springville? 
A That's correct. 
Q As you approached the intersection you heard the 
accident? 
A Yes. 
MR. PETRO: l don't have any other questions. 
MR. BODILY: I don't have any other questions for 
this witness. 



























MR. BODILY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. BODILY: Could I have just a moment? 
THE COURT: Are there more witnesses? 
MR. BODILY: I don't think so. I need to clarify one 
thing with my witness. 
THE COURT: All right 
(Recess taken.) 
MR. BODILY: The State would recall Lieutenant 
Gordon. 
THE COURT: Please come up. You're still under oath. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BODILY: 
Q Lieutenant Gordon, I just want to clarify a couple of 
things, one thing in particular. At the time that you arrived 
on the scene, who was in control of the scene? 
A Corporal Anderson. 
Q Corporal Anderson at the time was with Springville 
Police Department? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did he tell you that the defendant was the driver of 
the truck involved in the accident? 
MR. PETRO: Objection; hearsay. 



























non-testifying officer to another officer under 1102. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Yes, he did. 
Q (By Mr. Bodily) That was the person that he 
identified to you that was seated in the back of the patrol 
car that we've already talked about, the defendant that is 
present here in court? 
A That's correct 
Q That's the same person seated here seated at counsel 
table? 
A Yes, it is. 
MR. BODILY: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Petro? 
MR. PETRO: No. 
THE COURT: You may be excused. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
MR. BODILY: Your Honor, the only thing I would do at 
this time is I would offer State's Exhibit Number 2, a copy of 
the medical examiner's report that shows the cause of death to 
the victim, Carlee Haymond, as blunt trauma as a result of an 
automobile accident 
MR. PETRO: I already stipulated to that. 
THE COURT: I need to see Exhibit 1 as well. Any 
other factual stipulations between the parties? 
MR. PETRO: Not that I recall. 



























MR. BODILY: Then Exhibits 3 and 4 are copies of 
witness statements. 
MR.PETRO: Object to those. 
MR. BODILY: They are offered under 1102. They're 
signed and have been provided to counsel containing the 
perjury warning. They're statements of non-testifying 
witnesses that were present at the time of the accident. 
MR. PETRO: Judge, objection. Clearly it's hearsay. 
I don't think there's a reliable type of hearsay that the 
statute suggests shouid be admitted into this type of 
proceeding. 
THE COURT: What makes you think they're not 
reliable? 
MR. PETRO: Well, when did that statute first -
MR. BODILY: It's under 1102(b)(8). "A statement of 
declarant written in this case which is under oath or 
affirmation or pursuant to a notification to the declarant 
that a false statement made therein is made punishable." 
THE COURT: I can't make a determination without 
looking at i t 
That is what it says, Mr. Petro. 
MR. PETRO: There's nothing that indicates that it's 
under oath. In fact, the person that fills it out witnesses 
it himself. He fills it in as the witness. His name is Roy 



























THE COURT: Our choices are that either, A, that it's 
under oath or affirmation or, B, pursuant to notification to 
the declarant that a false statement made therein is 
punishable. 
Is there any statement on these documents that 
warrants them that such a statement if false would be 
punishable? Do they have that notification? 
MR. PETRO: Yes, there is - let me take a look at 
it It cites a statute 76-8-504. 
MR. BODILY: I believe that's the perjury statute. 
MR. PETRO: It deals with written false statements. 
THE COURT: 76-8-504(1) looks like it dovetails -
MR. PETRO: It's not really the perjury statute 
because It deals with false statements. 
MR. BODILY: That's right. 
THE COURT: No, but it refers to a form bearing 
notification authorized by law the effect of false statements 
made therein are punishable. I think it's probably a direct 
reference to the reports that are anticipated by Rule 1102 of 
the Rules of Evidence. I think perjury would have to be under 
oath. 
MR. BODILY: That's right 
THE COURT: Here it's under notification. 



























THE COURT: Mr. Petro, are you continuing your 
objection? i 
MR. PETRO: I'll withdraw the objection. 
THE COURT: All right These were Exhibits 3 and 4? 
MR. BODILY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: AH right I need to see them. 
MR. PETRO: If I hadn't offered those, I offer them 
at this point 
THE COURT: With no objection these are received. 
Exhibit 3 is a statement from looks like Charles Gilchrist 
Exhibit 4 is Roy Scott. I'm going to take a minute to read 
them. 
(S ta te ' s E x h i b i t Numbers 3 and 4 
were rece ived i n t o ev idence.) 
(Court rev iews document ) 
THE COURT: Counsel, may I just ask as a point of 
clarification, is this the intersection by Clyde Construction? 
MR. PETRO: Yes. 
THE COURT: It has a fairly recent light in the last 
few years? 
MR.PETRO: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have a copy that doesn't have the 
bottom line chopped off -
MR. BODILY: Yes, I do. 




























(Court is handed a new copy.) 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Opposing argument? 
MR. BODILY: Your Honor, I believe that considering 
the inferences favorable to the State and given the standard 
the State has to prove, the State has proven all the charges 
and have put forth enough evidence on all the charges to allow 
for this case to be bound over. In regards to the automobile 
homicide charge, that Mr. Miller did operate a motor vehicle 
in a criminal and negligent manner causing the death of 
another under the influence of a drug and rendered him 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
We've stipulated to the medical examiner's report. 
The accident was the cause of death. Relying on the DRE 
testimony of Officer Chappell, that in his opinion, Mr. Miller 
was under the influence and that he was incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. His opinions are corroborated by the lab 
report. The lab report also indicates that the drugs, which 
were influencing Mr. Miller, have an additive effect upon each 
other, given their similar classification. 
The other evidence the State would rely on for that 
point would be the statement of Mr. Scott and the driving 
pattern that was observed - Mr. Miller's driving pattern 



























As far as the possession charge based on the lab 
report and the fact that Mr. Miller stated to Officer Chappell 
that he had used OxyContin and Lortab in either Mapleton or 
Springville, the statute only requirs that he used a 
controlled substance, that he knowingly and intentionally used 
a controlled substance, and he stated that he did. 
Finally, the driving under the influence and also 
relying heavily on the statement by Mr. Scott and the 
testimony of Officer Chappell and the lab report. The only 
concern that I have about this case - well, as far as it 
relates to preliminary hearing, is that the standard in the 
automobile homicide is criminal negligence. 
The evidence that the State is relying on at that 
point is the testimony of Penny Wheeler, that as she was 
approaching the intersection and for some seconds in her 
direction the light was green; it was never red as she was 
approaching the intersection. The inference being that the 
light in the other direction had been red for some seconds. 
It's also supported by the witnesses' statements. 
If the court is unpersuaded on that point 
specifically, then I would ask for a continuance that's 
contemplated under 1102, and we would want to bring Roy Scott 
in to testify. He is a retired Ohio patrolman, and so he was 
not brought in for that purpose for the expense that would be 


























all I have. 
MR. PETRO: Judge, my attitude with regard to that is 
you can't have it both ways. You can't intend to rely on an 
affidavit under the statute, and then if it doesn't quite meet 
muster, I want a continuance for the purpose of bringing the 
declarant into court. I think you have to make that call at 
the outset; that's not a good reason to continue the case. 
Let me make a couple arguments. I think, number one, 
I think Count 3, the driving under the influence of alcohol 
merges into Count 1. I think it's the lesser included offense 
of automobile homicide. There's absolutely no difference 
between the two crimes except in the automobile homicide a 
death occurs. I think, one, the DUI is the lesser included of 
the automobile homicide and can't be charged separately. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PETRO; Secondly, with regard to the criminal 
negligence and/or whether it is third degree automobile 
homicide - whether it's second or third, depends on whether 
It was a reckless accident or one involving criminal 
negligence. The only evidence you have is in the form of 
affidavits. None of the witnesses that testified today really 
saw the accident. I think all that Ms. Wheeler can testify to 
is that she saw that the light was green for a couple seconds. 
She didn't really even know where she was in relationship to 
the intersection. If you look at the other two witness 
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1 statements, one of them being I think the Gilchrist one -
2 THE COURT: The very short one? 
3 MR. PETRO: Yes. It says, "The white truck was 
4 headed northbound on Main, ran red light and hit van that was 
5 headed eastbound." Well, that's an indirect contradiction of 
6 the other statement that says the van was going - the another 
7 statement says that the van actually was going southbound 
8 turning - 1 think going to turn east and they collided at the 
9 intersection. So the van really — it was at the 
10 intersection. It was heading southbound but going to make a 
11 turn going eastbound. And then that statement says something 
12 I about a black Jag hit the back of the truck. Mr. Miller was 
13 driving a truck. I don't know what black Jag Mr. Gilchrist is 
14 talking about because it was my understanding it was just a 
15 two car accident. 
16 If a black Jag did hit Mr. Miller from behind, then 
17 there's an issue, well, did he go through the intersection or 
18 did someone push him through because of the collision, so that 
19 statement is confusing. If you look at Mr. Scott, he says 
20 that, "I saw the traffic light at US 89 and 1400 North turn 
21 yellow. As the light turned red, the truck entered the 
22 intersection." So he's not saying that the light was red and 
23 that the truck, you know, clearly saw a red light and then 
24 entered the intersection. It says that happened almost 


























you get into the intersection when it's red, you haven't run a 
red light under the Utah statute. 
The other thing I would point out to the court is the 
other lady Is already into the intersection. From what I 
think everybody indicates, she had to turn in front of 
Mr. Miller. So I think at most it's a case where you might 
imply that he was neglect, but I don't know how you get to the 
issues of recklessly or maliciously or even further than that 
criminal negligence. 
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Petro, is there an 
argument to be made that with the introduction of the 
statement from Mr. Scott - we've got a DUI that is happening 
clear from east bay in Provo to until the accident happens, 
does it necessarily merge? With his testimony he's got the 
driving pattern. 
MR PETRO: I think what you're asking me is --
THE COURT: It's an interesting question. It ought 
to be researched later. 
MR. PETRO: I assume what the court is saying is it 
possible that a DUI occurred prior to the accident. You've 
got a DUI there and it doesn't necessarily merge with the 
automobile homicide. I don't want it to be a homicide, but -
THE COURT: The alleged. 
MR. PETRO: That's interesting. I never thought of 
it. 
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THE COURT: As I look at it, the two scenarios, if 
you didn't have Mr. Scott's testimony then you would have the 
discrete set of facts surrounding the actual accident itself 
with the possibility that your client was under the influence. 
What we have here is a pattern that one of the witnesses 
claims begins in south Provo, continues all the way down the 
highway and then ends in the accident. 
MR. PETRO: I guess the significance of that is do 
you have the DUI and then the subsequent accident and what 
arises from the accident. I don't think it tells you much as 
to the mental state because the statute assumes he's impaired. 
But that's --1 honestly don't know the answer to that. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. BODILY: Your Honor, my response to that, a 
couple of things. I think 1102 and 9(c) specifically 
contemplates that where reliable hearsay testimony has been 
offered and where testimonial evidence could be used but was 
not then a continuance is appropriate if the court -- if the 
magistrate believes there's not enough to bind the case over. 
So that's what I'm relying on in relation to Mr. Scott's 
testimony. 
As far as the criminally neglect standard, it is hard 
to pull a lot of good detail out these statements; that 
they're brief and we don't have the opportunity to ask 


























fairly lengthy time which, you know, at freeway or even rural 
highway speeds, I think a couple seconds or more than a couple 
seconds at least --1 think she also said several seconds. 
She had trouble pinning that done, but any of those could be 
found for purposes here to mean that there was a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk. Just the kind of result that happened 
here would happen, and that his failure to perceive is a gross 
deviation. That's all I have in response. 
MR. PETRO: Can I just make one last observation? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. PETRO: My understanding of criminal negligence 
is best argued probably by illustration. If you shoot a gun 
in a crowd of people not necessarily trying to hit one but the 
risk is so high that somebody is likely to be injured or 
killed, that's criminal negligence. Or if you drive down a 
school zone like maybe 10 miles over, it may be negligent. If 
you drive over 30 or 40, it may be reckless and if you go over 
60 or 70 miles an hour, it could be criminal negligence. But 
that's not what we have here. We have at best a very close 
call at an intersection. 
I think the problem with Ms. Wheeler's statement is 
that makes the other driver equally at fault because she was 
in the intersection for several seconds before the accident 
occurred and probably is negligent herself. If you rely on 
Mr. Scott that was behind Mr. Miller, he says that Mr. Miller 
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1 entered the intersection just as the light turned red. That 
2 may be negligence, but it certainly isn't criminal negligence. 
3 I don't think even using Mr. Scott's statement, that the State 
4 has proven a criminal negligent standard. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Petro, you think that the two witness 
6 statements have the driver of the white van going two 
7 different directions? 
8 MR. PETRO: No. I think the Gilchrist statement says 
9 that the van is going eastbound, and actually the van was 
10 heading in a northbound direction and was turning east. But 
11 from what I understand, they met right in the middle of the 
12 intersection. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Scott says northbound white van was 
14 in the intersection waiting to turn left. 
15 MR. PETRO: Right. 
16 THE COURT: They both have her northbound but 
17 Mr. Scott has her making a left turn which would be west and 
18 Mr. Gilchrist has her making a right turn which would be east, 
19 right? 
20 MR. PETRO: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. Let me work my way through things 
22 that I think really are at issue. The unrefuted testimony 
23 today, although it's been hearsay but it's acceptable hearsay 
24 through the rule, is that on Count 1, the defendant was the 


























or from Ms. White, but I have an officer that tells me he was 
the driver and that he was operating a motor vehicle. 
There is no doubt that we had a death. Carlee 
Haymond was killed as a result of this accident and that's 
based on the report from the medical examiner. 
As to the influence of any drug or the combined 
influence of alcohol or drugs. In looking at the testimony of 
Officer Chappell, who did the DRE exam - just for the 
purposes of the record that stands for Drug Recognition 
Expert, I believe - I find that there's probable cause to 
believe that the defendant was under the influence, a combined 
influence of several drugs. And I base that not only on the 
DRE testimony but also on the toxicology report which 
indicates that we have measurable amounts, quantifiable 
amounts, of blood Meprobamate, blood Diazepam, blood 
Nordiazepam and blood Oxycodone. 
On the second page, we have an explanation of each 
one of these, showing that the Meprobamate is a central 
nervous system depressant It has in parenthesis CNS, and 
states its effects may be additive to those of alcohol and 
other CNS depressants. Diazepam, in parenthesis, Valium, is 
also a CNS depressant and also may be additive to those of 
alcohol and other CNS depressants. The same statement is made 
for the Nordiazepam and for the Oxycodone. 
It's interesting to me. I see in parenthesis after 
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Oxycodone the following drugs: OxyContin, Percodan, Percocet, 
Roxicet, Roxicodone and Tylox. My understanding when I was 
prosecuting was that Lortab was also something that was 
associated with Oxycodone being the generic, but they don't 
list it here. I think for purposes of probable cause, I have 
four central nervous system depressants here that fall into 
the category that's considered in the last paragraph here, 
"Drugs that cause central nervous system effects can impair 
drivability. When used in combination with others CNS 
depressant drugs including alcohol, which we have no 
indication that there was alcohol involved here, these effects 
may be enhanced. 
So for purposes of probable cause for this hearing, I 
find that he was impaired, the defendant was impaired. I also 
make that finding based upon the written statement of 
Mr. Scott who followed the defendant from east bay, which 
would be south Provo, to the intersection at the very north 
edge of Springville. The reason I asked is I wanted to make 
sure I was thinking of the correct intersection. It is the 
intersection where Clyde Construction is located, and I don't 
know that anyone is going to take any offense if I also note 
that it is the intersection from which you would go westbound 
to get to 1-15, so it's a well-known intersection and I have 
used the intersection, heavily used intersection. 
From the toxicology report from the Crime Lab and the 
description of the defendant's pattern, I think there is 
definitely impairment. 
So, I think that leaves the question of whether or 
not there is criminal negligence. Let me read from the 
statute so we have on the record what the definition of 
criminal negligence is. And I read from 76-2-103(4). "With 
criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in 
all circumstances as viewed from the act or standpoint." 
It's clear from the defendant's statements to Officer 
Chappeli that he knew he had taken five Lortab the night 
before, strength 7.5. One OxyContin. I have to check my 
notes. He had taken - the testimony I believe was that the 
defendant had taken five 7.5 tablets of Lortab at his home the 
night before in Mapleton at about 10 o'clock. And then on the 
day of the accident, he had taken ten 2 milligram Valium at a 
friend's house in Springville, plus the OxyContin at 5:30 at 
his house in Mapleton, which is within a short period of time 
before the accident. 
Based on that I find for purposes of probable cause 
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1 for this hearing that the defendant was well aware that he had 
2 taken Lortab, a great deal of Lortab the night before, and 
3 that he had taken Valium and OxyContin, and the one OxyContin 
4 was shortly before the accident occurred. So he knew that he 
5 had taken these drugs. He also -- it's a tricky thing. I 
6 found that he was impaired and he drove for some time, 
7 according to the off-duty retired officer who was behind him, 
8 Mr. Scott, all over the road. Having driven all over the road 
9 for some period of time between south Provo and north 
10 Springville, he does not pull over. He does nothing to take 
11 himself off the road. The language here is with respect to 
12 circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
13 conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and 
14 unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result 
15 will occur. 
16 The ordinary person, I believe, would exercise 
17 greater care. And I believe that his behavior here -- or I 
18 find by using the probable cause standard that his behavior 
19 here did constitute the gross deviation from the standard of 
20 care that an ordinary person would exercise. I believe that 
21 an ordinary person would have taken more care knowing that the 
22 drugs had been consumed and knowing that he was having troubli 
23 driving, would have more carefully removed himself from the 
24 road. 


























that we are having today, I find and do bind over Count 1, 
finding that the defendant did operate the motor vehicle in a 
criminally neglect manner. 
I don't make that decision disregarding the possible 
conflicts in the statements of the two witnesses whose written 
statements we have, plus the testimony of Ms. Wheeler. But I 
do have, I believe, enough evidence to make probable cause 
finding that the light was red when he went through it for 
purposes of this hearing. 
As to Count 2, possession or use of OxyContin, this 
would be possession by the presence of it in his body as 
verified by the toxicology report and his own admission, and I 
bind that over for trial as well. 
As to Count 3,1 am going to find, for purposes of 
today's hearing, that there was a discrete and separate 
offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or 
drugs, but I will certainly entertain pretrial motions that 
Mr. Petro wants to make with regard to that issue. I think 
it's an interesting issue and I'm not sure if I've ever seen 
any case law on it. But if you can find something that's 
helpful, please file a motion. 
Based on the testimony of Mr. Scott who was behind 
the defendant's pickup truck for a matter of some miles and 
observed him crossing the center line and crossing the 
right-hand line for quite some period of time and then 



























observed the accident happened, and based upon the evidence of 
the drug recognition expert who testified today, Mr. Chappell, 
and also Dell Gordon and his observations, albeit short in 
duration of time of the defendant, I find that there's 
probable cause that the defendant did operate the vehicle and 
that he was under the influence of any drugs or a combination 
of drugs which rendered him incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle. So I do bind over on all three counts. 
Where do you want to go from here, Mr. Petro? Do you 
want to enter a plea today or do you want some time? 
MR. PETRO: We'd like to enter a plea today. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PETRO: He intends on entering not guilty pleas. 
THE COURT: That was my assumption. 
Stand up, Mr. Miller, and let me take your pleas. 
On Count 1, automobile homicide, a second degree 
felony, what is your plea? 
THE WITNESS: Not guilty. 
THE COURT: Count 2, possession or use of OxyContin, 
your plea? 
THE WITNESS: Not guilty. 
THE COURT: Count 3, driving under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs, your plea? 
THE WITNESS: Not guilty. 


























move would generally be to set it for trial. Do you want some 
time, Mr. Petro? 
MR. PETRO: Judge, I do because I anticipate filing 
some motions. 
THE COURT: How much time do you want to file the 
motions? 
MR. PETRO: Probably two weeks at least. 
THE COURT: AH right. Two weeks from today would 
put us on August 12th. Should we make them due Friday, 
August 13th, they would be due? 
MR. PETRO: Okay. 
THE COURT: Could you have your response to Mr. Petro 
by two weeks later? 
MR. BODILY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, so that would make it the 27th. Do 
you want some response time, Mr. Petro? 
MR. PETRO: Yes. 
THE COURT: How about a week. I assume you will be 
faxing these back and forth, or do I need to factor in more 
time for mailing? 
MR. PETRO: Fax will be fine. 
MR. BODILY: We can fax them. 
THE COURT: If so, a week would be fine and a week 
after that would be September 3rd, which would put us setting 
this for oral arguments. Do you think you're going to need 
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1 any evidence or maybe oral arguments? 
2 MR. BODILY: I think probably just oral arguments. I 
3 don't want to preclude offering some evidence. 
4 THE COURT: All right. We have no court on the 9th 
5 because of the judicial conference, so we would be looking at 
6 the 16th; does that work? 
7 MR. PETRO: Yes. 
8 MR. BODILY: Yes, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Shall we do it at 3 o'clock after 
10 everything else is cleared out? 
11 MR. PETRO: That's fine. 
12 MR. BODILY: Okay. 
13 THE COURT: 3 o'clock for oral arguments on any 
14 motions that are filed by either side. If you decide to file 
15 anything, reverse time would be the same, okay? Does the 
16 State withdraw its evidence? 
17 MR. BODILY: Yes, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Petro? 
19 MR. PETRO: No. 
20 THE COURT: Anything else we need to cover? 
21 MR. PETRO: No. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you very much. We'll be in recess. 
23 (Proceedings in the above-entitled 
24 matter were concluded.) 
25 
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ailments [1] 30/12 
albeit [1] 100/3 
alcohol [10] 4/16 4/17 89/9 95/7 95/20 
95/23 96/10 96/11 99/16 100/23 
all [51] 5/6 5/13 5/19 6/7 6/18 7/16 7/24 
8/8 9/16 9/21 14/6 14/21 18/12 21/13 26/1 
26/9 34/6 34/12 40/25 53/18 57/16 57/18 
59/8 60/1 60/8 63/7 67/14 67/24 67/24 68/3 
71/17 78/1 79/9 79/10 82/7 86/4 86/6 87/7 
87/8 89/1 89/22 92/6 92/13 93/8 97/14 98/8 
98/8100/8100/12101/8102/4 
alleged [1] 91/23 
allow [3] 14/14 38/3 87/8 
almost [2] 75/25 90/24 
along [1] 49/4 
already [12] 9/1010/818/3 45/5 64/22 
69/5 69/25 71/20 77/5 83/6 83/22 91/4 
also [44] 12/2517/6 22/22 27/24 31/6 
31/25 32/13 32/19 36/5 36/10 36/13 36/13 
37/2 39/2 39/20 41/5 42/1 42/13 47/22 50/5 
53/17 55/19 58/14 58/15 59/12 61/22 63/9 
63/17 68/20 68/22 73/1 84/25 87/19 88/7 
88/19 93/3 95/13 95/22 95/22 96/3 96/14 
96/2198/5100/3 
also -- [2] 41/5 98/5 
alternative [1] 5/9 
although [1] 94/23 
always [1] 58/5 
am [4] 99/14103/4103/14103/15 
ambulance [4] 9/8 17/25 18/8 18/20 
ambulances [1] 9/9 
amend [1] 4/23 
amending [1] 5/14 
amendment [1] 5/16 
amount [3] 73/22 74/10 74/13 
amounts [2] 95/14 95/15 
analgesic [11] 41/9 43/4 57/15 58/15 
58/16 58/19 58/22 59/21 63/15 68/22 69/7 
analgesics [5] 42/10 43/5 43/11 59/24 
68/10 
and - [2] 45/6 77/9 
Anderson [19] 10/210/1011/711/10 
13/15 13/24 16/15 17/1 17/3 17/11 20/1 
20/2 21/11 23/10 42/3 47/2 48/5 82/18 
82/19 
Anderson's [1] 21/18 
Angle [1] 53/20 
another [11] 4/15 4/2519/12 25/6 27/11 
27/12 70/13 80/4 83/1 87/12 90/6 
another-[1] 4/15 
answer [4] 46/14 47/20 63/18 92/12 
answering [1] 47/22 
answers [2] 49/8 50/7 
anticipate [1] 101/3 
anticipated [1] 85/20 
any [99] 4/16 4/17 5/13 5/14 6/13 6/14 
8/14 8/17 9/15 12/1 12/17 13/4 13/10 13/18, 
13/21 14/2 14/5 15/23 16/11 23/25 24/4 ! 
24/6 24/11 24/21 24/21 25/25 2//1U &ld.6 
30/8 30/10 30/11 34/10 35/20 35/21 36/3 
36/22 36/24 37/11 38/11 38/23 39/22 40/1 
40/11 40/15 40/17 42/19 43/15 43/21 45/15 
46/22 47/4 47/20 47/22 47/23 48/2 49/15 
50/7 50/11 50/19 50/23 52/1 54/4 60/14 
62/24 62/24 62/25 63/11 63/13 64/17 64/18 
64/18 65/4 68/5 68/15 68/25 71/13 72/4 
73/11 74/15 76/14 76/15 78/16 78/20 78/23 
80/3 80/19 81/22 81/23 83/23 85/6 93/4 
95/6 96/21 99/20 100/6 102/1 102/13 
102/18103/14 
any --[2] 36/22 62/24 
anybody [1] 25/5 
anymore [1] 79/9 
anyone [5] 6/14 17/12 17/22 80/13 96/21 
anything [28] 13/1713/2518/1124/2 
25/21 27/17 27/19 27/21 29/10 29/17 36/14 
36/17 47/15 49/9 49/10 52/1 62/19 63/7 
65/2 66/5 66/24 73/2 76/15 78/2 79/1 83/13 
102/15102/20 
anyways [1] 74/3 
appear [4] 21/13 21/14 56/12 73/11 
appeared [6] 11/1312/1412/18 29/13 
29/14 50/12 
appears [1] 42/18 
applies [2] 50/10 67/18 
appointed [1] 47/19 
approach [2] 41/14 79/4 
approached [6] 22/15 56/23 77/3 78/17 
79/2 81/19 
approaching [12] 76/25 77/12 77/13 77/18 
78/8 78/12 78/25 81/10 81/12 81/13 88/15 
88/17 
appropriate [1] 92/18 
approximately [2] 20/8 39/3 
are [89] 5/23 6/7 6/24 7/21 19/1 20/12 22/5 
26/15 27/5 28/10 29/22 29/22 29/23 30/10 
30/17 30/21 31/8 33/4 33/25 34/22 35/21 
38/1 42/4 42/9 42/20 42/22 43/23 44/15 
44/17 44/18 47/18 48/10 48/11 50/13 50/15 
50/21 50/23 51/20 52/3 53/19 57/23 59/10 
60/1 60/2 60/3 60/6 60/8 60/12 61/2 61/6 
61/11 61/19 62/24 63/13 65/10 65/16 65/16 
65/17 65/19 65/19 65/20 65/25 66/1 66/1 
66/4 67/14 67/16 67/18 67/24 68/2 68/11 
68/11 70/1 70/12 71/14 74/10 75/5 82/4 
84/1 84/4 85/2 85/19 85/20 86/1 86/9 87/18 
94/22 99/1 102/14 
area[1] 37/1 
argued [1] 93/12 
argument [2] 87/4 91/11 
arguments [6] 5/12 89/8101/25102/1 
102/2102/13 
arises [1] 92/10 
arm [3] 37/12 62/9 62/11 
arms [4] 32/2 32/16 32/19 33/3 
around [1] 58/2 
arrest [8] 16/12 16/13 16/14 23/22 46/22 
47/3 64/25 71/21 
arrested [4] 46/13 46/16 46/20 46/21 
arrival [1] 28/21 
arrive [2] 9/2 45/7 
arrived [12] 9/21 9/23 13/7 15/16 17/16 
18/4 18/7 20/1 20/2 21/12 58/24 82/16 
arrows [1] 54/4 
as [102] 4/12 4719 4/22 4/25 6/9 6/22 8/9 
11/8 11/23 11/23 12/12 16/21 17/1 19/7 
19/13 22/14 23/12 26/13 27/11 28/3 28/4 
29/15 31/6 36/21 37/4 40/18 40/20 41/17 
42/3 42/11 42/23 49/14 49/14 49/16 50/10 
52/3 52/3 53/13 53/13 56/25 57/8 57/8 
57/20 61/2 62/11 65/10 65/16 66/21 66/21 
67/18 69/5 69/5 69/8 69/16 69/18 69/21 
as... [46] 69/22 69/24 71/6 74/12 75/3 
76/24 76/25 77/3 77/17 77/17 77/18 78/8 
78/12 78/17 78/20 78/25 79/1 79/4 81/11 
81/19 83/20 83/20 83/23 84/24 84/25 86/16 
88/1 88/1 88/10 88/10 88/14 88/16 90/21 
92/1 92/10 92/22 92/22 94/1 95/4 95/6 
97/14 99/10 99/11 99/13 99/14 103/6 
ask [19] 4/11 6/13 19/1 30/7 30/9 39/22 
40/13 43/23 49/12 54/22 59/5 61/17 64/15 
69/10 71/18 86/16 88/21 91/10 92/24 
asked [22] 11/1012/2212/2512/2513/25 
14/12 21/14 22/17 22/21 25/17 29/21 31/2 
32/15 40/14 54/24 62/24 64/17 67/7 71/4 
71/6 72/10 96/18 
asking [1] 91/16 
assessment [1] 43/6 
assigned [4] 9/25 27/6 27/8 27/14 
assignment [2] 7/23 7/25 
assistance [1] 80/3 
associated [2] 96/4103/14 
assume [4] 46/16 52/15 91/19 101/18 
assumed [1] 46/17 
assumes [1] 92/11 
assuming [1] 17/18 
assumption [1] 100/14 
at [140] 
attempt [1] 46/22 
attempts [2] 34/6 57/17 
attended [1] 27/22 
attention [2] 30/19 34/11 
attitude [2] 51/2 89/2 
Attorney [2] 2/5 2/10 
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attorneys [1] 7/5 
audio [2] 64/3 64/4 
August [2] 101/9101/10 
authorized [1] 85/18 
automobile [13] 4/7 4/13 5/2 8/10 83/21 
87/9 88/12 89/11 89/12 89/14 89/17 91/22 
100/16 
aware [61 8/9 23/24 29/24 97/9 98/1 98/13 
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because [30] 4/11 10/8 11/12 22/23 24/25 
31/20 36/4 38/1 43/9 46/17 53/18 56/18 
61/11 61/11 61/21 67/23 68/9 70/10 76/8 
77/6 77/9 78/13 80/6 85/15 90/14 90/18 
92/1193/22101/3 102/5 
become [1] 28/15 
been [55] 6/11 6/21 7/19 8/3 8/4 9/9 10/7 
10/12 10/23 11/21 11/22 18/3 21/22 24/6 
24/19 26/12 27/3 27/8 28/7 28/11 29/14 
29/25 38/12 38/18 38/19 38/22 40/9 40/10 
41/17 44/21 48/4 48/8 48/14 48/17 48/20 
51/2 51/21 51/22 54/16 56/10 57/1 57/6 
60/16 64/11 64/17 75/2 75/24 76/13 78/5 
78/22 84/5 88/18 92/16 94/23 98/22 
before [35] 1/11 6/17 6/24 8/4 13/1 13/19 
18/8 20/1 20/2 26/15 38/19 39/2 41/18 
45/12 47/19 48/23 64/19 66/19 66/21 66/24 
67/11 67/13 72/11 72/23 73/4 74/20 75/5 
76/1 78/21 93/23 97/17 97/20 97/24 98/2 
98/4 
began [5] 29/20 29/21 30/15 55/3 66/17 
beginning [3] 30/15 38/8 38/18 
begins [1] 92/6 
begun [1] 77/14 
behavior [2] 98/17 98/18 
behind [4] 90/16 93/25 98/7 99/22 
being [13] 13/21 14/6 15/19 18/7 24/6 
24/10 27/19 28/12 34/1 47/18 88/17 90/1 
96/4 
believe [28] 9/3 10/6 13/25 14/22 15/20 
18/24 20/10 21/18 24/3 25/9 25/15 38/3 
46/17 58/25 59/6 59/20 71/20 73/24 74/5 
85/11 87/5 95/10 95/11 97/18 98/16 98/17 
98/20 99/7 
believe-[1] 95/10 
believes [1] 92/19 
below [6] 35/2 35/18 35/21 63/17 63/17 
63/18 
belt [1] 21/10 
bench [1] 29/13 
besides [1] 14/6 
best [3] 77/23 93/12 93/19 
between [15] 18/10 35/25 44/12 45/11 
49/5 49/14 58/16 58/18 61/10 61/20 61/23 
62/1 83/24 89/12 98/9 
babies [2] 74/10 74/12 
back [11 ] 7/25 16/8 16/16 22/14 34/3 
54/24 55/3 79/6 83/5 90/12 101/19 
backseat [2] 11/1124/10 
balance [4] 32/3 32/17 32/20 33/3 
balancing [2] 32/16 32/19 
base[1] 95/12 
based [15] 10/25 14/13 14/17 14/19 63/14 
66/1 66/4 66/13 70/16 88/1 95/5 96/15 
97/25 99/22100/1 
basically [12] 9/6 10/5 11/20 12/2 13/13 
15/5 15/22 17/21 20/19 25/1 51/14 52/24 
basis [2] 40/23 40/24 
bay [2] 91/13 96/16 
be [91] 4/8 6/16 6/18 6/24 11/13 11/14 
11/14 12/13 12/23 17/10 21/13 21/14 26/1 
26/9 26/15 27/7 29/14 29/24 33/25 34/20 
34/24 35/18 37/5 38/8 47/16 47/19 51/18 
51/24 53/17 54/8 54/11 54/11 56/12 57/3 
58/4 59/3 60/23 60/24 61/3 61/5 61/13 
61/25 62/12 63/9 66/15 67/25 68/12 68/22 
69/13 74/17 75/5 78/1 79/9 81/25 83/15 
84/10 85/7 85/21 87/9 87/23 88/24 89/14 
! 91/11 91/18 91/22 92/17 93/4 93/14 93/16 
, 93/17 93/18 94/2 94/17 94/18 95/20 95/22 
96/12 96/17 97/9 97/11 98/13 99/11 101/1 
101/10 101/18 101/21 101/23 101/24 102/5 
102/15102/22 
bearing [1] 85/17 
biceps [5] 60/22 61/19 61/20 61/20 61/23 
bind [4] 92/19 99/1 99/13 100/8 
bit [4] 10/23 38/1 56/2 71/4 
black [5] 55/13 55/16 90/12 90/13 90/16 
Blindness [1] 51/25 
blocking [1] 9/8 
blood [29] 13/1 14/3 22/10 22/21 29/14 
36/10 36/12 36/17 37/12 37/13 37/15 37/21 
37/25 38/3 38/5 41/11 42/7 58/8 60/7 63/5 
63/17 73/8 73/9 73/17 73/22 95/15 95/15 
95/15 95/16 
bloodshot [2] 51/20 51/23 
blunt [1] 83/20 
board [4] 70/3 70/5 70/6 70/6 
bodily [35] 2/4 3/3 3/4 3/6 3/7 3/9 4/25 
5/19 6/2 7/11 7/17 10/22 11/2 14/24 15/23 
24/16 25/24 31/2 39/12 41/14 64/13 65/5 
65/9 72/4 74/18 75/16 78/6 78/8 78/12 
79/13 79/24 80/19 82/3 83/4 84/4 
body [10] 33/12 33/17 36/20 60/8 61/18 
61/21 63/8 63/18 67/25 99/11 
both [10] 5/5 6/16 15/9 21/7 22/5 53/2 56/3 
70/10 89/3 94/16 
bottom [1] 86/23 
bound [1] 87/9 
brake [1] 78/23 
break [1] 74/20 
breath [2] 51/6 51/8 
BRIAN [3] 1/7 4/419/2 
brief [2] 15/2192/24 
briefly [1] 33/9 
bring [2] 33/17 88/22 
bringing [2] 34/3 89/5 
brought [1] 88/24 
builder [2] 61/18 61/21 
busy[1] 38/1 
but [61] 4/19 6/25 8/7 13/14 13/25 15/2 
15/21 23/1 23/4 23/14 24/7 26/16 27/8 
33/25 37/5 43/4 43/10 45/2 45/9 47/12 49/6 
51/20 53/25 54/19 56/11 56/14 57/19 58/5 
60/4 61/3 61/22 62/1 67/2 68/12 71/2 74/7 
74/13 75/6 77/5 79/15 79/20 79/22 85/17 
90/10 91/7 91/22 92/12 92/17 93/4 93/13 
93/18 94/2 94/10 94/16 94/23 95/1 95/13 
96/4 99/6 99/17 99/20 
by-products [1] 22/6 
Bvbeem 28/17 
c 
C-H-A-P-P-E-L-L [1] 26/25 
cadet [1] 27/11 
call [8] 6/2 25/6 28/16 45/10 71/2 74/9 89/6 
93/20 
called [11] 6/21 8/16 8/17 8/20 17/7 26/12 i 
28/12 28/13 28/14 45/3 75/2 
calls [3] 6/4 26/5 74/23 
came [2] 41/1 76/9 
can [24] 31/5 33/9 34/20 34/23 47/16 49/1 
51/10 54/8 61/17 64/13 71/6 74/4 76/7 
76/21 77/23 77/24 78/1 78/1 79/9 89/22 
93/9 96/8 99/20 101/22 
can't [5] 79/10 84/19 89/3 89/3 89/14 
cancel [1] 70/13 
candy [1] 49/7 
cannot [1] 47/18 
car [9] 11/11 11/19 12/20 16/16 17/20 
19/13 24/10 83/6 90/15 
card [2] 47/9 47/10 
care [8] 29/22 30/4 30/5 50/21 97/13 98/17 
98/20 98/21 
carefully [1] 98/23 
Carlee [7] 18/3 18/6 18/10 18/22 19/3 
83/20 95/3 
cars[1] 23/18 
Carter [2] 44/19 44/25 
case [32] 1/6 6/14 6/24 19/24 23/8 23/19 
! 24/1 25/8 26/15 41/22 41/22 42/2 42/2 
| 45/16 47/1 49/20 53/9 54/19 66/8 67/18 
!
 67/22 68/1 68/8 70/17 75/5 84/16 87/9 
,88/10 89/7 91/6 92/19 99/20 
case-[1] 88/10 
cases [1] 25/3 
categories [2] 65/14 70/11 
categorized [1] 65/16 
category [11] 43/11 43/12 54/10 57/12 
65/23 68/9 68/20 68/22 70/2 70/24 96/7 
cause [13] 62/7 68/11 83/19 87/15 95/10 
96/5 96/8 96/13 97/25 98/18 98/25 99/7 
100/5 
causes [1] 71/14 
causing [3] 4/15 49/18 87/11 
cavity [1] 36/25 
center [3] 2/515/14 99/24 
central [9] 41/9 42/10 42/11 43/3 69/8 
69/12 95/18 96/6 96/8 
cereal [2] 49/5 49/6 
certain [7] 31/8 53/17 66/1 67/7 67/8 67/14 
67/15 
certainly [2] 94/2 99/17 
CERTIFICATE [1] 103/1 
certification [1] 28/4 
certified [3] 28/2 28/7 28/8 
certify [1] 103/4 | 
challenged [1] 15/1 
chance [1] 15/20 
change [1] 68/15 
changed [1] 27/7 
CHAPPELL [17] 3/5 6/10 20/22 26/5 26/11 
26/23 26/25 41/16 43/20 44/6 65/10 87/16 
88/2 88/9 95/8 97/16100/2 
charge [3] 9/25 87/10 88/1 
charged [2] 4/22 89/14 
charges [2] 87/7 87/8 
charging [1] 5/7 
Charles [2] 19/1186/10 
chart [1] 56/17 
check [7] 13/1515/14 35/3 35/9 35/11 
57/5 97/17 
checked [3] 36/25 37/7 37/7 
checking [1] 37/20 
child [2] 10/513/16 
children [2] 80/4 80/5 
choices [1] 85/2 
chopped [1] 86/23 
Christina [3] 1/24103/4103/22 
circular [1] 31/7 
circumstances [9] 10/1311/2216/19 
25/16 97/8 97/10 97/14 98/12 98/14 
cites [1] 85/10 
city [3] 8/23 27/2 79/18 
claims [1] 92/6 
clarification [1] 86/17 
clarify [3] 12/1182/5 82/15 
class [1] 45/1 
classes [1] 66/8 
classification [1] 87/21 
classifications [1] 70/6 
classified [2] 69/13 69/22 
classifies [2] 69/7 69/16 
classify [2] 69/17 69/20 
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clear [2] 91/13 97/15 
cleared [1] 102/10 
clearly [2] 84/8 90/23 
clerk [2] 6/19 74/24 
client [1] 92/4 
climate [1] 29/6 
clinch [1] 33/11 
clock [2] 55/6 59/13 
close [3] 38/8 54/25 93/19 
clue [1] 33/6 
clues [11] 32/4 32/21 32/22 32/22 32/23 
32/25 33/5 34/1 52/24 62/22 62/25 
Clyde [2] 86/17 96/20 
CNS [9] 69/17 69/18 69/20 69/22 95/19 
95/21 95/22 95/23 96/9 
cold [3] 24/10 49/6 60/17 
collided [1] 90/8 
collision [1] 90/18 
combination [2] 96/9100/6 
combined [3] 4/17 95/6 95/11 
come [12] 6/19 7/314/914/12 26/7 26/9 
46/18 66/5 74/24 75/9 79/1 82/11 
comes [1] 37/24 
coming [2] 10/16 81/5 
command [1] 33/14 
common [3] 70/16 70/20 70/22 
company [1] 21/4 
complete [2] 20/20 46/2 
completed [6] 13/5 23/10 28/2 44/12 45/23 
63/21 
completely [3] 9/6 9/7 9/20 
completes [1] 37/25 
completing [2] 40/24 59/2 
complicate [1] 70/7 
computer-aided pj IUJ / IU 
concern [1] 88/10 
concerned [1] 11/23 
concluded [2] 6/17102/24 
conclusion [3] 41/1 66/12 69/3 
conclusions [1] 58/24 
condition [4] 11/2312/613/1615/17 
conditioned [1] 61/4 
conditions [6] 9/4 12/15 15/14 24/23 
24/25 29/4 
conduct [4] 97/8 97/9 98/12 98/13 
conducted [2] 29/1 29/2 
conference [1] 102/5 
conflicts [1] 99/5 
confused [1] 71/4 
confusing [1] 90/19 
congestion [1] 36/13 
connection [2] 19/24 20/18 
consider [3] 25/8 34/4 35/22 
considered [1] 96/7 
considering [2] 67/14 87/5 
consistent [5] 22/1 46/11 47/24 51/23 
60/17 
consisting [1] 103/10 
constitute [1] 98/19 
constitutes [2] 97/12 103/12 
constricted [12] 13/9 14/21 34/17 34/21 
34/25 35/22 35/24 57/10 61/13 61/14 62/3 
68/13 
constriction [1] 34/25 
constricts [2] 57/12 68/10 
Construction [2] 86/17 96/20 
consumed [1] 98/22 
contact [3] 13/1115/5 29/11 
contacts [1] 71/17 
containing [1] 84/5 
contemplated [1] 88/22 
contemplates [1] 92/16 
continuance [3] 88/21 89/5 92/18 
continue [1] 89/7 
continues [1] 92/6 
continuing [1] 86/1 
contracted [1] 61/5 
contracting [1] 61/3 
contradiction [1] 90/5 
control [1] 82/17 
controlled [5] 42/20 42/23 42/25 88/5 88/6 
converge [2] 54/12 54/19 
converged [3] 54/6 54/13 54/16 
convergence [2] 54/3 54/5 
conversation [10] 11/18 12/1 13/4 13/5 
15/4 15/9 15/21 17/11 38/14 64/1 
coordinate [1] 79/15 
coordination [2] 51/5 67/24 
copies [1] 84/1 
copy [6] 48/24 57/20 64/13 83/18 86/22 
87/2 
corner [1] 77/8 
corners [1] 9/17 
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13/23 16/15 17/3 17/11 20/1 20/2 21/11 
21/18 23/10 44/19 47/1 48/5 82/18 82/19 
correct [59] 4/10 4/21 15/7 16/9 16/10 
17/2 17/6 19/6 19/17 20/15 20/23 21/1 
21/10 21/22 22/15 22/16 22/18 22/19 23/3 
23/15 23/20 24/20 36/1 44/7 44/10 45/19 
45/25 52/22 52/25 54/1 54/2 56/7 56/8 
56/10 56/14 56/15 57/2 58/9 58/13 60/18 
62/17 64/23 64/24 72/12 72/15 72/16 73/9 
73/12 73/23 73/24 74/1 74/11 74/13 81/7 
81/18 82/2183/8 96/19103/12 
Corrective [1] 52/11 
correctly [2] 34/8 63/18 
corroborated [1] 87/18 
curruuui died |,ij uutu 
cosmetic [2] 7/4 75/12 
cottonmouth [2] 51/6 51/9 
could [22] 5/8 8/21 10/3 11/18 12/11 14/25 
26/6 37/5 46/25 51/18 51/24 60/16 71/11 
71/11 78/22 80/3 80/6 82/3 92/17 93/4 
93/18 101/12 
couldn't [1] 57/16 
counsel [8] 47/21 47/23 78/4 79/11 83/9 
84/5 86/16103/15 
Count [12] 4/7 4/22 5/14 89/9 89/10 94/24 
99/1 99/10 99/14 100/16 100/19 100/22 
counts [1] 100/8 
COUNTY [5] 1/2 2/4 2/5 8/25 103/3 
couple [12] 24/17 67/2 69/10 72/6 78/3 
78/10 82/15 89/8 89/23 92/15 93/2 93/2 
course [1] 37/19 
court [125] 
COURT [1] 86/25 
court --[1] 92/18 
courtroom [3] 6/8 6/12 6/15 
cover [1] 102/20 
CPR[1] 27/24 
crash [1] 13/22 
crime [7] 25/12 41/12 41/21 69/7 73/14 
73/17 96/25 
crimes [1] 89/12 
criminal [14] 4/12 87/11 88/12 89/16 89/19 
91/9 93/11 93/15 93/18 94/2 94/4 97/4 97/6 
97/7 
criminally [4] 4/14 92/22 97/7 99/3 
Cross-Examination [7] 3/4 3/6 3/9 16/5 
43/22 44/4 80/22 
crossing [2] 99/24 99/24 
crowd [1] 93/13 
crying [9] 11/21 21/22 22/1 29/14 51/2 
51/18 51/2151/22 80/8 
CSR[2] 1/24103/22 
currently [2] 19/2128/4 
custody m 71/23 
D-E-L-L[1] 7/15 
damage [1] 21/7 
damaged [1] 11/12 
dark [5] 9/18 9/20 9/20 9/21 56/9 
darkness [6] 35/9 35/9 36/1 56/6 60/8 
60/11 
date [2] 5/17 45/2 
daughter [4] 18/21 76/8 80/14 80/24 
day [8] 19/23 39/3 49/13 72/11 72/23 73/4 
97/21 103/17 
days [2] 7/5 71/12 
deal [1] 98/2 
dealing [2] 25/1125/12 
deals [2] 85/12 85/15 
death [6] 4/15 83/19 87/11 87/15 89/13 
95/3 
December [1] 103/18 
decide [2] 47/20102/14 
decision [4] 24/22 47/2 72/2 99/4 
declarant [4] 84/16 84/17 85/4 89/6 
defects [3] 29/23 30/1150/19 
defendant [28] 1/8 2/9 5/20 5/2010/16 
11/16 13/6 13/18 14/5 14/8 15/6 32/12 
33/10 33/20 38/23 40/17 54/22 82/22 83/6 
94/24 95/11 96/14 96/16 97/19 98/1 99/2 
100/4100/5 
defendant's [5] 17/1417/16 97/1 97/15 
99/23 
defendants [2] 25/1125/12 
definitely [1] 97/2 
definition [1] 97/5 
degree [6] 4/13 4/17 4/24 89/17 97/11 
degree... [1] 100/16 
degrees [2] 53/20 54/1 
DELL [6] 3/3 6/4 6/20 7/13 7/15 100/3 
demeanor [2] 67/19 67/22 
demonstrated [1] 33/18 
demonstration [1] 33/20 
dense [1] 61/6 
dentist [3] 29/23 30/6 50/21 
department [17] 7/18 7/2212/2419/21 
22/18 22/23 25/4 27/2 27/9 27/14 28/1 
28/14 28/18 28/21 44/16 55/10 82/20 
depends [3] 25/16 57/6 89/18 
depressant [20] 41/9 43/3 43/10 58/12 
59/1 59/7 62/17 62/20 63/2 69/8 69/12 
69/17 69/18 69/20 69/21 69/22 69/24 95/19 
95/22 96/10 
depressants [7] 42/10 42/12 59/23 69/13 
95/21 95/23 96/6 
Deputy [1] 2/5 
describe [3] 31/5 33/9 76/21 
described [2] 15/5 35/19 
description [1] 97/1 
detail [1] 92/23 
determination [3] 22/8 60/3 84/19 
determinations [2] 65/23 65/25 
determined [4] 34/21 34/24 35/23 70/17 
determining [1] 71/2 
deviation [6] 53/14 54/1 54/9 93/8 97/12 
98/19 
diabetic [1] 50/15 
Diazepam [4] 42/8 69/19 95/15 95/21 
did [174] 
didn't [20] 10/8 12/7 12/10 12/10 13/2 13/9 
15/20 21/14 25/23 47/4 48/23 56/19 59/22 
62/21 62/25 63/11 63/14 77/6 89/24 92/2 
died[1] 15/18 
difference [10] 35/25 36/3 58/18 61/10 
61/20 61/22 61/23 62/1 62/1 89/11 
differences [1] 58/16 
different [2] 58/20 94/7 
difficult [1] 24/24 
dilate [1] 68/11 
dilated [1] 35/23 
direct [13] 3/3 3/6 3/9 7/10 26/21 35/15 
35/25 56/18 56/20 56/23 57/5 75/15 85/19 
direction [7] 77/21 78/17 81/5 81/14 88/16 
88/18 94/10 
directions [1] 94/7 
directly [1] 38/22 
discrete [2] 92/3 99/15 
discussed [1] 23/4 
discussion [4] 4/6 6/13 13/21 40/15 
discussion - [1] 40/15 
dispatch [3] 17/7 45/10 48/5 
dispatchers [1] 28/17 
disregarding [1] 99/4 
distanced] 79/8 79/10 
DISTRICTS] 1/11/13 
divided [2] 30/19 34/10 
dividing [1] 30/20 
dividing «[1] 30/20 
division [1] 27/9 
do [92] 5/5 5/8 5/8 5/13 6/23 7/2 7/14 7/17 
8/11 8/12 8/13 9/23 10/11 11/9 15/12 16/1 
18/10 19/23 20/18 21/2 22/10 22/20 22/25 
23/1 25/5 25/11 26/14 27/1 27/10 28/4 28/6 
28/11 29/19 30/14 31/2 32/12 33/19 37/20 
37/25 41/11 41/25 42/19 42/25 43/24 45/3 
45/3 46/15 47/11 48/23 48/24 48/25 49/12 
50/17 50/19 51/8 54/23 55/10 56/16 57/4 
60/20 64/5 70/25 71/23 73/20 75/4 75/8 
75/20 75/20 76/4 76/10 77/16 78/16 80/2 
83/17 85/8 86/22 86/24 92/8 99/1 99/7 
100/8 100/9 100/9 100/10 101/1 101/3 
101/5 101/15 101/19 101/25 102/9 103/4 
doctor [3] 29/22 30/6 50/21 
doctor's [1] 30/4 
document [2] 68/14 86/15 
documents [1] 85/6 
does [25] 24718 32/25 42/6 42/9 42/13 
42/15 43/5 53/5 53/16 57/8 57/8 57/11 61/6 
62/5 62/6 69/17 70/5 70/7 70/8 73/16 91/14 
98/10 98/10102/6102/15 
doesn't [9] 25/4 43/4 61/2 73/11 73/14 
73/15 86/22 89/4 91/21 
doing [2] 12/6 43/23 
don't [66] 13/13 13/16 13/16 13/23 13/25 
15/23 17/10 22/25 23/2 23/4 24/3 24/5 24/9 
24/11 25/9 25/14 25/15 25/25 30/25 37/23 
38/6 40/14 43/20 44/24 45/1 45/9 46/14 
47/12 47/14 49/5 49/10 49/24 52/1 53/25 
58/21 61/8 61/9 62/14 65/4 72/4 73/13 
73/20 74/12 74/15 78/19 78/22 79/15 79/17 
79/20 79/22 80/19 81/22 81/23 82/5 84/9 
90/13 91/7 91/22 92/10 92/12 92/24 94/3 
96/4 96/20 99/4102/3 
done [8] 10/12 21/7 22/11 23/9 24/18 25/7 
44/13 93/4 
door[1] 11/19 
dosage [2] 73/25 74/2 
dots [1] 57/21 
double [1] 10/20 
doubt [1] 95/3 
dovetails [1] 85/13 
down [17] 12/2316/22 32/18 33/12 33/17 
34/3 49/17 54/5 55/21 63/16 70/23 70/25 
77/7 78/13 79/192/6 93/15 
draw [4] 22/10 38/5 73/8 73/9 
drawn [3] 37/12 37/22 54/4 
DRE [33] 22/10 28/1 28/5 28/18 29/1 29/21 
37/4 37/17 38/18 43/10 44/7 44/13 44/21 
45/3 45/12 45/14 45/23 46/4 46/15 48/22 
48/23 49/15 62/19 63/20 65/10 69/6 69/14 
69/17 69/20 69/23 87/15 95/8 95/13 
DRE's[2] 44/15 44/18 
dressed [1] 24/8 
drivability[1] 96/9 
drive [2] 93/15 93/17 
driven [1] 98/8 
driver [11] 11/8 11/10 11/13 13/22 18/13 
18/15 82/22 93/22 94/6 94/25 95/2 
driving [18] 10/16 13/25 16/23 18/17 76/23 
77/4 77/5 77/7 80/10 87/23 87/24 88/7 89/9 
90/13 91/15 98/23 99/16 100/22 
drizzling [1] 12/21 
droopy [2] 29/15 52/18 
drop [1] 31/1 
drove [1] 98/6 
drug [29] 4/16 4/17 12/12 12/13 12/24 14/5 
28/3 36/5 38/11 53/12 53/18 54/10 54/17 
57/6 57/12 62/12 65/14 68/9 68/20 70/2 
70/10 70/13 70/14 70/24 72/10 87/12 95/6 
95/9 100/2 
drugs [30] 39/23 40/2 40/4 40/13 42/17 
42/20 50/23 53/18 54/10 57/8 62/7 64/18 
64/18 65/16 65/19 66/9 70/5 73/3 87/19 
95/7 95/12 96/1 96/8 96/10 98/5 98/22 
99/17100/6100/7100/23 
dry [3] 22/5 51/11 51/14 
due [3] 51/18101/9101/10 
DUI [5] 89/13 91/12 91/20 91/21 92/9 
duly [3] 6/2126/12 75/2 
duration [1] 100/4 
during [9] 32/3 33/4 36/11 37/19 37/21 
.38/2 47/23 62/23 71/17 
Iduties T41 7/21 20/12 20/12 27/5 
duty [2] 10/18 28/16 
duty-HI 10/18 
each [7] 6/14 39/15 42/14 52/24 53/25 
87/20 95/17 
earlier [1] 71/5 
east [6] 2/5 90/8 91/13 94/10 94/18 96/16 
eastbound [7] 76/23 79/20 81/3 81/14 
90/5 90/1194/9 
eaten [5] 49/1 49/3 49/5 49/13 71/8 
edge[1] 96/18 
effect [3] 65/14 85/18 87/20 
effects [3] 95/20 96/8 96/11 
Eighteen [1] 55/24 
either [11] 14/22 27/11 33/13 33/14 35/22 
53/21 53/25 66/15 85/2 88/3 102/14 
elevating [1] 32/18 
else [16] 6/1411/2315/217/1217/22 
17/22 27/17 29/17 44/18 59/14 63/7 65/2 
72/25 83/13102/10102/20 
else--[1] 44/18 
employed [1] 21/2 
end [4] 9/1815/5 27/25 56/12 
ends[1] 92/7 
enforcement [2] 27/10 27/23 
enhanced [1] 96/12 
enough [4] 77/8 87/8 92/19 99/7 
enter [2] 100/10100/11 
entered [3] 90/21 90/24 94/1 
entering [1] 100/13 
entertain [1] 99/17 
epileptic [1] 50/15 
equal [2] 51/25 52/12 
equally [1] 93/22 
Equanil[1] 69/11 
Esklund[2] 20/14 20/18 
especially [1] 8/17 
estimate [2] 54/25 77/24 
estimated [2] 31/6 55/1 
estimation [1] 31/20 
evaluation [15] 28/19 28/23 29/1 29/21 
36/12 37/24 38/18 38/21 40/25 41/6 43/10 
45/18 59/2 70/7 71/24 
evaluations [1] 70/1 
evaluator[1] 58/12 
even [9] 25/10 61/4 69/7 73/11 74/7 89/24 
91/8 93/1 94/3 
evening [3] 39/5 39/6 76/4 
events [1] 103/16 
eventually [1] 15/18 
ever [9] 18/19 48/16 48/19 64/25 66/19 
66/2171/18 76/199/19 
every [4] 28/7 70/16 70/23 70/25 
everybody [3] 11/23 80/6 91/5 
everything [1] 102/10 
evidence [17] 4/12 4/19 23/12 43/19 64/10 
85/21 86/14 87/8 87/22 88/13 89/20 92/17 
99/7 100/1102/1102/3102/16 
exact [3] 37/23 45/9 47/12 
exactly [4] 13/1416/20 22/12 22/25 
exam [6] 45/12 45/14 45/23 46/4 49/15 
95/8 
exam~[1] 95/8 
examination [16] 3/3 3/4 3/6 3/7 3/9 7/10 
22/10 24/15 26/21 34/14 53/23 62/19 62/25 
65/8 75/15 82/13 
examined [4] 6/22 26/13 34/15 75/3 
examiner [1] 95/5 
examiner's [2] 83/19 87/14 
exams [2] 35/19 44/13 
except [1] 89/12 
exclude [2] 6/6 6/12 
exclusionarv Ml 6/11 
excuse [1] 71/12 
excused [5] 6/18 26/1 74/17 81/25 83/15 
exercise [3] 97/13 98/16 98/20 
exhibit [12] 3/14 3/14 3/15 32/25 41/17 
43/14 43/18 83/18 83/23 86/10 86/11 86/13 
exhibited [1] 62/22 
exhibits [4] 3/13 70/23 84/1 86/4 
exist [2] 97/10 98/14 
expect [6] 10/8 62/22 63/5 63/8 63/16 
70/13 
expected [3] 62/20 63/1 63/13 
expecting [2] 4/1915/22 
expense [1] 88/24 
experience [9] 8/14 27/10 27/19 41/5 
42/19 60/4 66/13 70/16 70/22 
expert [4] 12/12 28/3 95/10100/2 
experts [1] 12/13 
explain [3] 10/18 54/2156/18 
explained [12] 10/15 11/3 11/5 11/6 11/21 
12/4 13/2 13/24 16/21 33/10 45/14 50/1 
explanation [1] 95/17 
extend [1] 33/11 
extended [1] 29/13 
extensive [1] 21/7 
eye [14] 34/14 35/19 52/14 52/25 53/3 53/8 
53/13 53/13 53/21 53/25 54/3 54/3 56/21 
60/10 
eyelids [2] 29/15 52/18 
eyes [17] 12/7 21/24 29/14 34/16 35/9 
35/21 51/20 51/23 54/6 54/11 54/13 54/13 
54/25 55/5 56/2 56/3 67/24 
face [2] 51/16 57/20 
fact [7] 12/13 17/8 21/14 54/13 60/16 
84/23 88/2 
factor [1] 101/19 
factors [2] 67/15 67/18 
facts [3] 24/2145/15 92/3 
factual [1] 83/24 
fail [8] 31/15 31/19 32/8 32/14 32/25 33/24 
33/25 60/3 
failed [4] 31/16 31/25 32/13 59/9 
failing [1] 31/13 
failure [5] 32/1 32/5 71/15 93/7 97/12 
fair [3] 31/12 58/4 61/7 
fairly [3] 79/4 86/19 93/1 
fall [2] 43/12 96/6 
false [6] 84/18 85/4 85/7 85/12 85/15 
85/18 
far [10] 49/14 52/3 53/13 57/8 66/21 69/5 
79/6 88/1 88/10 92/22 
fatal [1] 23/5 
fatality [6] 8/18 17/5 17/9 23/3 25/13 48/8 
fatigue [2] 49/17 50/8 
fault [1] 93/22 
favorable [1] 87/6 
fax [2] 101/21 101/22 
faxing [1] 101/19 
feel [3] 61/20 61/22 61/22 
feeling [1] 47/4 
feels [1] 62/10 
felony [3] 4/13 4/24100/17 
felt [2] 16/23 68/6 
few [6] 13/8 29/21 66/17 76/13 76/20 86/20 
field [6] 14/2 22/22 27/24 28/25 30/19 
67/19 
file [4] 4/5 99/21 101/5102/14 
filed [1] 102/14 
filing [1] 101/3 
filled [1] 76/19 
filling [1] 11/4 
fills [2] 84/23 84/24 
finally [2] 17/19 88/7 
find [11] 10/211/2412/3 95/10 96/14 
97/25 98/18 99/1 99/14 99/20 100/4 
finding [3] 96/15 99/2 99/8 
fine [5] 7/8 43/17 101/21 101/23 102/11 
finger [6] 30/24 33/8 33/15 33/19 34/2 
59/15 
fingers [1] 33/12 
finish [1] 78/4 
finished [1] 44/6 
first [21] 6/2 7/14 9/10 9/23 9/24 14/17 
16/7 16/25 19/19 20/5 20/16 28/8 28/25 
29/11 29/12 31/3 31/4 32/22 66/11 77/10 
84/14 
fist [1] 33/11 
five [10] 31/21 32/22 39/1 72/11 72/21 
73/4 73/7 75/25 97/16 97/19 
fix[1] 92/25 
fixed [2] 55/9 55/10 
flaccid [1] 60/24 
flat [3] 79/2 79/4 79/7 
flexing [1] 61/23 
floor [1] 55/9 
flooring [2] 55/12 55/16 
floors [1] 29/8 
foamy [3] 37/137/3 60/13 
follow [1] 52/15 
followed [2] 16/22 96/16 
following [2] 11/8 96/1 
follows [3] 6/22 26/13 75/3 
foot [4] 32/16 32/18 32/18 55/21 
foothills [1] 81/6 
forearms [1] 60/23 
forensic [4] 20/25 21/3 37/24 38/5 
form [6] 40/20 61/18 66/14 67/11 85/17 
89/20 
formed [1] 67/8 
forming [1] 41/3 
forth [2] 87/8101/19 
forward [3] 5/23 55/5 74/24 
found [4] 9/25 42/6 93/5 98/6 
foundation [2] 14/11 14/16 
foundational [1] 11/1 
four [5] 8/4 9/17 55/18 59/17 96/6 
FOURTH [2] 1/1 1/13 
frame [1] 37/23 
free [2] 46/25 47/4 
freeway [2] 81/5 93/1 
Friday [1] 101/9 
friend's [2] 39/19 97/22 
friends [2] 18/12 40/2 
fries [1] 49/4 
front [4] 7/4 61/18 78/20 91/5 
further T41 12/5 74/16 83/12 91/8 
gather [2] 80/5 80/9 
gauged [1] 34/22 
gave [4] 33/7 49/3 67/6 67/8 
gaze [5] 52/4 52/6 52/16 52/21 53/24 
general [3] 29/4 65/14 65/23 
generally [7] 7/21 25/13 25/14 27/5 34/4 
58/1 101/1 
generic [1] 96/4 
get [13] 5/5 11/11 15/20 17/24 35/1 40/15 
53/18 64/13 67/2 80/9 91/1 91/7 96/23 
getting [1] 9/20 
Gilchrist [6] 19/11 86/10 90/1 90/13 94/8 
94/18 
girl's [1] 18/4 
give [8] 6/24 10/12 26/15 33/14 68/25 75/5 
76/17 78/1 
given [8] 12/15 14/3 23/25 33/13 49/15 
70/24 87/6 87/21 
go [14] 5/23 11/16 15/8 22/17 23/1 48/22 
49/17 74/21 81/14 81/17 90/17 93/17 96/22 
100/9 
God [3] 7/126/17 75/7 
goes [3] 69/5 74/6 74/7 
going [24] 5/16 22/20 27/7 41/16 61/20 
61/25 67/25 74/20 77/7 81/13 81/15 81/16 
81/17 86/11 90/6 90/7 90/8 90/10 90/11 
94/6 94/9 96/2199/14101/25 
going-[1] 90/6 
gone [3] 18/20 55/4 71/12 
good [5] 29/6 61/1 79/8 89/7 92/23 
GORDON [15] 3/3 6/4 6/20 7/13 11/2 16/7 
24/17 26/6 44/19 44/23 45/4 45/5 82/10 
82/15100/3 
got [24] 16/25 17/7 30/25 48/23 50/14 51/5 
51/16 51/16 52/11 52/18 53/2 53/13 53/21 
53/24 54/3 54/4 55/1 56/18 60/25 61/17 
73/17 91/12 91/14 91/21 
got - [1] 48/23 
graduated [1] 27/22 
great [1] 98/2 
greater [1] 98/17 
green [8] 77/6 77/7 77/19 77/24 78/5 78/14 
88/16 89/23 
Greg [1] 19/20 
gross [3] 93/7 97/12 98/19 
ground [1] 24/4 
guess [2] 55/18 92/8 
guilty [5] 100/13 100/18 100/21 100/24 
100/25 
gun Ml 93/12 
H 
habit [1] 25/12 
had [96] 9/9 9/10 9/22 10/7 10/12 10/12 
10/17 11/3 11/11 11/21 11/22 11/24 12/3 
13/1 13/7 13/19 13/24 14/13 14/20 15/9 
16/22 17/4 18/3 18/20 21/22 29/11 29/14 
29/25 30/8 30/11 31/7 31/11 32/4 38/23 
39/1 39/15 39/16 39/22 40/2 40/3 40/8 40/8 
40/8 40/10 40/11 40/13 41/6 44/6 46/18 
47/2 48/4 48/4 48/14 48/16 48/17 48/20 
49/3 49/5 49/7 49/7 50/4 50/5 50/12 51/21 
51/22 54/16 55/4 62/17 62/20 63/2 63/14 
64/17 65/11 68/24 69/1 71/12 72/11 77/4 
77/9 77/13 77/23 77/24 78/5 88/3 88/18 
91/5 93/4 95/3 97/16 97/18 97/19 97/21 
98/1 98/3 98/5 98/22 
hadn't [1] 86/7 
half [3] 20/10 50/5 55/18 
hand [2] 41/16 103/17 
handcuffed [1] 16/16 
handed [1] 87/2 
Hang [1] 28/22 
hanging [1] 62/10 
happen [2] 37/17 93/7 
happened [19] 8/21 11/25 12/3 34/13 38/7 
38/10 38/24 44/9 76/14 76/18 76/19 76/21 
76/21 77/9 81/9 81/11 90/24 93/6 100/1 
happening [1] 91/12 
happens [1] 91/13 
hard [2] 57/23 92/22 
has [23] 6/11 10/23 20/7 33/16 42/1 42/1 
42/2 44/21 61/1 62/2 62/3 62/5 64/11 68/13 




haven't [2] 71/10 91/1 
having [9] 4/5 6/21 26/12 47/21 70/5 75/2 
98/8 98/22 99/1 
Haymond [5] 18/3 18/18 19/16 83/20 95/4 
H 
he [248] 
he's [11] 10/2319/442/18 50/9 61/18 
61/19 62/9 62/10 90/22 91/14 92/11 
head [6] 46/3 52/14 53/4 54/24 55/3 55/5 
headed [3] 78/16 90/4 90/5 
heading [3] 81/3 90/10 94/10 
hear[1] 7/6 
heard [7] 60/10 67/6 77/1 77/11 79/24 
81/10 81/19 
hearing [12] 1/18 5/18 5/24 6/17 76/22 
78/9 88/11 96/13 98/1 98/25 99/9 99/15 
hearsay [7] 10/20 82/24 84/8 84/9 92/16 
94/23 94/23 
heavily [2] 88/8 96/24 
help [6] 6/25 7/5 26/16 32/17 32/19 75/6 
heiped [3] 20/2 62/14 80/4 
helpful [1] 99/21 
helping [1] 20/20 
her [13] 10/8 15/20 15/22 18/8 18/14 18/19 
18/21 79/11 80/15 88/15 94/16 94/17 94/18 
here [31] 5/18 5/19 5/20 6/8 6/9 6/10 7/3 
7/7 8/9 28/1 28/10 38/4 47/13 75/9 76/3 
83/7 83/9 85/24 92/5 92/25 93/5 93/7 93/19 
96/5 96/6 96/7 96/11 98/11 98/17 98/19 
100/9 
here«[1] 98/17 
herein [1] 103/15 
herself [1] 93/24 
high [1] 93/14 
higher [1] 74/7 
highway [7] 10/16 10/18 11/3 16/23 19/5 
92/7 93/2 
hill [2] 79/1 79/1 
him [80] 7/7 10/2 10/12 10/25 11/4 11/6 
11/8 11/11 11/11 11/14 11/15 11/20 11/21 
12/1 12/4 12/22 12/25 13/2 13/12 13/21 
13/21 13/24 13/25 14/12 16/18 16/18 16/20 
16/21 16/22 21/15 22/15 22/17 22/20 22/21 
23/2 23/5 23/22 23/25 24/9 25/21 25/24 
26/6 29/11 29/15 29/21 30/7 30/9 31/2 
31/10 33/7 33/11 38/13 39/22 40/3 40/13 
40/14 40/18 45/14 45/15 46/9 46/23 47/5 
47/7 47/17 56/9 62/1 64/15 64/17 66/18 
66/19 66/21 67/6 67/7 67/7 71/20 87/12 
90/18 98/7 99/24100/7 
him--[1] 12/25 
himself [3] 84/24 98/1198/23 
hire[1] 47/19 
his [144] 
his ~[1] 63/8 
history [1] 66/24 
hit [4] 90/4 90/12 90/16 93/13 
Holbrook[3] 1/24103/4103/22 
hold[1] 33/12 
home [7] 8/16 8/20 17/7 17/7 17/18 76/8 
97/19 
homicide [14] 4/7 4/13 4/13 5/3 5/7 87/10 
88/12 89/11 89/12 89/14 89/18 91/22 91/22 
100/16 
homicide - [1] 89/18 
honest [1] 17/10 
honestly [1] 92/12 
Honor [15] 6/5 24/13 26/3 41/14 43/13 
44/1 65/6 82/25 83/17 86/5 87/5 92/14 
101/14102/8102/17 
HONORABLE [1] 1/11 
horizontal [5] 52/3 52/6 52/16 52/21 53/24 
hospital [6] 9/10 10/8 13/15 15/13 15/16 
18/2 
hot [1] 49/6 
hour [2] 46/193/18 
hni ire TQ1 **AM7 1Q/9 Af^hf) AQfd 4Q/7 50/5 
50/6 50/6 71/12 
hours--[1] 71/12 
house [5] 39/17 39/20 39/21 97/22 97/23 
how [65] 5/5 7/14 7/19 8/310/2410/25 
11/18 12/2 14/20 14/20 16/14 20/7 23/1 
24/8 27/3 27/15 28/15 29/25 30/3 30/22 
31/10 31/10 31/24 32/12 32/21 32/25 33/18 
33/22 34/20 34/20 34/24 40/3 40/11 41/25 
43/23 43/23 44/13 44/21 45/2 47/7 51/8 
56/16 60/20 61/9 65/19 66/11 66/14 67/5 
67/19 68/1 69/13 69/17 69/19 69/20 69/23 
75/24 76/7 77/23 77/24 78/5 79/6 80/24 
91/7101/5101/18 
hungry [2] 49/20 49/23 
hurt T31 48/14 48/17 48/20 
I--[2] 28/2177/17 
I'd [1] 78/3 
'II [8] 5/10 5/12 5/17 6/13 10/21 10/22 
14/14 86/3 
I'm [22] 4/7 4/12 4/19 5/16 7/23 8/18 12/12 
17/18 23/24 27/7 41/16 60/6 61/9 61/21 
66/12 74/20 75/21 76/12 79/8 86/11 92/20 
99/19 
I've [4] 8/4 27/7 61/17 99/19 
identified [1] 83/5 
identify [1] 79/11 
if [84] 4/13 4/24 5/7 7/5 8/19 12/21 12/22 
12/25 14/12 15/1 15/1 16/1 17/10 18/11 
22/17 22/21 23/5 25/17 26/6 29/25 30/3 
33/3 35/21 38/2 39/22 41/11 42/19 42/25 
47/18 47/20 47/20 49/6 49/8 49/13 49/23 
51/8 52/13 54/9 54/16 60/10 60/23 60/24 
60/25 61/17 61/23 62/5 62/9 62/11 62/14 
62/20 63/1 64/16 64/17 69/14 71/7 71/10 
71/11 71/23 73/13 74/12 77/24 78/16 80/3 
85/7 86/7 88/20 89/4 89/25 90/16 90/19 
90/25 92/1 92/18 92/18 93/12 93/15 93/16 
93/17 93/24 96/21 99/19 99/20 101/23 
102/14 
ii[1] 4/15 
illegal [1] 64/17 
illustration [1] 93/12 
immediately [3] 10/2 33/16 34/3 
impact [1] 48/11 
impacted [1] 10/25 
impair [1] 96/8 
impaired [12] 11/14 14/9 14/22 15/2 22/9 
40/21 66/16 70/18 92/11 96/14 96/14 98/6 
impairment [4] 4/19 69/3 71/7 97/2 
imply [1] 91/7 
important [6] 8/15 12/2 67/16 67/19 67/21 
67/22 
in [234] 
inability [1] 71/7 
inappropriate [1] 13/10 
incapable [7] 4/18 40/21 41/2 41/10 87/13 
87/17100/7 
inches [1] 55/18 
incident [4] 8/118/13 27/6 76/3 
included [2] 89/10 89/13 
includes [1] 6/16 
including [1] 96/10 
inclusive [1] 103/11 
inconsistent [1] 50/24 
incorrect [1] 43/5 
incurred [1] 88/25 
indicate [6] 25/22 42/9 48/16 49/2 51/22 
57/21 
indicated [18] 16/7 16/17 17/4 21/16 30/10 
30/13 32/5 38/17 38/21 44/6 46/10 51/21 
52/19 53/9 57/20 63/8 72/11 72/14 
indicated - Ml 57/20 
indicates [8] 42/11 45/18 45/23 46/6 84/22 
87/19 91/5 95/14 
indicating [2] 38/4 53/22 
indication [4] 62/12 66/15 70/23 96/11 
indicative [1] 70/12 
indicator [2] 36/5 70/17 
indicators [5] 12/17 31/8 32/4 32/7 67/25 
indirect [1] 90/5 
individual [1] 33/15 
individuals [2] 18/2319/1 
inference [1] 88/17 
inferences [1] 87/6 
inflicts [1] 4/25 
influence [21] 4/16 4/17 41/8 43/3 54/10 
59/1 59/7 59/20 63/2 87/12 87/17 88/7 89/9 
92/4 95/6 95/7 95/11 95/12 99/16 100/6 
100/22 
influencing [1] 87/20 
information [9] 4/6 4/7 5/1411/111/1 
14/1317/617/24 40/11 
ingested [1] 40/3 
ingestion [2] 36/22 36/24 
initial [2] 5/1719/25 
initially [1] 28/25 
initially - [1 ] 28/25 
injection [4] 37/7 37/11 37/20 38/10 
injured [10] 21/13 21/14 21/15 25/17 25/20 
25/22 29/22 30/1 50/13 93/14 
injuries [2] 10/9 23/4 
injury [5] 4/25 48/11 48/13 52/14 52/14 
inlaid [1] 55/16 
instead [1] 4/9 
instructed [1] 33/13 
instructional [1] 33/4 
instructor [1] 44/20 
insulin [1] 50/17 
intend [1] 89/3 
intends [2] 4/23100/13 
intentionally [1] 88/5 
interested [1] 103/16 
interesting [4] 91/17 91/24 95/25 99/19 
internal [2] 55/6 59/12 
interrogation [1] 40/18 
intersection [48] 9/13 9/14 9/15 9/16 
10/17 76/24 76/25 77/3 77/12 77/13 78/9 
78/13 78/18 78/25 79/2 79/5 79/6 79/12 
79/13 79/16 81/8 81/11 81/13 81/15 81/19 
86/17 88/15 88/17 89/25 90/9 90/10 90/17 
90/22 90/24 91/1 91/4 93/20 93/23 94/1 
94/12 94/14 96/17 96/19 96/20 96/22 96/23 
96/24 96/24 
interviewed [1] 67/7 
into [11] 24/22 43/19 71/23 81/17 84/10 
86/14 89/6 89/10 91/1 91/4 96/6 
intoxicated [3] 11/8 12/5 16/24 
introduction [1] 91/11 
investigate [2] 11/2412/5 
investigated [1] 36/13 
investigating [2] 24/1 41/23 
investigation [22] 10/1 11/9 20/21 23/10 
28/10 28/15 28/20 29/20 30/8 34/13 34/18 
35/23 36/9 37/4 37/18 37/19 37/21 38/2 
38/6 45/6 46/15 67/15 
invoked [1] 6/11 
involved [13] 9/7 10/9 13/22 17/5 17/9 
19/2 28/11 28/15 38/12 45/5 80/10 82/23 
96/11 
involves [1] 8/18 
involving [1] 89/19 
is [236] 
is - [2 ] 33/10 85/9 
isn't [4] 49/17 60/8 60/17 94/2 
issue [5] 50/8 90/17 94/22 99/18 99/19 
issues m 91/8 
it [212] 
it's [50] 4/24 10/24 11/1 37/5 43/17 47/12 
48/23 51/12 53/12 55/12 55/12 55/15 55/15 
55/15 56/11 56/11 56/25 58/20 60/23 61/14 
62/7 64/10 68/13 70/20 74/13 76/13 79/4 
79/8 79/15 79/16 84/8 84/15 84/22 85/2 
85/14 85/19 85/24 88/19 89/10 89/18 91/1 
91/6 91/17 94/23 94/23 95/25 96/23 97/15 
98/5 99/19 
its [4] 43/10 69/12 95/20 102/16 
itself \2\ 24/7 92/3 
Jacqueline [5] 18/518/618/11 18/2219/4 
Jag [3] 90/12 90/13 90/16 
Johnson [3] 18/518/619/4 
JOSH [4] 3/5 26/5 26/11 26/25 
Judge [3] 84/8 89/2101/3 
Ijudgment [2] 71/2 79/10 
judicial [2] 1/1 102/5 
JULY [2] 1/19 4/1 
|just [68] 4/5 4/11 5/17 7/20 10/24 11/1 
11/3 11/5 12/2 12/9 12/14 12/15 12/16 
12/22 14/12 15/4 15/21 17/20 18/7 20/10 
20/20 21/20 25/15 33/6 33/18 34/4 35/19 
37/5 43/23 43/25 46/25 49/10 50/1 53/22 
54/6 56/9 58/1 58/2 58/20 59/22 60/11 
60/22 61/9 61/10 61/17 61/18 62/7 66/13 
66/17 67/5 67/23 68/12 69/10 72/6 76/20 
76/21 80/6 80/8 81/10 82/3 82/15 86/16 
90/14 93/6 93/9 94/1 95/8 102/2 





killed [2] 93/15 95/4 
kin [1] 103/14 
kind [9] 12/21 33/20 52/14 55/11 57/4 
64/17 64/18 76/15 93/6 
kinds [2] 54/9 70/1 
Kirk [1] 4/4 
knew [2] 97/16 98/4 
know [48] 4/11 13/23 14/21 16/14 18/10 
19/23 21/2 23/2 23/4 40/14 41/11 41/25 
42/19 42/25 44/24 45/1 45/1 45/3 45/9 
46/14 49/5 49/10 49/13 49/14 58/21 59/23 
60/22 62/14 66/22 66/23 66/24 69/14 71/23 
73/13 73/13 74/12 79/15 79/17 79/20 79/22 
79/23 89/24 90/13 90/23 91/7 92/12 93/1 
96/21 
knowing [2] 98/21 98/22 
knowingly f11 88/5 
lab [19] 41/12 41/21 42/4 42/6 42/9 42/13 
43/4 67/12 69/5 69/11 69/16 69/19 69/23 
73/17 87/18 87/19 88/1 88/9 96/25 
lack [4] 53/6 53/24 54/8 68/15 
Lacks [1] 53/2 
ladies [1] 18/16 
lady[1] 91/4 
lanes [1] 9/8 
language [1] 98/11 
last [13] 7/12 7/25 8/10 26/24 28/11 50/2 
50/4 75/18 76/4 80/17 86/19 93/9 96/7 
later [4] 13/11 50/25 91/18101/13 
latter [1] 66/3 
law [6] 2/10 27/10 27/23 47/16 85/18 99/20 
lawyer [3] 24/2 47/17 47/19 
LAYCOCK[1] 1/11 
lead[1J 69/3 
leads [1] 59/6 
least [4] 22/10 78/3 93/3 101/7 
least --[1] 93/3 
leave [5] 5/10 6/15 46/25 47/4 71/18 
leaves [1] 97/3 
led [3] 14/22 58/25 59/19 
Lee[1] 18/6 
left [13] 9/10 32/15 32/18 33/14 53/3 53/13 
53/21 54/3 56/3 58/2 71/25 94/14 94/17 
leg [3] 32/1132/15 32/18 
legs[1] 29/13 
length [1] 46/4 
lengthy [1] 93/1 
lenses [1] 52/11 
less [1] 20/10 
lesser [2] 89/10 89/13 
let [11] 5/12 12/9 19/1 34/23 43/23 85/9 
89/8 91/10 94/2197/4100/15 
let's [2] 38/9 48/22 
level [1] 29/8 
lieutenant [13] 7/23 8/411/2 16/7 17/1 
24/17 26/6 44/19 44/23 45/4 45/5 82/9 
82/15 
lifted [1] 61/1 
light [36] 12/15 35/3 35/5 35/15 35/25 36/4 
56/9 56/9 56/20 56/20 56/24 57/5 60/11 
63/9 68/16 68/21 77/5 77/6 77/18 77/21 
77/23 77/24 78/13 79/3 86/19 88/16 88/18 
89/23 90/4 90/20 90/21 90/22 90/23 91/2 
94/1 99/8 
lighting [3] 9/15 29/4 29/6 
lightly [1] 9/12 
lights [2] 9/16 9/22 
like [23] 4/11 6/5 9/11 11/7 12/20 16/23 
16/23 24/2 27/20 27/21 27/21 29/21 33/11 
50/8 57/25 62/10 73/5 73/6 79/1 85/13 
86/10 93/16100/11 
likely [1] 93/14 
line [11] 32/2 55/9 55/10 55/11 55/13 
55/16 70/23 71/1 86/23 99/24 99/25 
list [6] 49/17 73/15 73/16 73/17 73/20 96/5 
listed [3] 19/119/18 52/18 
listen [1] 4/12 
lit [2] 9/16 29/6 
little [9] 10/2218/4 38/1 46/1 56/2 56/20 
68/16 68/2171/4 
live [2] 10/815/22 
living [1] 75/20 
located [1] 96/20 
location [1] 23/18 
long [14] 7/19 8/3 20/7 27/3 27/15 31/10 
44/21 45/2 66/11 66/14 75/24 77/23 77/24 
78/5 
look [8] 21/5 34/1 41/18 65/22 85/9 89/25 
90/19 92/1 
looked [5] 11/712/6 66/9 67/5 67/5 
looking [13] 4/12 12/6 31/8 40/25 52/24 
56/9 57/21 58/4 59/2 62/2 84/20 95/7 102/5 
looks [3] 67/23 85/13 86/10 
loose [1] 60/24 
loosely [1] 62/10 
Lortab [20] 13/1 13/19 14/6 39/9 64/20 
72/11 72/19 73/4 73/7 73/11 73/13 73/15 
73/16 73/20 88/3 96/3 97/16 97/19 98/2 
98/2 
Lortabs[3] 39/139/17 40/7 
lot [4] 49/16 73/5 73/6 92/23 
low[1] 56/12 
lower f21 63/5 63/5 
M 
made [16] 5/16 23/17 24/24 40/17 41/1 
41/6 47/2 67/21 78/21 81/12 84/18 84/18 
OD/4 00/ 13 » 1/ I I 9 3 / U 
magistrate [1] 92/19 
mailing [1] 101/20 
Main [3] 8/22 79/16 90/4 
mainly [2] 31/10 58/2 
maintain [4] 28/4 32/3 32/17 32/19 
make [31] 5/12 13/18 14/5 22/8 38/23 
46/22 49/17 52/6 55/25 65/23 65/25 68/14 
70/1 71/2 72/2 76/14 76/14 77/6 77/8 84/19 
89/6 89/8 90/10 93/9 96/15 96/18 99/4 99/7 
99/18101/9101/15 
makes [4] 60/2 73/13 84/12 93/22 
making [9] 62/11 76/23 76/25 77/1 77/17 
78/2181/1194/17 94/18 
maliciously [1] 91/8 
manager [1] 75/21 
manner [3] 4/15 87/1199/3 
many [5] 30/22 32/21 32/25 43/23 44/13 
Mapleton [7] 27/14 27/15 39/19 39/21 88/3 
97/20 97/23 
marble [2] 55/12 55/15 
marked [2] 41/17 58/12 
marks [2] 23/16 24/25 
mathematical [1] 23/12 
matter [5] 4/22 10/24 99/23 102/24103/7 
matters [1] 38/19 
maximum [3] 53/14 53/25 54/9 
may [30] 6/15 6/16 6/18 7/711/1411/14 
24/6 24/19 26/1 27/23 28/10 41/14 47/21 
47/22 48/8 53/17 53/17 57/6 67/25 69/13 
74/17 81/25 83/15 86/16 93/16 93/17 94/2 
95/20 95/22 96/12 
maybe [4] 50/8 76/12 93/16102/1 
McDonald's [1] 79/16 
me [41] 10/3 10/5 10/12 10/15 11/511/11 
11/13 11/15 12/9 12/25 13/24 14/7 14/22 
15/22 16/15 17/7 19/1 21/11 34/23 40/7 
43/23 48/5 49/3 55/1 57/24 57/25 58/24 
62/1 64/6 71/12 77/6 85/9 89/8 91/10 91/16 
94/21 95/1 95/25 97/4 100/15 103/9 
mean [6] 23/11 24/18 43/5 55/2 61/6 93/5 
means [3] 6/12 54/13 58/22 
meant [2] 34/25 35/2 
measurable [1] 95/14 
measure [3] 56/16 56/2160/20 
medical [6] 15/14 27/21 49/19 83/19 87/14 
95/5 
medication [3] 30/8 30/10 50/23 
medicines [1] 64/18 
meet [1] 89/4 
memory [2] 46/1147/8 
Mendez[3] 19/25 20/3 20/9 
Mendez' [1] 20/5 
mental [1] 92/11 
mentally [1] 15/1 
mention [1] 43/4 
mentioned [1] 4/22 
Meprobamate [5] 42/8 69/1169/16 95/15 
95/18 
merge [2] 91/14 91/21 
merges [1] 89/10 
met[1] 94/11 
MICHAEL [1] 2/10 
microgram [1] 73/23 
microphone [2] 7/4 75/12 
middle [2] 17/20 94/11 
midnight [1] 50/4 
might [4] 24/1 34/25 66/15 91/6 
Mike [1] 5/20 
miles [3] 93/16 93/18 99/23 
military [1] 27/20 
MILLER [49] 1/7 4/4 6/516/8 16/1717/8 
17/12 19/2 21/9 22/14 23/21 24/8 25/17 
29/10 29/12 31/6 31/24 38/11 41/8 42/16 
M 
MILLER... [29] 43/2 45/13 46/6 46/13 
46/16 48/3 48/16 48/19 54/24 58/25 62/17 
63/21 63/24 64/15 64/25 66/9 66/11 71/17 
72/10 87/10 87/16 87/20 88/2 90/12 90/16 
91/6 93/25 93/25100/15 
Miller's [4] 19/13 42/1 42/7 87/24 
milligram [6] 39/1 39/4 39/4 74/4 74/13 
97/21 
milligrams [6] 72/17 72/18 72/19 74/3 
74/6 74/10 
millimeters [1] 36/1 
Miltown[1] 69/11 
mind [2] 16/167/16 
mine[1] 45/2 
minimum [1] 32/7 
minus [1] 31/20 
minute [2] 40/16 86/11 
minutes [6] 9/3 46/1 50/6 66/17 67/2 76/20 
Miranda [5] 23/22 46/7 46/9 47/5 47/7 
Mirandize[1] 38/13 
misdemeanor [1] 4/22 
missed [2] 33/23 34/6 
Mitchell [2] 20/24 38/4 
mix[1] 12/21 
moment [2] 77/10 82/3 
moments [1] 13/8 
months [1] 76/13 
moonlight [1] 60/7 
more [19] 23/11 34/20 34/24 40/11 43/24 
61/6 66/1 66/4 67/16 70/2 70/5 70/6 72/6 
78/1 82/4 93/2 98/21 98/23 101/19 
most [4] 7/417/14 68/3 91/6 
mostly [1] 75/12 
mother [1] 15/21 
motion [1] 99/21 
motions [4] 99/17 101/4101/6 102/14 
motor [8] 4/14 14/10 40/21 41/2 41/10 
87/10 95/2 99/2 
mouth [3] 22/5 51/11 51/14 
move [2] 4/23101/1 
MR [45] 3/3 3/4 3/4 3/6 3/6 3/7 3/7 3/9 3/9 
5/19 6/2 7/11 7/17 10/22 11/2 14/2415/23 
16/3 24/16 25/24 31/2 39/12 41/14 41/16 
42/16 46/22 62/16 65/4 65/9 72/4 74/15 
74/18 75/16 78/6 78/8 78/12 79/13 79/24 
80/19 81/22 82/3 83/4 84/4 84/22 86/7 
Mr. [83] 4/23 5/12 5/13 6/5 15/25 16/8 
16/17 17/8 17/12 19/13 21/9 22/14 23/21 
24/8 25/17 29/10 29/12 31/6 31/24 38/11 
41/8 42/1 42/7 43/2 45/13 46/6 46/13 46/16 
48/3 48/16 48/19 54/24 58/25 62/17 63/21 
63/24 64/13 64/15 64/25 65/5 66/9 66/11 
71/17 72/10 83/13 84/21 86/1 86/25 87/10 
87/16 87/20 87/23 87/24 88/2 88/8 90/12 
90/13 90/16 90/19 91/6 91/10 91/12 92/2 
92/20 93/25 93/25 93/25 94/3 94/5 94/13 
94/17 94/18 96/16 98/8 99/18 99/22 100/2 
100/9 100/15 101/2 101/12 101/16 102/18 
Mr. Bodily [2] 64/13 65/5 
Mr. Chappell [1] 100/2 
Mr. Gilchrist [2] 90/13 94/18 
Mr. Miller [45] 6/5 16/8 16/17 17/8 17/12 
21/9 22/14 23/21 24/8 25/17 29/10 29/12 
31/6 31/24 38/11 41/8 43/2 45/13 46/6 
46/13 46/16 48/3 48/16 48/19 54/24 58/25 
62/17 63/21 63/24 64/15 64/25 66/9 66/11 
71/17 72/10 87/10 87/16 87/20 88/2 90/12 
90/16 91/6 93/25 93/25 100/15 
Mr. Miller's [4] 19/13 42/1 42/7 87/24 
Mr. Petro [15] 4/23 5/12 5/13 15/25 83/13 
84/21 86/1 91/10 94/5 99/18 100/9 101/2 
101/12101/16102/18 
Mr. Scott [9] 87/23 88/8 90/19 93/25 94/13 
94/17 96/16 98/8 99/22 
Mr. Scott - [1 ] 91/12 
Mr. Scott's [4] 86/25 92/2 92/20 94/3 
Ms [8] 75/17 75/20 80/24 89/22 92/25 
93/21 95/1 99/6 
much [9] 6/18 13/5 15/20 31/10 36/4 79/2 
92/10101/5102/22 
multiple [1] 32/2 
muscle [7] 37/7 37/9 60/20 61/10 61/10 
61/24 61/24 
muscles [7] 61/2 61/3 61/5 61/6 62/3 62/8 
62/11 
must[1] 97/11 
muster [1] 89/5 
my [38] 5/13 6/19 7/13 7/23 8/19 9/24 13/5 
14/15 14/19 19/3 19/15 23/14 24/5 29/12 
34/23 38/17 41/1 41/5 46/10 51/4 55/4 60/4 
61/20 71/25 74/24 76/8 77/10 80/14 82/6 
89/2 90/14 92/14 93/11 94/21 96/2 97/17 
100/14103/17 
N 
NACP [1] 28/3 
name [22] 7/12 7/12 7/13 7/14 18/418/14 
19/18 19/19 20/5 20/16 21/3 26/23 26/24 
42/1 42/2 75/17 75/18 79/23 80/15 80/17 
84/24 84/25 
narcotic [20] 41/8 42/10 43/3 43/4 43/11 
57/15 58/14 58/15 58/16 58/16 58/18 58/19 
59/20 59/24 63/15 68/10 68/22 68/24 68/25 
69/7 
nasal [2] 37/1 37/2 
nasal - [1] 37/2 
Nathan [1] 19/13 
nature [1] 97/11 
near[1] 35/9 
necessarily [4] 58/5 91/14 91/21 93/13 
need [9] 6/12 22/10 75/11 82/5 83/23 86/6 
101/19101/25102/20 
needed [2] 11/2412/5 
neglect [3] 91/7 92/22 99/3 
negligence [12] 88/12 89/17 89/20 91/9 
93/11 93/15 93/18 94/2 94/2 97/4 97/6 97/7 
negligent [6] 4/14 87/11 93/16 93/24 94/4 
97/7 
nervous [9] 41/9 42/10 42/11 43/3 69/8 
69/12 95/19 96/6 96/8 
never [2] 88/16 91/24 
new[1] 87/2 
next [14] 5/21 11/9 18/6 26/4 31/17 31/22 
32/10 33/7 33/8 34/13 36/8 37/6 77/16 
100/25 
night [16] 8/15 8/1513/113/19 25/10 
38/24 39/2 47/25 66/25 76/5 76/17 76/19 
79/14 97/16 97/20 98/2 
no [90] 1/6 3/2 3/13 5/1512/1913/20 
13/23 15/13 18/9 18/20 18/24 23/16 24/3 
24/18 24/24 25/15 25/23 25/24 27/18 29/18 
30/2 30/9 30/10 30/13 33/25 34/12 36/16 
36/19 37/12 38/10 40/12 40/19 43/7 43/16 
45/17 46/19 46/21 46/24 48/9 48/18 49/14 
50/14 50/16 50/18 50/20 50/22 50/24 51/13 
52/2 55/15 58/23 60/15 63/12 64/8 64/12 
65/1 65/3 65/18 65/21 66/20 66/23 67/1 
68/7 68/21 70/19 70/21 71/9 71/19 71/22 
72/3 73/21 74/16 76/2 76/16 77/15 78/15 
78/24 79/10 80/12 83/14 85/17 86/9 89/11 
94/8 94/25 95/3 96/10 102/4 102/19 102/21 
Nods [2] 46/3 53/4 
non-testifying [2] 83/1 84/6 
none [4] 51/25 52/11 68/17 89/21 
Nordiazepam [4] 42/8 69/22 95/16 95/24 
normal [39] 12/15 35/2 35/7 35/8 35/13 
35/14 35/17 35/18 35/22 36/15 36/18 36/2I 
36/21 37/9 52/10 52/19 52/20 54/7 54/8 
56/4 56/5 56/9 56/10 56/11 56/12 56/13 
56/14 56/23 57/3 58/10 60/8 60/12 61/15 
61/16 63/9 63/17 63/17 63/18 68/12 
normally [2] 53/20 54/14 
north [5] 1/14 8/22 90/20 96/17 98/9 
northbound [5] 79/15 90/4 94/10 94/13 
94/16 
nose [23] 30/24 33/8 33/15 33/16 33/19 
33/23 34/2 34/6 37/2 37/3 57/16 57/17 
57/18 57/19 57/20 57/22 58/1 58/2 58/3 
58/5 59/15 59/16 60/16 
not [88] 4/19 8/8 10/23 14/4 14/7 14/10 
16/11 16/13 16/14 16/15 17/10 18/9 18/20 
21/15 22/9 23/6 23/22 23/24 24/7 25/20 
30/5 30/5 31/11 31/20 34/25 36/4 39/9 40/1 
43/8 46/20 46/21 47/3 47/5 48/7 48/21 
49/20 49/23 51/9 51/12 53/9 53/17 53/22 
54/11 54/11 54/16 55/15 60/3 60/6 60/15 
61/3 61/9 61/21 62/2 62/14 66/12 66/23 
70/20 71/8 71/20 71/25 73/14 73/16 74/4 
77/13 78/24 79/8 83/25 84/12 85/14 88/24 
89/7 90/22 90/25 92/18 92/19 93/13 93/19 
95/12 97/4 98/10 99/19 100/13 100/18 
100/21 100/24 100/25 103/14 103/15 
not - [1] 61/9 
note [3] 5/18 68/14 96/21 
noted [1] 37/5 
notes [3] 41/5 76/14 97/18 
nothing [9] 6/25 26/16 53/13 53/21 58/8 
75/6 83/12 84/22 98/10 
notice [2] 13/10 29/10 
noticed [7] 12/712/1012/1412/17 13/11 
36/24 78/7 
notification [5] 84/17 85/3 85/8 85/18 
85/24 
notified [1] 8/18 
now [18] 6/24 7/23 16/25 22/14 26/15 38/9 
43/2 46/13 47/21 54/3 55/8 57/16 59/23 
60/160/13 64/6 75/5 80/25 
number [14] 3/14 3/14 3/15 4/5 32/7 41/17 
42/2 43/14 43/18 44/14 55/23 57/25 83/18 
89/8 
Numbers [1] 86/13 
nurse [1] 20/25 
Nursing [3] 21/3 37/24 38/5 
NYAL[1] 2/4 
nystagmus [5] 52/21 53/14 53/18 53/24 
53/25 
o'clock [3] 97/20 102/9 102/13 
oath [5] 82/11 84/16 84/23 85/3 85/22 
Object [2] 10/20 84/3 
objection [11] 5/1314/1114/16 43/15 
43/16 82/24 84/8 86/2 86/3 86/9 102/18 
observation [8] 21/19 29/12 35/5 51/3 
51/4 52/6 52/9 93/9 
observations [2] 23/17100/3 
observe [5] 25/21 32/21 34/15 37/6 65/23 
observed [11] 16/19 29/15 31/7 34/17 38/9 
49/19 59/3 66/11 87/24 99/24 100/1 
observed - [1] 87/24 
obtain [1] 38/3 
obtained [3] 23/13 38/5 40/2 
obvious [2] 11/2015/3 
obviously [4] 21/22 28/16 51/11 60/23 
occasion [1] 103/6 
occur [3] 9/13 97/1198/15 
occurred [7] 8/10 76/3 76/11 79/14 91/20 
93/24 98/4 
occurs [1] 89/13 
October [10] 7/25 8/10 9/18 28/11 39/1 
October... [5] 39/3 41/23 44/9 44/13 76/4 
odd [2] 13/1013/12 
off [8] 10/18 12/18 28/16 31/1 32/2 47/8 
86/23 98/11 
off-duty [1] 98/7 
off-the-record [1] 4/6 
offense [3] 89/10 96/2199/16 
offer [4] 43/13 80/3 83/18 86/7 
offered [5] 10/23 10/24 84/4 86/7 92/17 
offering [2] 10/23102/3 
Office [1] 2/4 
officer [36] 6/10 9/24 9/25 12/23 19/18 
19/19 19/23 19/25 20/3 20/5 20/7 20/9 
20/22 26/5 26/9 26/23 26/25 27/1 27/8 
27/20 41/16 43/20 44/6 44/25 47/1 49/18 
65/10 83/1 83/1 87/16 88/2 88/9 95/1 95/8 
97/15 98/7 
officer's [1] 42/2 
officers [6] 7/24 8/7 12/13 17/23 17/25 
20/1 
Official [1] 103/5 
Ohio [3] 10/1919/7 88/23 
okay [17] 13/1819/18 21/16 34/15 37/6 
44/2 60/24 60/24 75/13 76/20 82/2 89/15 
94/21 101/11 101/15 102/12 102/15 
old [2] 10/6 80/24 
on [118] 
Once [3] 10/10 33/15 66/5 
one [42] 4/21 5/8 8/18 9/10 10/7 15/18 
15/18 28/17 32/5 32/11 33/6 39/4 43/25 
47/12 47/13 47/19 57/12 57/25 60/2 62/16 
68/9 68/20 69/25 70/2 70/13 73/4 74/3 82/5 
82/16 88/25 89/8 89/13 89/19 90/1 90/1 
90/2 92/5 93/9 93/13 95/18 97/17 98/3 
one-leg [3] 55/19 59/8 59/10 
one-legged [1] 30/23 
ones [1] 42/22 
only [14] 5/8 8/7 36/25 37/12 48/4 57/12 
66/17 68/9 68/20 83/17 88/4 88/9 89/20 
95/12 
onset [1] 53/20 
opened [2] 11/19 55/5 
operate [5] 14/10 71/7 87/10 99/2 100/5 
operates [1] 4/14 
operating [9] 4/18 5/1 40/21 41/2 41/10 
87/13 87/18 95/2100/7 
opinion [24] 14/9 14/13 14/15 14/17 14/19 
40/20 40/23 40/24 41/1 41/4 41/7 43/2 
58/12 60/14 60/15 63/14 66/5 66/6 66/13 
66/14 67/9 67/1171/6 87/16 
opinions [2] 62/16 87/18 
opportunity [1] 92/24 
opposed [2] 23/12 61/2 
Opposing [1] 87/4 
or [169] 
or--[1] 71/15 
oral [5] 36/25 101/25 102/1 102/2 102/13 
orally [1] 40/8 
order [2] 6/13 22/8 
ordinary [4] 97/13 98/16 98/20 98/21 
other [56] 4/21 6/7 6/14 6/14 12/13 12/17 
13/4 13/8 13/10 13/11 14/5 15/23 17/11 
17/23 18/4 18/13 18/22 18/23 23/16 23/17 
23/25 24/11 24/21 25/2 25/24 25/25 29/4 
30/11 34/1 34/10 40/10 40/17 43/21 43/25 
44/15 44/18 50/1 65/4 69/10 69/13 72/4 
74/15 80/19 81/22 81/23 83/24 87/21 87/22 
88/18 89/25 90/6 91/3 91/4 93/22 95/21 
95/23 
others [3] 56/25 67/16 96/9 
otherwise [2] 34/8103/14 
ought [4] 29/24 91/17 97/9 98/13 
our [8] 4/5 28/14 28/17 42/1 64/10 76/8 
85/2100/25 
out [27] 5/17 8/17 8/20 10/2 10/2 10/16 
11/411/5 11/12 11/24 12/3 12/20 28/12 
33/23 46/25 61/1 61/2 61/4 61/11 70/13 
71/14 76/19 80/9 84/23 91/3 92/23 102/10 
outset [1] 89/7 
outside [3] 17/20 36/15 36/17 
over [19] 7/20 8/4 27/4 27/16 46/1 48/22 
79/1 80/3 87/9 92/19 93/16 93/17 93/17 
98/8 98/8 98/10 99/1 99/13 100/8 
Overruled [1] 83/2 
overseen [1] 25/2 
oversight [3] 23/14 24/19 52/2 
overview [1] 10/12 
overwhelming [1] 25/9 
own [2] 43/10 99/12 
Oxycodone [14] 42/8 42/23 43/9 43/11 
69/6 69/25 73/13 73/18 73/22 74/1 95/16 
95/24 96/1 96/4 
OxyContin [23] 39/4 39/5 39/8 39/12 
39/20 40/8 40/11 43/11 64/20 72/14 72/17 
73/4 73/18 74/3 74/5 88/3 96/1 97/17 97/22 
98/3 98/3 99/10100/19 
p.m[4] 9/3 28/17 39/3 39/14 
page [5] 3/2 3/13 73/18 86/25 95/17 
pages [1] 103/10 
paper [1] 76/19 
paragraph [1] 96/7 
paramedic [1] 27/21 
paraphrase [1] 47/8 
parenthesis [3] 95/19 95/21 95/25 
parents [6] 13/6 15/10 15/11 17/15 17/16 
72/1 
part [9] 23/14 24/19 30/8 37/4 38/6 40/18 
59/6 62/25 65/13 
[particular [1] 82/16 
parties [3] 5/23 83/24103/15 
party [1] 14/6 
pass [4] 31/11 31/15 33/24 60/3 
passage [1] 54/25 
passed [2] 31/11 68/6 
passing [1] 31/13 
past[1] 25/7 
patrol [15] 7/23 7/24 8/3 8/7 11/11 11/19 
12/20 16/8 17/20 20/12 24/10 27/7 27/9 
27/14 83/5 
patrolman [4] 10/1911/419/5 88/23 
pattern [5] 87/24 87/24 91/15 92/5 97/1 
Pause [1] 85/25 
peak[1] 61/18 
pen[1] 56/20 
PENNY [7] 3/8 6/9 19/9 74/23 75/1 75/19 
88/14 
people [5] 17/14 17/24 18/24 80/7 93/13 
people-[1] 17/24 
perceive [2] 93/7 97/12 
Percocet[2] 73/19 96/1 
Percodan[2] 73/19 96/1 
perform [10] 28/18 28/20 28/22 30/20 
30/22 31/24 33/22 34/8 34/11 68/3 
performance [4] 31/5 34/4 65/22 68/1 
performed [4] 34/14 63/20 67/6 67/20 
performing [1] 30/21 
period [3] 97/23 98/9 99/25 
perjury [4] 84/6 85/11 85/14 85/21 
person [16] 4/14 4/18 4/25 16/25 19/2 32/7 
33/18 54/9 67/23 83/4 83/9 84/23 97/13 
98/16 98/20 98/21 
personal [2] 48/1148/13 
personnel [1] 18/1 
PETRO [31] 2/10 2/11 3/4 3/6 3/7 3/9 4/23 
5/12 5/13 5/20 15/25 15/3 41/lb 4b/ZZ 
62/16 65/4 74/15 81/22 83/13 84/21 84/22 
86/1 86/7 91/10 94/5 99/18 100/9 101/2 
101/12101/16102/18 
phase [1] 33/4 
Phoenix [1] 75/23 
phone [1] 28/16 
photographs [1] 20/20 
physical [6] 12/6 23/17 29/23 30/11 50/19 
63/23 
pickup [2] 10/15 99/23 
picture [2] 58/4 67/3 
pictures [1] 17/25 
piece [1] 55/14 
pills [1] 74/4 
pinning [1] 93/4 
place [5] 38/2 64/25 71/20 76/24103/8 
placed [1] 71/23 
plain [1] 58/18 
Plaintiff [2] 1/5 2/3 
played [1] 24/22 
plea [5] 100/10 100/11 100/17 100/20 
100/23 
pleas [3] 100/13100/15100/25 
please [8] 7/3 7/12 26/24 74/24 75/9 75/18 
82/1199/21 
plus [3] 31/20 97/22 99/6 
point [22] 4/19 12/19 12/22 13/5 13/6 
13/13 15/8 15/24 27/8 30/7 30/9 35/21 
38/13 43/13 43/20 80/20 86/8 86/16 87/23 
88/14 88/20 91/3 
pointed [1] 11/4 
pointer [1] 33/11 
police [22] 7/18 7/22 12/23 19/2 19/21 
22/17 22/22 25/4 27/2 27/9 27/14 27/20 
28/14 28/18 28/21 29/2 29/5 44/15 45/7 
55/10 76/17 82/20 
policy [1] 25/15 
poor[1] 51/5 
portion [2] 8/7 46/15 
portions [1] 67/15 
possession [4] 88/1 99/10 99/11 100/19 
possibility [2] 23/5 92/4 
possible [10] 8/18 8/19 23/3 25/13 53/12 
70/12 70/17 71/14 91/20 99/4 
possibly [7] 17/5 17/9 30/12 51/19 52/14 
70/5 78/22 
potentially [2] 36/5 70/3 
practiced] 25/11 
preclude [1] 102/3 
preliminary [8] 1/18 5/18 5/24 29/20 30/7 
38/19 71/5 88/11 
prescribed [2] 65/20 74/8 
prescription [3] 39/22 40/164/18 
presence [1] 99/11 
present [10] 9/4 14/2 37/15 47/17 47/21 
53/2 53/9 53/22 83/7 84/7 
preserved [1] 6/16 
pressure [7] 36/10 36/12 36/17 58/8 60/7 
63/5 63/17 
pretrial [1] 99/17 
pretty [6] 13/5 25/9 47/24 57/23 74/10 79/2 
prior [8] 27/10 31/11 45/9 76/22 78/9 
78/14 87/25 91/20 
probability [2] 66/2 66/4 
probable [8] 95/10 96/5 96/13 97/25 98/18 
98/25 99/7100/5 
probably [7] 23/14 49/17 85/19 93/12 
93/24101/7102/2 
problem [4] 15/3 24/23 49/19 93/21 
proceeded [2] 10/2511/18 
proceeding [2] 84/11 103/9 
proceedings [5] 1/17 85/25 102/23 103/7 
103/13 
process [1] 77/1 
prosecuting [1] 96/3 
prosecutor [1] 4/8 
protocols [1] 69/14 
prove [1] 87/7 
proven [2] 87/7 94/4 
provide [2] 40/10 42/13 
provided [1] 84/5 
PROVO [11] 1/15 2/6 2/12 4/1 10/17 16/22 
91/13 92/6 96/17 98/9103/17 
proximate [1] 5/1 
psychophysical [9] 30/15 30/17 34/10 
59/4 59/6 59/19 59/22 62/23 67/20 
Public [1] 28/1 
pull [2] 92/23 98/10 
pulled [1] 80/3 
pulse [10] 36/10 36/11 36/14 37/8 52/18 
52/19 58/8 60/7 63/6 63/16 
pulses [1] 36/14 
punishable [4] 84/18 85/5 85/8 85/19 
pupil [10] 52/11 52/12 56/2 56/6 56/10 
56/16 56/22 60/7 67/2168/8 
pupillometer [1] 56/17 
pupils [15] 12/14 13/9 14/21 34/17 34/21 
34/22 34/24 35/3 35/22 35/23 57/5 57/13 
68/10 68/1168/13 
purely [1] 7/4 
purpose [3] 69/6 88/24 89/5 
purposes [8] 93/5 95/9 96/5 96/13 97/25 
98/25 99/9 99/14 
pursuant [2] 84/17 85/3 
pursuit [3] 53/2 53/6 54/9 
push[1] 90/18 




qualified [1] 25/5 
quantifiable [1] 95/14 
quantity [1] 68/25 
question [15] 7/7 29/25 30/3 30/10 34/23 
40/14 46/14 49/12 49/15 49/25 61/17 77/10 
78/4 91/17 97/3 
questioned [1] 47/18 
questioning [2] 47/20 47/23 
questions [21] 15/23 24/11 24/17 25/24 
25/25 29/21 43/21 47/21 47/22 49/16 65/4 
67/7 71/6 72/4 72/6 74/15 74/16 80/19 
81/22 81/23 92/25 
quick [1] 74/20 
quite F41 17/10 79/8 89/4 99/25 
R.H [1] 84/25 
rain [1] 12/21 
raining [1] 12/21 
raise [1] 32/15 
raised [2] 32/2 33/3 
raises [1] 33/4 
Ralph [1] 10/2 
ran [1] 90/4 
range [14] 35/7 35/8 35/13 35/14 35/17 
35/18 36/15 36/18 42/13 42/18 56/14 56/23 
64/23 78/2 
ranges [9] 35/2 35/22 42/16 52/20 56/5 
56/11 57/3 57/7 68/12 
rarely [2] 70/25 74/7 
rate[1] 63/16 
rather [1] 45/4 
reaction [4] 36/4 63/9 68/16 68/21 
reactions T21 22/3 22/5 
read [12] 21/9 23/22 46/6 46/9 47/5 47/7 
47/8 47/14 47/24 86/11 97/4 97/6 
reads [1] 5/14 
ready [2] 5/2318/7 
real [1] 12/8 
really [10] 22/8 49/24 58/21 60/24 61/14 
85/14 89/21 89/24 90/9 94/22 
really «[1] 90/9 
reason [7] 8/16 8/19 32/1 52/1 61/12 89/7 
96/18 
reasons [1] 24/21 
recall [16] 12/21 13/13 13/16 13/16 16/21 
19/14 23/5 24/5 24/9 25/9 37/23 42/24 
48/21 78/22 82/9 83/25 
recall-[1] 13/16 
received [7] 27/23 28/16 43/17 43/19 
45/10 86/9 86/14 
receiving [1] 478 
recent [1] 86/19 
recently [1] 27/7 
recess [3] 74/22 82/8 102/22 
reckless [2] 89/19 93/17 
recklessly [1] 91/8 
recognition [5] 12/1212/13 28/3 95/9 
100/2 
recognize [1] 65/13 
recollection [3] 8/13 19/15 24/5 
reconstruction [5] 23/7 23/9 24/18 25/2 
25/5 
record [5] 26/24 60/4 64/1 95/9 97/5 
recorder [2] 64/3 64/4 
recording [3] 64/5 64/9 76/15 
Recross-Examination [2] 3/7 72/8 
red [13] 21/24 51/17 78/14 88/16 88/18 
90/4 90/21 90/22 90/23 91/1 91/2 94/1 99/8 
Redirect [6] 3/4 3/7 24/12 24/15 65/8 
82/13 
Reed [2] 20/16 20/17 
refer [1] 74/12 
reference [3] 14/5 41/22 85/20 
refers [1] 85/17 
refrain [1] 6/13 
regard [7] 4/6 52/16 53/23 53/23 89/2 
89/16 99/18 
regards [1] 87/9 
Regional [1] 15/14 
relates [1] 88/11 
relation [1] 92/20 
relationship [3] 18/10 81/8 89/24 
relative [2] 27/19 37/17 
relaxed [1] 61/19 
relayed [1] 48/4 
relevant [2] 8/13 8/15 
reliable [3] 84/9 84/13 92/16 
rely [4] 41/3 87/22 89/3 93/24 
relying [7] 23/11 23/18 59/10 87/15 88/8 
88/13 92/20 
remain [3] 15/1116/147/15 
remember [14] 8/1117/10 22/25 24/9 
28/12 37/21 38/6 64/16 65/2 76/4 76/7 
76/10 78/16 78/19 
removed [1] 98/23 
rendered [2] 87/12100/7 
renders [1] 4/18 
Repeat [1] 69/15 
report [33] 19/2 21/9 21/17 21/18 38/17 
41/21 42/4 42/6 42/9 42/13 43/4 46/10 
48/24 58/25 68/16 69/5 69/7 69/11 69/16 
69/19 69/23 69/23 73/14 83/19 87/14 87/19 
87/19 88/2 88/9 95/5 95/13 96/25 99/12 
reported [3] 1/24103/6103/9 
reporter [2] 103/5103/6 
REPORTER'S [2] 1/17103/1 
reoortsni 85/20 
represent [1] 47/19 
request [1] 47/22 
requested [1] 28/18 
requirs[1] 88/4 
researched [1] 91/18 
reservation [1] 88/25 
resource [1] 27/8 
respect [2] 97/7 98/11 
respond [5] 8/19 21/21 28/18 29/25 30/3 
responded [1] 13/15 
responding [1] 19/25 
response [19] 8/19 9/24 22/24 25/19 39/24 
40/6 49/2 49/15 50/3 50/10 50/11 51/3 
51/16 64/16 64/19 92/14 93/8 101/12 
101/16 
responses [3] 12/8 67/6 67/8 
responsibilities [2] 8/6 20/19 
result [9] 5/1 35/11 83/20 93/6 95/4 97/8 
97/10 98/12 98/14 
results [4] 42/4 59/19 67/12 73/8 
retired [7] 10/18 11/3 11/5 12/4 19/5 88/23 
98/7 
reverse [1] 102/15 
reviewed [1] 73/8 
reviews [1] 86/15 
right [59] 4/20 5/6 5/6 5/10 5/10 5/13 5/19 
6/7 6/18 7/16 7/23 12/7 12/10 12/10 12/22 
19/3 19/6 19/8 19/14 20/11 22/12 26/1 26/9 
32/16 32/18 33/13 33/14 34/23 36/2 45/20 
46/2 47/13 47/15 47/17 53/3 53/13 53/21 
54/3 56/3 57/16 60/10 63/7 64/6 71/17 77/8 
81/16 82/7 85/16 85/23 86/4 86/6 92/13 
94/11 94/15 94/18 94/19 100/12 101/8 
102/4 
right-[2] 33/13 60/10 
right-hand [2] 76/23 99/25 
rights [5] 23/22 46/7 46/9 47/5 47/7 
rigid [3] 60/23 61/1161/11 
rigidity [4] 37/7 37/9 60/20 61/10 
risk [5] 93/6 93/14 97/10 97/1198/14 
road [7] 24/5 24/6 24/7 98/8 98/8 98/11 
98/24 
roads [1] 9/12 
Romberg [8] 30/16 30/23 31/3 31/15 31/19 
54/21 54/22 59/12 
room [5] 29/7 35/3 35/5 60/11 64/10 
route [1] 22/13 
routine [1] 25/12 
Roxicet[2] 73/19 96/2 
Roxicodone [2] 73/19 96/2 
Roy [4] 19/4 84/24 86/11 88/22 
RPR [2] 1/24103/22 
rule [4] 6/11 71/14 85/20 94/24 
Rules [1] 85/21 
run [1] 91/1 
running [2] 80/6 80/7 
runny [3] 37/2 37/3 60/16 
rural [1] 93/1 
Ruth m 28/17 
sad [1] 51/2 
safe[1] 22/23 
safely [8] 14/10 40/21 41/2 41/10 71/7 
87/13 87/17100/7 
Safety [1] 28/1 
said [31] 4/15 11/5 12/4 12/9 12/20 12/24 
13/8 15/4 21/15 22/25 23/1 24/18 28/22 
30/2 31/2 35/25 43/2 50/4 50/8 50/16 50/18 
50/22 56/19 57/16 60/11 69/1 73/2 77/18 
81/3 93/3103/13 
same [12] 5/4 18/5 27/25 30/21 56/25 
59/25 78/17 80/17 83/9 95/23 102/15 
103/12 
samples [1] 14/3 
sandwich [1] 49/4 
sat[1] 11/11 
saw [8] 60/13 67/5 67/11 77/11 89/22 
89/23 90/20 90/23 
say [18] 14/24 25/17 30/11 30/17 36/22 
39/18 42/6 47/16 48/10 58/4 58/17 60/10 
61/7 65/25 66/1 70/21 73/14 78/3 
saying [4] 11/2 40/10 90/22 91/19 
says [21] 19/2 47/14 49/1 50/2 50/13 50/20 
50/24 68/16 69/11 69/19 73/18 84/21 90/3 
90/6 90/7 90/11 90/19 90/24 93/25 94/8 
94/13 
scared [1] 80/8 
scenarios [1] 92/1 
scene [22] 9/2 9/23 15/12 17/1 17/13 
17/17 17/23 18/19 20/2 20/19 22/23 23/13 
23/17 23/23 23/24 24/22 25/10 25/16 28/12 
28/13 82/17 82/17 
scenes [1] 25/12 
Schedule [2] 42/23 43/1 
school [3] 27/7 28/193/16 
Scott [14] 19/4 84/25 86/11 87/23 88/8 
88/22 90/19 91/12 93/25 94/13 94/17 96/16 
98/8 99/22 
Scott's [5] 84/25 86/25 92/2 92/20 94/3 
seat [4] 7/3 21/10 26/19 75/9 
seated [9] 5/21 12/19 16/1 16/16 18/6 19/3 
83/5 83/9 83/9 
second [9] 4/13 12/9 28/22 32/23 73/18 
86/25 89/18 95/17100/16 
Secondly [1] 89/16 
seconds [17] 31/6 31/11 31/21 54/25 55/1 
55/4 55/25 77/25 78/3 78/10 88/15 88/18 
89/23 93/2 93/3 93/3 93/23 
section [3] 32/23 32/23 54/5 
secure [1] 20/2 
see [31] 18/8 18/19 38/9 51/10 57/4 57/23 
60/5 62/20 62/21 62/22 62/25 63/1 63/5 
63/11 63/14 63/14 63/16 68/12 68/20 70/10 
70/13 70/16 70/20 70/22 70/25 80/3 80/6 
80/10 83/23 86/6 95/25 
seeing [1] 76/22 
seem [3] 12/712/1012/10 
seemed [6] 12/812/1613/913/1013/12 
14/20 
seems [2] 73/5 73/6 
seen [6] 14/20 41/18 66/19 77/23 77/24 
99/19 
separate [5] 5/2 33/5 39/15 43/10 99/15 
separately [1] 89/14 
September [4] 27/25 27/25 44/7 101/24 
sergeant [3] 8/5 20/14 20/18 
serious [6] 4/25 8/17 23/4 24/1 48/6 48/10 
Services [3] 21/3 37/24 38/5 
set [2] 92/3101/1 
setting [1] 101/24 
seven [1] 10/6 
several [10] 17/1449/3 68/11 71/12 71/12 
77/25 80/4 93/3 93/23 95/12 
severity [1] 48/2 
Shall [1] 102/9 
shape [1] 61/1 
Sharane[3] 18/1818/2219/16 
she [18] 6/19 18/5 18/6 18/8 18/20 28/17 
78/6 81/25 88/14 88/16 89/23 89/24 89/24 
91/5 92/25 93/3 93/4 93/22 
she-[1] 78/6 
she'll [1] 74/25 
she's [3] 10/7 21/2 80/25 
sheet [1] 57/21 
Sherwood [3] 19/1919/23 20/7 i 
Sherwood's [1] 19/19 
shine [1] 56/21 
shivering [1] 24/9 
shoot [1] 93/12 
short [3] 90/2 97/23100/3 
shorten [1] 10/22 
shortly [1] 98/4 
shot [2] 29/14 79/2 
should [4] 4/8 57/1 84/10 101/9 
shoulders [2] 24/7 49/21 
show [4] 10/2413/162/5 66/8 
showing [2] 54/6 95/18 
shown [1] 32/4 
shows [2] 59/12 83/19 
Shrugs [1] 49/21 
sick [2] 29/22 50/13 
side [6] 5/17 33/17 34/3 58/2 62/10 102/14 
sides [1] 33/12 
sign [3] 53/12 54/17 70/25 
signed [1] 84/5 
significance [13] 49/8 49/14 49/24 50/7 
50/11 53/11 54/4 58/21 68/15 68/23 71/5 
73/3 92/8 
significant [11] 34/18 34/19 35/20 36/3 
37/4 49/11 65/2 68/2 68/8 68/19 73/2 
significantly [3] 48/14 48/17 48/20 
signs [11] 14/19 36/10 36/13 36/22 36/24 
40/25 49/18 59/3 70/10 70/12 84/25 
silent [1] 47/15 
similar [3] 8/6 47/12 87/21 
simply [1] 4/18 
simultaneously [1] 90/25 
since [3] 23/21 28/7 76/13 
single [1] 70/17 
Sir [1] 30/25 
sites [4] 37/8 37/11 37/20 38/10 
sites -- [1] 37/20 
sitting [1] 29/13 
situation [2] 10/310/4 
situations [1] 70/2 
six [5] 33/23 33/23 34/6 50/5 57/17 
Sixteen [2] 81/1 81/2 
size [13] 34/22 35/6 35/12 52/12 52/12 
56/3 56/6 56/10 56/16 56/21 60/7 67/21 
68/8 
skid [2] 23/16 24/24 
sleep [2] 50/2 71/13 
slept [4] 50/4 50/5 50/12 71/10 
slightly [1] 54/24 
slow [18] 11/13 12/8 12/16 12/16 13/9 13/9 
14/20 14/23 14/24 21/20 21/21 22/3 22/5 
29/16 55/6 59/13 63/10 78/13 
slowed [1] 77/7 
slurred [3] 14/2121/20 29/16 
small [2] 74/10 74/13 
smaller [2] 12/15 56/12 
smallest [1] 74/4 
smell [1] 51/12 
smooth [4] 53/2 53/6 53/24 54/8 
smoothly [2] 53/8 53/10 
snorted [2] 40/9 40/10 
snow [3] 12/2124/4 24/6 
snowing [1] 9/12 
so [65] 4/12 4/18 5/14 6/15 6/25 7/5 7/24 
10/2 12/6 12/22 13/7 13/16 15/20 23/11 
23/16 24/3 25/5 26/16 32/4 33/3 38/1 38/17 
38/22 45/10 46/1 46/10 48/14 50/5 53/9 
55/6 55/25 56/9 56/12 57/1 57/23 61/6 
65/11 71/14 73/19 75/6 77/3 77/6 77/7 80/8 
81/5 81/11 81/13 82/5 88/23 90/9 90/18 
90/22 91/6 92/20 93/14 96/13 96/23 97/3 
97/5 98/4 98/25 100/8 101/15 101/23 102/5 
sobriety [6] 14/2 22/22 27/24 29/1 30/19 
67/19 
solemnly [3] 6/23 26/14 75/4 
some [38] 11/1 12/712/10 14/23 14/24 
17/24 19/1 22/22 36/6 38/13 40/2 48/22 
49/5 49/7 52/14 54/4 54/10 61/12 61/25 
62/7 62/12 65/14 66/14 66/16 68/12 70/12 
71/5 88/15 88/18 98/6 98/9 99/23 99/25 
100/10 101/1 101/4101/16 102/3 
somebody [10] 25/6 48/14 48/17 48/20 
60/25 61/2 61/4 63/1 68/13 93/14 
somebody's [3] 51/8 57/5 71/11 
somehow [1] 62/2 
someone [7] 32/25 62/20 65/14 70/18 
70/23 71/8 90/18 
something [14] 11/1415/2 30/20 34/14 
47/1 47/2 51/12 61/14 66/15 67/25 68/13 
90/1196/3 99/20 
sometime [2] 45/10 49/6 
somewhere [2] 21/9 38/4 
Sorry [1] 39/6 
sort [1] 60/25 
sought [1] 10/2 
south [5] 2/11 81/17 92/6 96/17 98/9 
southbound [4] 9/810/16 90/7 90/10 
speak [5] 7/5 17/12 17/22 30/25 75/11 
specific [6] 8/14 27/20 34/20 34/24 78/1 
79/9 
specifically [6] 17/14 41/3 50/10 59/5 
88/21 92/15 
speech [6] 12/1613/914/20 21/20 29/16 
67/24 
speed [1] 48/11 
speeds [1] 93/2 
spell [4] 7/12 7/14 26/23 75/17 
spent [1] 14/8 
spoke [6] 10/10 15/11 16/17 16/25 29/15 
64/15 
spoken [1] 66/21 
Springville [21] 7/18 7/19 7/21 8/2419/21 
20/3 20/7 22/17 25/4 27/2 27/3 39/20 44/15 
79/19 81/6 81/17 82/19 88/4 96/18 97/22 
98/10 
squeeze [2] 60/22 61/19 
SS[1] 103/2 
stand [8] 6/16 30/24 32/11 32/15 55/19 
59/8 59/10100/15 
standard [7] 87/6 88/11 92/22 94/4 97/13 
98/18 98/19 
standardized [1] 27/24 
standing [2] 61/18 62/9 
standpoint [1] 97/14 
stands [1] 95/9 
start [3] 45/21 45/22 57/25 
started [4] 37/24 38/21 45/12 77/4 
starting [1] 67/2 
state [28] 1/2 1/4 4/4 4/23 5/19 6/4 6/21 
7/12 26/5 26/12 26/23 41/21 73/17 74/23 
75/2 75/17 82/9 87/6 87/7 87/7 87/22 88/13 
88/25 92/11 94/3 102/16 103/2 103/5 
State's [8] 3/14 3/14 3/15 41/17 43/14 
43/18 83/18 86/13 
stated [7] 38/25 39/2 40/1 42/4 71/20 88/2 
88/6 
statement [22] 11/413/18 76/17 84/15 
84/18 85/4 85/6 85/7 86/10 87/1 87/23 88/8 
90/6 90/7 90/11 90/19 91/12 93/21 94/3 
94/8 95/23 96/15 
statements [18] 38/23 40/17 41/1 67/21 
68/23 84/2 84/6 85/12 85/15 85/18 88/19 
90/1 92/23 94/6 94/25 97/15 99/5 99/6 
states [1] 95/20 
station [4] 13/14 29/2 29/5 45/8 
statute [11] 84/10 84/14 85/10 85/11 85/14 




Stepped [1] 32/2 
still [4] 20/3 33/6 61/25 82/11 
stimulus [1] 52/15 
stipulated [2] 83/22 87/14 
stipulations [1] 83/24 
stood [1] 32/17 
Stop [7] 12/9 34/23 47/21 77/6 77/16 79/24 
81/12 
stopped [5] 9/6 77/2 77/8 77/17 80/2 
stopping [1] 38/2 
straight [4] 55/13 77/4 77/5 81/14 
street [9] 8/22 9/16 17/21 74/9 79/16 79/17 
79/21 79/22 79/23 
strength [1] 97/17 
stress [1] 22/6 
stronger [1] 62/11 
struck [2] 10/710/17 
subjective [2] 60/2 60/6 
submit [2] 22/2137/13 
submitted [1] 41/11 
subsequent [1] 92/9 
substance [9] 15/2 36/6 37/1 37/3 42/23 
42/25 60/13 88/5 88/6 
substances [2] 42/20 70/6 
substantial [3] 93/5 97/9 98/13 
successfully [1] 28/2 
such [4] 29/23 85/7 97/11 103/6 
suggests [1] 84/10 
Suite [1] 2/5 
supervise [1] 7/24 
supervisor [1] 8/3 
supported [1] 88/19 
supposed [1] 33/19 
sure [8] 12/12 15/1 22/7 31/14 49/17 64/14 
96/19 99/19 j 
surface [1] 79/4 
surrounding [4] 10/13 92/3 97/8 98/12 
Susan [1] 38/4 ! 
suspected [1] 66/9 I 
sustain [1] 10/21 
Suzette [1] 20/24 
swallowed [1] 40/8 
sway[1] 31/7 
swayed [2] 32/16 32/19 
swear [5] 6/19 6/23 26/14 74/25 75/4 
sworn [4] 6/22 26/9 26/13 75/3 
symptom [3] 53/12 70/23 70/25 
symptoms [6] 12/1713/10 40/25 49/18 
59/3 70/10 
system [10] 41/9 42/10 42/11 43/3 69/8 
69/12 73/12 95/19 96/6 96/8 
if 
| 19/3 19/4 19/16 38/11 38/20 38/25 55/8 
J 56/2 59/23 69/5 69/25 83/6 
[talking [10] 30/18 48/10 48/12 51/14 52/3 
60/6 66/12 66/17 79/14 90/14 
Tamera[1] 80/16 
tape [3] 55/14 64/5 64/9 
Taylor [1] 19/13 
teach [1] 12/13 
tell [22] 8/21 10/3 10/4 11/18 14/17 16/19 
22/20 39/16 51/8 52/13 53/5 53/16 55/1 
57/8 57/9 57/11 57/23 58/24 61/9 72/17 
72/25 82/22 
tells [3] 53/17 92/10 95/1 
temperature [7] 29/7 36/12 36/20 58/11 
60/8 63/9 63/18 
ten [1] 97/21 
tense [2] 61/12 61/13 
tensed [1] 60/23 
term[1] 58/20 
terms [2] 31/12 48/11 
test [54] 12/24 13/2 22/11 22/22 30/12 
30/15 30/16 30/17 30/19 30/19 30/23 31/3 
31/3 31/4 31/5 31/9 31/13 31/15 31/17 
31/22 31/24 32/3 32/8 32/10 32/12 32/13 
32/21 32/23 32/24 33/1 33/4 33/7 33/8 33/8 
33/9 33/10 33/22 34/8 34/11 37/13 41/11 
52/21 54/21 54/22 55/3 55/8 59/4 59/6 
59/12 59/19 59/22 62/23 67/12 68/1 
test — [2] 54/21 59/4 
testified [7] 6/22 26/13 64/22 75/3 76/1 
89/21 100/2 
testify [3] 6/17 88/23 89/22 
testimonial [1] 92/17 
testimony [20] 6/15 6/23 10/23 26/14 75/4 
82/25 87/16 88/9 88/14 91/14 92/2 92/16 
92/21 94/22 94/25 95/7 95/13 97/18 99/6 
99/22 
tests [15] 14/2 22/22 29/1 30/22 31/12 
60/1 60/6 63/23 65/22 67/6 67/20 67/20 
68/3 68/4 68/5 
than [16] 12/15 13/8 17/11 18/22 20/10 
23/17 34/1 40/10 45/4 50/1 56/12 67/16 
70/2 74/7 91/8 93/2 
thank [13] 6/18 7/6 16/3 26/4 39/11 65/6 
75/10 78/11 82/2 83/16 87/3 92/13 102/22 
that [577] 
that's [65] 4/10 4/21 5/6 7/8 8/19 9/24 15/7 
16/10 16/15 17/6 17/6 19/6 19/8 19/15 21/1 
21/3 22/12 22/12 22/19 23/15 23/20 25/1 
33/6 35/14 36/2 42/18 45/20 45/21 45/25 
49/15 51/1 52/15 54/2 56/8 56/11 64/24 
65/2 68/10 69/6 69/12 72/16 73/24 73/25 
81/7 81/18 82/21 83/8 83/9 85/11 85/16 
! 85/23 88/21 88/25 89/7 90/5 91/24 92/12 
92/20 93/8 93/15 93/19 95/4 96/7 99/20 
102/11 
that's-[2] 56/1192/12 
the - [1] 43/9 
their [8] 9/22 20/12 33/19 33/19 54/11 61/5 
87/21 103/15 
them [25] 8/8 13/7 17/19 21/7 33/12 34/12 
38/1 38/3 39/16 40/2 42/11 47/8 47/8 72/21 
74/9 74/12 80/9 80/9 85/7 86/6 86/7 86/12 
90/1 101/9 101/22 
then [55] 8/18 10/11 10/25 11/12 15/13 
19/3 20/14 20/22 20/24 23/16 29/19 30/14 
32/17 33/4 33/12 33/13 33/16 34/2 37/24 
38/10 46/6 49/4 49/6 49/12 50/13 51/20 
52/11 53/13 53/20 54/16 54/21 55/19 56/6 
56/18 59/15 62/11 67/8 67/21 73/18 77/2 
77/7 80/2 81/12 84/1 88/21 89/4 90/11 
90/16 90/23 92/2 92/7 92/9 92/18 97/20 
99/25 
therapeutic T61 42/13 42/16 42/18 64/23 
73/25 74/2 
there [95] 4/21 6/8 9/6 9/8 9/9 9/9 9/9 9/1 £ 
9/22 10/5 11/13 11/20 13/11 14/15 15/3 
16/21 16/22 17/4 17/8 17/18 18/23 20/11 
21/7 21/8 22/20 22/23 23/3 23/5 23/9 24/4 
24/6 24/21 24/24 25/15 27/23 29/8 29/23 
30/9 31/8 33/25 34/10 34/23 36/22 37/1 
37/11 38/9 40/15 40/17 42/4 44/15 44/17 
44/18 46/15 46/18 46/18 48/8 50/10 51/16 
52/1 54/4 57/4 61/25 62/9 62/19 62/24 
62/24 63/13 66/5 67/14 68/10 68/11 68/15 
68/18 70/2 73/2 73/3 73/11 75/24 78/16 
78/20 78/22 80/4 80/4 80/13 82/4 85/6 85/S 
91/10 91/21 93/5 95/3 96/11 97/1 97/4 
99/15 
there-[1] 46/18 
there's [19] 8/17 23/16 25/13 36/4 49/10 
49/14 55/13 57/12 62/12 68/9 68/20 68/21 
84/9 84/22 89/11 90/17 92/19 95/10 100/4 
therein [3] 84/18 85/4 85/19 
thereof [1] 103/16 
these [16] 31/12 39/15 39/23 49/16 63/23 
69/10 70/1 80/6 85/6 86/4 86/9 92/23 95/18 
96/11 98/5101/19 
they [46] 10/8 10/17 15/22 15/22 17/18 
17/18 18/12 20/1 30/20 30/21 35/2 35/6 
38/1 45/3 51/8 51/10 51/10 52/13 54/10 
54/16 54/19 57/6 60/3 61/4 61/11 61/13 
65/17 65/20 66/1 66/1 66/4 71/10 71/12 
73/19 73/20 74/10 74/12 80/7 80/8 84/4 
85/8 90/8 94/11 94/16 96/4 101/10 
they're [4] 84/4 84/6 84/12 92/24 
they've [2] 49/13 73/17 
thick [1] 21/17 
thing [7] 36/8 36/25 82/6 82/16 83/17 91/3 
98/5 
things [21] 12/7 12/10 13/11 14/22 29/23 
39/15 41/3 48/22 49/3 54/9 59/17 63/11 
63/13 65/22 67/8 67/14 67/24 69/11 82/16 
92/15 94/21 
think [49] 5/7 13/213/23 16/18 18/5 20/19 
21/16 30/21 45/5 46/19 46/21 49/16 57/20 
58/20 63/8 68/16 74/6 74/7 82/5 84/9 84/12 
85/19 85/21 89/6 89/8 89/9 89/10 89/13 
89/22 90/1 90/8 91/5 91/6 91/16 92/10 
92/15 93/2 93/3 93/21 94/3 94/5 94/8 94/22 
96/5 97/1 97/3 99/18 101/25 102/2 
thinking [3] 25/10 76/12 96/19 
third [4] 4/24 37/8 89/17 89/18 
this [55] 4/5 5/24 6/17 9/13 10/20 10/23 
14/6 15/24 19/24 20/18 23/7 23/18 27/6 
27/8 29/1 32/3 33/11 33/22 34/1 35/23 39/6 
1
 41/22 43/13 43/20 44/9 44/14 45/6 47/12 
! 49/17 49/20 50/8 53/8 54/19 66/8 67/18 
67/22 68/1 68/8 80/20 81/24 82/25 83/18 
84/10 84/16 86/8 86/17 87/9 88/10 95/4 
96/13 98/1 99/9 99/10 101/25 103/17 
those [34] 5/12 14/21 18/24 30/22 33/4 
34/12 42/9 42/14 42/17 42/20 49/8 50/7 
54/9 57/21 57/23 59/17 60/1 60/8 60/12 
63/11 64/22 65/19 65/25 67/14 67/18 67/20 
67/24 68/2 73/3 84/3 86/7 93/4 95/20 95/22 
though [2] 61/4 69/7 
thought [5] 11/6 11/13 11/14 12/4 91/24 
thought-[1] 11/6 
three [12] 18/24 20/8 32/23 35/19 36/11 
36/11 36/14 52/18 52/24 55/18 65/11 100/8 
through [10] 45/1 48/5 60/4 81/14 90/17 
90/18 94/21 94/24 99/8 103/11 
tight [3] 61/2 61/5 61/14 
tightened [1] 62/2 
tightening [2] 62/8 62/11 
tile [1] 55/12 
tilt m 54/24 
T-A-M-E-R-A[1] 80/16 
table [2] 5/2183/10 
tablets [1] 97/19 
take [15] 12/24 23/11 23/16 23/21 41/18 
50/17 66/12 66/14 74/4 74/20 85/9 86/11 
96/2198/10100/15 
taken [32] 13/1 18/2 30/8 36/11 36/12 
36/13 37/15 39/1 39/5 39/12 39/15 39/16 
39/17 39/19 39/20 40/8 40/11 40/13 62/17 
62/20 63/2 72/11 74/22 82/8 97/16 97/18 
97/19 97/21 98/2 98/3 98/5 98/21 
taken-[1] 97/18 
taking [5] 17/25 20/20 30/10 50/23 73/3 
talk [22] 8/9 9/24 11/15 11/16 15/20 17/19 
24/1 25/13 25/14 28/10 31/12 40/3 45/12 
45/15 47/17 48/23 51/10 59/22 63/20 63/24 
76/3 76/20 
talked [17] 11/2012/213/713/2416/8 
t 
tilted [2] 55/3 55/5 
time [55] 8/17 9/2 9/510/1411/414/8 
15/19 16/12 16/13 23/2 24/24 24/25 27/6 
27/20 30/21 31/10 31/10 31/20 37/23 38/4 
38/21 39/12 40/20 43/23 44/12 45/7 45/9 
45/18 45/21 45/22 46/9 47/22 47/23 55/4 
76/10 76/13 77/9 77/16 82/16 82/19 83/18 
84/7 93/1 97/23 98/6 98/9 99/25 100/4 
100/10 101/2 101/5 101/16 101/20 102/15 
103/7 
times [5] 32/2 33/23 36/11 36/11 52/19 
tip [10] 33/15 33/15 33/16 33/23 34/2 34/2 
57/17 57/19 58/6 59/16 
tired [1] 50/9 
to- [2 ] 54/1180/7 
today [9] 49/1 49/3 89/21 94/23 99/1 100/2 
100/10 100/11 101/8 
today's [1] 99/15 
together [1] 80/5 
told [18] 9/9 10/5 11/6 11/10 11/13 11/22 
13/6 15/22 16/15 16/18 16/18 18/12 21/11 
23/5 40/7 46/17 50/25 64/19 
tone [2] 61/24 61/24 
tongue [2] 37/1 60/13 
tongued[1] 21/17 
took [10] 31/10 36/10 37/8 39/4 46/1 72/14 
72/21 72/25 73/1 76/24 
total [3] 32/21 32/22 36/1 
touch [8] 33/14 33/19 34/1 57/16 57/17 
57/18 58/1 59/15 
touched [4] 33/16 57/19 57/22 58/5 j 
touching [1] 34/6 
toward [1] 69/3 
towards [1] 81/6 
toxicology [6] 41/21 66/7 66/8 95/13 96/25 
99/12 
track [1] 55/4 
tracking [7] 51/25 52/3 52/4 52/7 53/8 53/9 
53/24 
traffic [7] 9/6 9/8 10/1 48/3 48/6 78/16 
90/20 
trained [6] 12/12 65/10 65/13 65/16 65/19 
70/1 
training [14] 8/14 12/14 27/20 27/21 27/24 
27/24 41/5 42/19 44/7 44/12 60/4 65/11 
65/13 66/13 
transcribed [1] 64/11 
TRANSCRIPT [1] 1/17 
transcription [2] 103/10103/13 
transport [1] 18/7 
transported [4] 10/7 13/14 15/19 18/4 
trauma [1] 83/20 
trial [2] 99/13 101/1 
tricky [1] 98/5 
trooper [2] 11/612/4 
trouble [2] 93/4 98/22 
truck [8] 10/15 82/23 90/3 90/12 90/13 
90/21 90/23 99/23 I 
true [6] 46/7 50/25 51/1 53/3 60/9 103/12 
truth [11] 6/25 6/25 6/2510/2412/3 26/16 
26/16 26/16 75/6 75/6 75/6 
try [1] 37/25 
trying [5] 17/24 71/14 80/7 80/8 93/13 
turn [27] 30/23 31/18 31/22 31/23 55/8 
59/8 59/11 76/23 76/25 77/1 77/4 77/8 
77/14 77/17 78/21 78/21 81/11 81/12 81/15 
81/16 90/8 90/11 90/20 91/5 94/14 94/17 
94/18 
turn - [2] 59/1176/25 
turned [2] 90/21 94/1 
turning [3] 78/14 90/8 94/10 
turning-[1] 90/8 
Itwenty [3] 7/zu y/3 /4/j 
two [25] 9/7 9/9 18/16 20/10 21/5 27/4 
32/4 32/4 32/9 32/22 33/2 39/4 70/5 70/6 
89/12 89/25 90/15 92/1 94/5 94/6 94/25 
99/5 101/7 101/8 101/13 
TyIox[2] 73/19 96/2 
type [7] 22/22 53/18 57/6 57/9 57/11 84/9 
84/10 
types [1] 30/22 
typical [5] 11/7 22/5 46/4 61/3 70/22 
Typically \2\ 37/23 60/22 
u 
ultimate [1] 66/12 
unable [2] 59/15 68/3 
under [46] 4/16 4/23 4/2416/1216/13 
16/14 23/22 29/22 30/3 30/5 41/8 43/2 
43/12 47/3 50/21 54/10 58/25 59/7 59/20 
63/1 64/25 65/14 69/14 71/21 73/17 82/11 
83/1 84/4 84/15 84/16 84/23 85/3 85/21 
85/24 87/12 87/17 88/7 88/22 89/4 89/9 
91/2 92/4 95/11 99/16 100/6 100/22 
understand [9] 17/1 19/7 20/24 49/24 
56/19 60/25 61/8 61/9 94/11 
understanding [11] 16/11 43/9 47/3 48/2 
48/4 48/7 48/20 71/25 90/14 93/11 96/2 
understood [1] 48/17 
unequal [2] 51/25 52/13 
unequalness [1] 52/12 
University [2] 15/19 75/23 
unjustifiable [3] 93/6 97/10 98/14 
unpersuaded [1] 88/20 
unrefuted[1] 94/22 
until [2] 6/17 91/13 
unusual [1] 58/8 
up [16] 6/19 7/3 7/510/22 26/9 27/8 30/25 
60/23 62/2 62/10 73/13 74/6 75/9 75/11 
82/11 100/15 
upon [8] 4/25 23/18 28/21 63/14 76/9 
87/20 96/15100/1 
upset [1] 11/21 
urine [7] 12/2413/214/3 22/10 22/21 
37/25 38/3 
us [7] 11/18 14/17 24/24 37/25 90/20 
101/9 101/24 
us--[1] 24/24 
use [11] 14/6 36/5 36/6 38/11 53/12 54/17 
55/9 56/17 72/10 99/10 100/19 
used [17] 13/19 32/16 32/19 47/16 53/19 
58/20 63/15 65/19 68/24 69/1 88/3 88/4 
88/5 92/17 96/9 96/24 96/24 
using [5] 57/7 64/17 94/3 98/18103/10 
usually [2] 57/4 74/6 
UTAH [21] 1/2 1/2 1/4 1/15 2/4 2/5 2/6 2/12 
4/1 4/4 5/19 8/25 15/13 15/19 28/2 41/21 
91/2 103/2 103/3 103/5 103/17 
UVSC[1] 27/22 j 
uvscsrn 27/22 
validated [1] 33/25 
Valium [12] 39/4 39/8 39/19 40/7 42/25 
64/20 69/19 73/1 73/4 95/21 97/21 98/3 
Valley [1] 15/13 
van [9] 10/6 90/4 90/6 90/7 90/9 94/6 94/9 
94/9 94/13 
variables [1] 57/4 
vehicle [26] 4/14 4/18 5/1 11/1213/22 
14/1 14/10 16/9 18/5 18/13 18/16 18/23 
18/25 22/14 40/21 41/2 41/10 71/7 80/13 
87/10 87/13 87/18 95/2 99/2 100/5 100/8 
vehicles [6] 9/7 9/21 21/5 78/20 78/23 
80/10 
verified [1] 99/12 
very [12] 6/18 12/16 15/21 21/20 38/1 
70/25 74/7 79/8 90/2 93/19 96/17 102/22 
victim [6] 5/2 5/4 15/17 15/18 18/3 83/20 
victim - [1 ] 15/18 
victims [1] 15/15 
Video [1] 64/3 
viewed [1] 97/14 
Vincent [1] 20/6 
violation [1] 90/25 
visible [1] 24/25 
vital [1] 36/10 
voice [1] 31/1 
voluntarily m 46/18 
w 
W-H-E-E-L-E-R[1] 75/19 
waiting [1] 94/14 
walk [7] 30/23 31/18 31/22 31/23 55/8 59/8 
59/10 
walked [1] 46/25 
want [18] 24/141/17 57/23 59/5 59/23 
69/10 76/20 82/15 88/22 89/5 91/22 100/9 
100/10 100/10 101/1 101/5 101/16 102/3 
wanted [4] 11/15 33/11 63/19 96/18 
wants [1] 99/18 
warning [1] 84/6 
warrants [1] 85/7 
was [340] 
was-[11 21/16 
wasn't [9] 15/1 21/9 22/23 23/9 23/21 
28/13 49/23 57/19 58/5 
watch [1] 55/4 
watery [2] 51/20 51/23 
way [15] 5/8 11/6 12/11 14/23 14/24 35/20 
36/3 66/16 67/5 67/23 67/23 76/8 80/9 92/6 
94/21 
ways [2] 79/8 89/3 
we [62] 4/5 11/22 11/24 12/2 19/3 19/16 
22/12 22/13 23/4 25/5 25/6 28/10 29/20 
29/20 30/15 34/1 34/14 35/22 35/23 36/10 
37/7 37/25 38/2 38/25 43/10 43/23 43/25 
49/16 55/10 56/20 56/21 59/22 59/23 69/5 
69/25 70/25 74/20 76/8 76/9 76/9 80/6 80/7 
80/8 88/22 92/5 92/24 92/25 93/19 93/19 
95/3 95/14 95/17 96/10 97/5 99/1 99/6 
101/9 101/22 102/4 102/5102/9 102/20 
we- [2 ] 56/20 76/9 
We*d[1] 100/11 
we'll [5] 35/1 40/15 60/22 75/11 102/22 
we're [6] 8/9 23/25 38/2 57/21 76/3 79/13 
we've [5] 19/4 38/20 83/6 87/14 91/12 
wearing [1] 21/10 
weather [5] 9/1111/1212/20 24/23 60/17 
week [3] 101/18101/23101/23 
weeks [3] 101/7101/8101/13 
weight [1] 68/25 
weights [1] 61/1 
well [19] 11/23 17/23 24/23 27/15 29/6 
29/20 36/21 42/3 49/16 59/2 61/4 76/9 
83/23 84/14 88/10 90/5 90/17 98/1 99/13 
well-known [1] 96/23 
went [10] 10/18 11/19 13/7 15/9 15/13 
18/8 22/12 27/25 45/199/8 
were [101] 4/5 9/4 9/4 9/6 9/7 9/12 9/22 
10/13 11/2 11/22 13/11 14/2 14/3 14/8 
16/18 16/19 17/16 17/18 17/23 17/25 18/12 
18/1618/22 18/2419/25 20/20 21/24 22/3 
23/11 23/17 23/22 23/25 24/21 24/24 24/25 
27/15 28/7 29/1 29/4 29/8 29/13 29/15 
34/10 34/12 34/17 34/21 34/25 35/2 35/6 
35/24 36/13 36/22 37/11 37/15 38/10 39/8 
39/17 40/17 41/22 52/13 52/24 54/13 56/3 
61/13 61/23 62/22 64/22 67/2 67/20 67/20 
w 
were... [31] 68/5 71/4 76/8 76/9 77/3 77/13 
77/18 78/8 78/12 78/17 78/20 78/20 78/25 
79/20 79/21 80/4 80/7 80/7 80/8 80/8 81/3 
81/5 81/8 81/13 81/15 81/17 84/7 86/4 
86/14 87/20102/24 
were--[1] 11/22 
weren't [2] 15/2217/18 
west [3] 1/14 2/1194/17 
westbound [1] 96/22 
wet [2] 9/12 24/5 
what [152] 
what's [9] 32/7 41/17 49/8 53/11 55/17 
58/15 58/18 73/3 80/15 
Wheel [1] 75/19 
WHEELER [12] 3/8 6/9 19/9 74/23 75/1 
75/17 75/20 80/24 88/14 89/22 92/25 99/6 
Wheeler's [1] 93/21 
when [49] 9/21 9/23 14/24 15/16 16/7 
16/25 17/7 17/16 18/4 18/7 21/11 28/25 
29/10 30/17 32/15 32/17 33/13 33/13 34/15 
37/15 37/17 37/21 38/16 48/10 50/2 51/10 
55/3 55/4 56/23 57/4 61/14 64/15 66/9 
66/11 68/12 71/4 72/10 77/4 78/5 78/6 78/7 
81/9 84/14 91/1 96/2 96/9 97/9 98/13 99/8 
where [33] 4/24 8/21 11/10 13/19 15/8 
17/16 17/19 21/2 25/13 27/1 27/13 30/20 
37/12 39/16 39/18 57/17 57/21 57/24 58/1 
64/9 68/21 70/2 70/17 76/24 79/12 79/22 
81/8 89/24 91/6 92/16 92/17 96/20 100/9 
whether [19] 14/9 16/11 22/8 23/2 30/8 
40/20 42/9 47/4 48/7 49/20 53/8 59/3 60/3 
61/10 62/2 89/17 89/18 89/18 97/3 
which [23] 6/12 18/16 22/1 28/2 39/1 39/6 
42/22 50/24 53/20 73/6 84/16 87/19 90/25 
93/1 94/17 94/18 95/13 96/10 96/16 96/22 
97/23 100/7 101/24 
while [4] 32/16 32/19 38/25 47/18 
white [7] 37/1 37/3 60/13 90/3 94/6 94/13 
95/1 
who [26] 4/16 6/15 7/17 9/2517/2218/2 
19/3 19/9 19/11 19/13 20/24 23/7 44/18 
44/19 44/22 60/25 61/2 70/23 71/8 80/10 
82/17 95/8 96/16 98/7 99/22 100/2 
whole [3] 6/25 26/16 75/6 
whose [1] 99/5 
why [15] 22/12 25/1 31/19 32/14 40/13 
43/8 45/3 47/14 49/12 65/16 67/22 68/2 
68/8 68/19 70/9 
width [1] 55/17 
will [27] 6/13 6/19 6/24 7/5 7/5 8/19 26/8 
26/15 33/14 38/2 47/16 47/19 54/11 54/11 
56/21 56/21 62/7 64/14 68/11 68/12 68/14 
75/5 97/11 98/15 99/17 101/18 101/21 
willing [1] 12/23 
wish [1] 47/20 
withdraw [2] 86/3102/16 
within [15] 35/7 35/8 35/14 35/17 42/16 
42/18 52/20 56/5 56/14 57/3 64/22 67/2 
73/25 74/2 97/23 
without [3] 47/2171/13 84/19 
witness [42] 3/2 6/3 6/9 6/16 7/2 7/15 
14/15 14/19 16/22 19/10 19/12 26/4 26/8 
26/18 39/7 39/10 41/14 43/25 46/21 62/4 
62/7 62/13 75/8 75/10 75/13 76/9 78/7 
79/22 81/24 82/6 83/3 83/16 84/2 84/24 
85/1 89/25 94/5 94/25 100/18 100/21 
100/24103/17 
witness-[1] 76/9 
witnesses [11] 6/6 6/7 6/15 23/12 43/24 
82/4 84/7 84/23 89/21 92/5 99/5 
witnesses1 [1] 88/19 
woman [1] 80/5 
won't [1] 53/18 
wondering [1] 49/23 
words [1] 16/18 
work [6] 7/17 27/1 61/2 62/12 94/21 102/6 
worked [1] 61/4 
working [1] 61/11 
works [1] 61/1 
would [90] 6/2 6/5 12/23 12/25 13/1 13/3 
22/9 22/17 22/21 22/25 23/1 24/22 25/21 
26/23 30/12 33/25 35/18 38/8 38/12 38/17 
38/19 38/22 43/12 43/13 47/2 52/12 54/16 
55/18 56/10 56/12 57/21 57/25 58/4 60/1 
60/23 60/24 61/3 61/5 61/13 61/22 62/12 
62/13 62/20 62/22 63/1 63/5 63/9 63/13 
63/16 65/25 66/1 68/22 69/20 69/23 70/13 
75/17 78/4 79/11 82/9 83/17 83/18 85/7 
85/21 87/22 87/23 88/21 88/22 88/24 91/3 
92/2 93/7 94/17 94/18 96/17 96/22 97/13 
98/16 98/20 98/21 98/23 99/11 101/1 101/8 
101/10 101/15 101/23 101/24 101/24 102/5 
102/15 
wouldn't [2] 22/6 22/9 
written [8] 51/2 51/16 52/1 54/5 84/16 
85/12 96/15 99/5 
wrong T21 11/14 66/15 
Yeah [2] 18/6 57/12 
year [8] 8/1 8/11 27/16 27/16 27/25 28/7 
28/1176/4 
years [9] 7/20 8/4 10/6 20/8 20/10 27/4 
65/1175/25 86/20 
yellow [1] 90/21 
yes [136] 
you [518] 
you -- [5] 6/13 34/20 38/9 66/12 77/4 
you'll [3] 61/22 68/20 70/10 
you're [13] 5/7 5/10 5/10 8/9 23/18 31/8 
43/5 51/14 62/1 65/13 82/11 91/16 101/25 
you've [13] 35/25 51/2 51/5 51/16 52/11 
53/2 54/5 55/1 56/2 65/10 71/20 73/8 91/20 
young [5] 2/11 10/5 18/16 80/4 80/7 
your [101] 6/2 6/5 6/15 7/12 7/12 7/21 7/25 
8/13 11/9 13/11 14/17 15/5 16/18 17/11 
19/18 21/19 24/13 24/19 26/3 26/4 26/23 
26/24 27/5 27/19 30/7 31/1 34/13 34/18 
35/5 36/8 37/4 37/17 37/21 38/6 38/13 
40/18 41/7 41/14 42/19 43/2 43/5 43/13 
43/25 44/7 44/12 46/11 47/3 48/19 48/22 
48/23 49/15 51/3 52/9 58/4 58/24 61/23 
61/23 62/16 62/19 63/14 64/19 65/6 66/6 
66/12 66/13 66/13 67/15 67/15 68/16 70/7 
70/16 70/22 71/5 71/6 71/17 71/23 75/17 
75/17 77/14 77/21 78/4 78/21 80/13 80/24 
81/14 82/25 83/17 86/1 86/5 87/5 92/4 
92/14 100/15 100/17 100/20 100/23 100/25 
101/12 101/14 102/8 102/17 
zone[1] 93/16 
1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
3 County of Utah ) 
4 I, Christina Holbrook, do certify that I am an 
5 Official Court Reporter in and for the State of Utah; 
6 That as such reporter, I reported the occasion of the 
7 proceedings of the above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time 
8 and place; 
9 That the proceeding was reported by me in stenotype 
10 using computer-aided transcription consisting of pages 4 
11 through 102 inclusive; 
12 That the same constitutes a true and correct 
13 transcription of the said proceedings; 
14 That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any 
15 of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am not 
16 interested in the events thereof. 
17 WITNESS my hand at Provo, Utah, this 10th day of 







Christina Holbrook, RPR, CSR 
Addendum D 
FILED 
-c^jrjr, Juciciai Distrct Court 
o* Utah County, Stale of Utah 
MICHAEL J. PETRO (4241) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-0700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
STATEMENT BY DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff, : IN SUPPORT OF GUTLTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
vs. : 
BRIAN K. MILLER, : Case No.041400862 
Defendant. : Judge Laycock 
I. Brian K. Miller
 x hereby acknowledge and certify that I have 
been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory Degree Punishment 
Provision Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
A. Automobile Homicide 3rd 0-5 years in Utah State Prison 
Fine up to S5.000 with an 85% 
surcharge, S32.00 Security Fee 
State of Utah v. Miller, Case No. 041400862 
Statement by Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
Page 2 
B. Attempted Possession or Use of 
Oxycontin, 
Class "A" 0-1 year in the Utah County Jail 
Fine up to $2,500 with an 85% 
surcharge, $32.00 Security Fee 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
Count I* 
AM 
Automobile Homicide, a Third Degree Felony: 
A. That I; 
B. In Utah County, State of Utah; 
C. On or about October 31, 2003; 
D. Did operate a vehicle in a negligent manner; 
E. Causing the death of another; and 
F Was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the defendant incapable 
of safely operating a vehicle. 
Count II: Attempted Possession of Oxycontin, a Schedule II Controlled Substance, a Class 
"A" Misdemeanor: 
§ 2 2 A. That I; 
jfiff) B. In Utah County, State of Utah; 
~ On or about October 31, 2003; 
Did attempt to possess; 
Oxycontin, a Schedule II controlled or counterfeit substance. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and 
State of Utah v. Miller, Case No. 041400862 
Statement by Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
Page 3 
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
On or about October 31, 2005 in Utah County, State of Utah, the Defendant was operating a 
motor vehicle. He was in an automobile accident and was negligent in the manner in which he 
drove the vehicle. The Defendant was under the influence of oxycontin, a controlled substance, 
at the time of the accident. The accident resulted in the death of a passenger in the other vehicle. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no 
contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I 
might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I 
have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charge and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Michael J. Petro. My attorney 
and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty (or no 
contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
State of Utah v. Miller, Case No. 041400862 
Statement by Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
Page 4 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) 
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-
examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that 
if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify 
against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or 
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case 
will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the 
charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, 
meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a 
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crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty 
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including 
any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I 
plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or 
no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense 
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred 
when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive 
sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are)(is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of 
the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
The Defendant is pleading guilty to Count 1 which has been reduced from a Second Degree 
Felony to a Third Degree Felony and Count 2 which has been reduced from a Third Degree 
Felony to a Class "A" Misdemeanor. Count 3, which is a Class "B" Misdemeanor was previously 
dismissed by the Court. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge 
may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
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I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
lam years of age. I have attended school through the _J_Z1 grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would 
impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of 
any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file 
a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before I have been sentenced and final judgment 
has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. 
Dated this ^° day of O c ^ t ^ , 200_. 
BRIAN K. MILLER 
Defendant 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for Brian K. Miller, the defendant above, and that I know 
he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her 
and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
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physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations 
made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
YOUNG, KESXER& PETRO: 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
Counsel for Defendant 
Bar No. 4241 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against Brian K. Miller, 
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are 
entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY: 
By: CHAD GRUNANDER 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
BarNo. f ? ^ 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
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j ^ U ^ v ^ 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ,2003 
BY THE COURT 
XAUDIA LAYCOC: 
District Court Judge 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 This matter is before the court on the 
State of Utah's petition for extraordinary 
relief pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65 B. The petition for relief is 
granted.^1 
FN1. Pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 2, in the interest 
of expediting a decision in this case, 
this court suspends the requirement 
of oral argument as provided in Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 19(c). 
Because the issues in this matter are 
resolved by interpretation of clear 
statutory language, oral argument 
would not significantly aid the 
resolution of this case. See Utah 
R.App.P. 2, 19(c). 
This petition arises out of an underlying 
third district court case of criminal 
nonsupport, State v. Taylor, No. 971012761. 
Taylor pleaded guilty to the charge in 1998, 
and since then had been paying both his 
ongoing support obligation and a stipulated 
amount for his arrearage. Several review 
hearings were held in this matter to 
determine progress and resolve issues, but 
no restitution amount had been entered by 
the trial court. 
At a March 2004 hearing, although both 
Taylor and the State agreed that the amount 
outstanding was in excess of $15,000, 
Taylor requested the trial court to enter a 
restitution amount of approximately $8200, 
forgiving the accrued interest. In an effort to 
be equitable, Judge Barrett announced that 
restitution would be set at $10,000. This 
restitution was revoked, however, after State 
counsel requested the determination of the 
amount of complete restitution, in addition 
to what was interpreted to be the court-
ordered restitution of $10,000, pursuant to 
the Utah Crime Victims Restitution Act (the 
Act). See Utah Code Ann. $ § 77-38a-101 
to -502 (2003). The trial court later entered 
its order striking all restitution for this 
matter, determining no amount of complete 
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or court-ordered restitution, and providing 
no rationale for its decision. 
The State alleges that Judge Barrett failed to 
comply with the requirements of the Act in 
revoking restitution and entering an order 
devoid of rationale. The Act provides that 
when a defendant has been convicted of 
criminal activity resulting in pecuniary loss, 
"the court shall order that the defendant 
make restitution" as provided for in the Act. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 77-38a-302(lV The Act 
requires trial courts to make two separate 
restitution determinations, and defines the 
criteria and procedures to be followed in 
making those assessments. See id. § 77-3 8a-
302Q), (2), 
The trial court must determine both 
complete restitution, the amount necessary 
to compensate a victim for all pecuniary 
losses, and court-ordered restitution, the 
amount the defendant will be required to pay 
as part of the criminal case. See id. § 77-
38a-302(2). When making these 
determinations, courts must consider factors 
specified in the Act. See id. $ 77-3 8a-
302(5). In addition to making the required 
restitution determinations, "the court shall 
make the reasons for the decision part of the 
court record." Id. § 77-38a-302f3). 
A trial court has discretion under the Act to 
determine the amounts of restitution. Under 
the plain language of the Act, a court does 
not, however, have discretion to not make 
restitution determinations with supporting 
findings. By express language, the Act 
imposes a nondiscretionary duty upon a 
judge to make the appropriate 
determinations regarding restitution, along 
with the rationale to explain the decision. 
See id. § 77-38a-302f2\ (3); see also State 
v. Stirba. 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (noting former provision 
"imposed a nondiscretionary duty" to make 
appropriate restitution). Thus, under the Act, 
Judge Barrett was required to perform three 
separate acts: first, he was bound to 
determine the amount necessary for 
complete restitution; second, he was bound 
to determine court-ordered restitution; and 
third, he was bound to explain his rationale 
with findings on the required factors made 
on the record. He did not do any of these 
required acts. 
*2 The subject order does not comply with 
the Act's requirements. The order provides 
only that restitution is stricken. It does not 
set either complete or court-ordered 
restitution amounts. The order does not 
provide any rationale for the decision, nor 
does it even imply that statutory factors 
were considered. The record of the hearing 
provides no more indication that statutorily 
required factors were considered. From all 
that appears, Judge Barrett did not consider 
the factors specified in the Act.— 
FN2. The sole rationale for striking 
restitution apparent from the hearing 
record is that the Office of Recovery 
Services could pursue Taylor in a 
civil proceeding, which is not a 
statutory factor. The court's 
assumption is questionable under the 
Act. The Act provides that the 
amount of complete restitution "shall 
be entered" on the civil docket and is 
enforceable as a civil judgment. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-401 (2003). 
Because the court did not determine 
complete restitution, it is unclear 
whether there is an amount that 
could be pursued civilly after the 
close of the criminal case. 
Judge Barrett did not determine complete 
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restitution, nor court-ordered restitution, and 
did not make findings on the record. As a 
result, he has "failed to perform an act 
required by law." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65Bfd)(2)(B). Accordingly, relief is granted, 
and Judge Barrett must consider the 
statutorily required factors, and make the 
required determinations of complete and 
court-ordered restitution amounts, with the 
supporting reasons on the record, in the 
matter of State v. Taylor. Because relief is 
granted under rule 65B(d)(2)(B\ and Judge 
Barrett is required to make the required 
determinations and findings, we decline to 
address abuse of discretion under rule 
65B(d)(2)(A). 
UtahApp.,2004. 
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